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
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


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GEORGE CANNING.

From the portrait by Sir Thomas Lawrence in the National
Portrait Gallery.

Frontispiece.]

PATRIOTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY

E. F. MALCOLM-SMITH, M.A., PH.D.

FELLOW OF NEWNHAM COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

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TO
THE MEMORY OF MY GRANDMOTHER
ELIZABETH SIMS
WHO TAUGHT ME TO READ, AND TO
MY MOTHER,
WHO FIRST TAUGHT ME TO LOVE HISTORY

A correct understanding of and attitude towards the past is the *sine qua non* of any attempt to remedy the present and re-establish the future on the firm foundation of justice and peace.

From *Bismarck, Andrassy and their Successors*,
by Count Julius Andrassy.

PREFACE

THE object of this book is to supply a need, which the Author, from personal experience of the teaching of European history in schools, felt to be a very real one. It is intended to supplement a text-book of European history by sketches of personalities who influenced the course of events during the nineteenth century, but who were in the main of secondary importance, and whose lives therefore are not easy of access except in a school possessing a very exceptional library. Hence Roon appears rather than Bismarck to illustrate the history of German unity, and Thiers rather than Napoleon III. Where statesmen of the first rank have been included the same reason holds good in the main. For example, the standard life of Count Andrassy consists of three volumes in German, which have never been translated. On the other hand, Garibaldi is omitted from the makers of Italy because his life is obtainable in the three inspiring volumes of Prof. G. M. Trevelyan, which have been issued in a popular edition and are therefore within the reach of all schools, however hampered they may be financially. Perhaps the Author's interest in the Balkans has been allowed to colour her choice to a certain extent. It accounts for the inclusion of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of Jelačić the Croat, and of the Balkan rulers.

The Author has to acknowledge the valuable help given by Miss G. Greenstreet, Mr. I. F. D. Morrow, and Mr. W. A. Nicholson in the correction of proofs.

No claim is made that the lives are in any way original, but wherever possible the latest authorities have been consulted, and a short bibliography has been appended to each life. The object of the book will have been attained if here and there the generation in whose hands lies the future, may be stimulated to read for themselves about the great men of the nations, and to think for themselves about the problems, not only of their own, but of foreign countries as well, for surely the French are right when they say that to understand everything is to forgive everything.

E. F. MALCOLM-SMITH.

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PATRIOTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

GEORGE CANNING

“His union of wit, generosity, and eloquence impressed me with a sense of superiority beyond any other man that I have ever seen.”—
LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

It is perhaps fitting to begin a study of the lives of some of the men who affected the destinies of Europe during the last century by considering the life of George Canning, who directed the foreign policy of Great Britain during the 'twenties, and who, though “an Irishman born in London,” was one of the greatest foreign ministers England has ever seen. His doctrine of non-intervention except on occasions when the peace of Europe was in danger set out the lines on which British foreign policy has travelled ever since, while the doctrine of nationality, of which Canning was the apostle, grew in importance throughout the century, being one of the main causes of the Great War and one of the chief principles underlying the peace treaties which followed it. Canning's motto was, “Every nation for itself and God for us all,” and this was the principle championed by Great Britain under his leadership. “Thus by promoting peace, goodwill,

and national independence she won over popular governments, she ranged the peoples on her side against their absolutist governments, she enlisted the smaller nations struggling for their rights in Europe and the nations struggling to birth in America, against the Holy Alliance. Canning meant to make England the arbiter of the world, but it was by peaceful means and for no greedy and selfish objects of aggrandisement. . . . England herself was to legislate for the world, but she demanded only for this service its respect and admiration.”¹

George Canning was born in London in 1770. His father was a poor barrister, a typical improvident Irishman, who had quarrelled with his father, Stratford Canning of Garvagh, because he had fallen in love with a lady of whom his father did not approve. The father therefore broke the entail on the estate and cut off his son with £150 a year. In 1768 he married a beautiful and penniless girl of eighteen and died a year after his son George was born. The child's grandfather then cut off his son's allowance, and Mrs. Canning in order to support herself and her son went on the stage. Many scandals were spread about her, but the best proof of her true worth was the devotion she inspired in her son. The life of a strolling player in the company of a man as dissolute as was Mrs. Canning's second husband was a bad upbringing for the boy, from which he was rescued by the kindness of Moody, the actor, who approached his relatives with the object of interesting them in George Canning's education. An uncle took charge of the boy and his grandfather settled £200 a year upon him. At his uncle's house he met Sheridan and

¹ H. W. V. Temperley, *George Canning*, pp. 172-3.

Fox, and the latter persuaded Stratford Canning to send his nephew to Eton. There he became a finished classical scholar, while his oratory won him a distinguished position in the Debating Society, and his literary talents made him one of the chief contributors to the *Microcosm*, a journal published by a group of Etonians. After winning more classical honours at Oxford, he went to London to be called to the Bar, but politics proved a superior attraction. In Sheridan's company he frequented Devonshire House and Carlton House, the strongholds of the Whigs, the party which he had supported at Oxford. Nevertheless, it was as a supporter of Pitt that he entered the House of Commons. The independence of character shown in this change from the Whig to the Tory party is typical of his whole life. "I should no more think of conforming to that of which I did not approve, because of the authority by which it was supported, than I should think of calling black white or white black in contradiction to my senses and in compliance to the fancy of another. . . . So long as God continues to me the power of comparing, selecting, and judging between facts and opinions, it shall be my earnest endeavour to do so with as little prejudice and partiality as possible, and that whatever faults and errors I may commit, I will at least have the satisfaction of charging them upon my own responsibility."

In 1793 Canning entered Parliament, and even in a House, which included the great Whig orators, Burke, Fox, and Sheridan, he soon established a great reputation. Until 1791 he had, in common with most moderate men, sympathised with the French Revolution, and as long as possible preached the doctrine of non-intervention, the doctrine afterwards peculiarly associated with his name.

But when the revolution became a militant power for the overthrow of existing institutions, England was driven to fight against France. Canning was the chief instigator of the *Anti-Jacobin*, the first number of which appeared on November 20, 1797, a satirical paper which not only attacked French principles but also the Whigs, as supporters of revolutionary doctrine. The number of his enemies increased daily, for the Whigs had never forgiven his so-called defection from their ranks, and as Wilberforce said, "His lash would have fetched the hide off a rhinoceros."

In 1796 Canning became Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, an office which gave him his first knowledge of administrative detail, and in which he had to steer a very difficult course between Pitt and his immediate chief, Grenville, who were filled with mutual mistrust and who worked secretly against each other. Between 1796 and 1801 he was the chief confidant of Pitt, and as such exercised more influence than most Cabinet Ministers, although he only held minor posts, being debarred from high office by the difficulties which then existed for a poor man to attain high rank. In 1801 Pitt resigned on the question of Catholic Emancipation, and Canning resigned as well out of personal regard for his chief. He spent the years of the Addington Ministry in trying to drive the "Doctor," as he was called from the fact that his father had been Chatham's physician, from office. His merciless attacks damaged Canning as much as they did his victim, so that when he became Foreign Minister in 1807 in Portland's Ministry, Sidney Smith wrote: "We shall see if a nation is to be saved by schoolboy jokes and doggerel rhymes, by affronting petulance and by the tones and gestures of Mr. Pitt. When he

[Canning] is jocular he is strong, when he is serious he is like Samson in a wig." This was the general opinion held in 1807 of the man who was to prove the ablest successor of Pitt.

The great statesman had died in 1806. At the inauguration of the Pitt Club in 1802 it was Canning who wrote the verses which gave Pitt the title of the Pilot who weathered the Storm; and his speech in Parliament on February 3, 1806, was a fitting tribute to the leader whose political pupil and personal friend he had been.

From 1807 to 1809 Canning directed the policy of England against Napoleon. His first action was the despatch of a British fleet to Copenhagen in order to gain possession of the Danish fleet before Napoleon could secure it. He had received secret information that the Treaty of Tilsit, signed between the Tsar and Napoleon in July, 1807, contained a secret provision, which ran: "If England did not mitigate the severity of her Orders in Council, and restore to France her maritime conquests since 1805 by December 1st, the two Emperors agreed to summon the three Courts of Lisbon, Copenhagen, and Stockholm to close their ports to the English and declare war against her, that one of the three Courts refusing shall be treated as an enemy." The possession of the Danish fleet would have gone far to compensate Napoleon for his losses at Trafalgar, but thanks to Canning's high-handed action England secured it instead. Naturally he was attacked for what seemed a flagrant breach of international law, but his masterly defence in the House of Commons silenced his accusers, although he could not disclose the source whence he had gained his information about the secret terms of the Treaty of Tilsit.

Napoleon used the seizure of the Danish fleet as a pretext for attacking Portugal. The Regent refused to submit to Napoleon's demands, and on October 22 a treaty of mutual alliance and defence was signed between England and Portugal. The Portuguese Royal Family took refuge in Brazil, and Portugal was overrun by a French army. But Napoleon was powerless at sea, and his invasion of Spain caused the States of South and Central America to become his enemies, so that they opened their ports to British commerce and the Continental System broke down.

It was Canning's foresight which recognised that the Peninsula was Napoleon's vulnerable point. He therefore determined to make Portugal the base of operations and the Spanish people his allies. It was his persistence which sent out the armies of Sir John Moore and Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, and which after Sir John Moore's death insisted that Wellesley should have supreme command in Portugal. His chief obstacle was his colleague, Lord Castlereagh, the Minister for War. Canning suggested to Lord Portland that Castlereagh should be given another office, not on the ground of incompetence but of incompatibility of policy. When six months had passed and the promised change had not been carried out, Canning resigned. At this point Castlereagh heard of the negotiations, but was misinformed as to their true content. He believed that Canning had demanded his dismissal on the ground of incompetence and yet had remained his colleague for six months, allowing him a free hand in matters like the Walcheren expedition. He challenged Canning to a duel and Canning accepted the challenge. The scandal was great and Canning gained an undesirable reputation

as an intriguer, from which the death of the Duke of Portland almost immediately after made it impossible for him to clear himself. Though England was thus deprived of the services of her ablest man at this critical juncture, it was Canning who had pledged Great Britain to the Spanish struggle, and it was that struggle which was one of the decisive factors in bringing about Napoleon's downfall. "True it was," he said, referring to this time, "that clouds and darkness occasionally gathered on the horizon; but even through those clouds and through that darkness I saw, or fondly fancied I saw, a ray of light which promised to pierce the gloom, and which might hereafter lighten the nations." He was indeed one in whom, "when she had died out among all other men, Hope still shone as a pillar of fire."¹

Between 1810 and 1822 misfortune dogged the career of Canning. Several times he almost reached the premiership, but it always eluded him, chiefly as the result of his own imprudence and hastiness. Even his talents were turned into weapons against him. The brilliance of his eloquence was regarded as a sign of emptiness and superficiality, and his powers of ridicule made many enemies. Some regarded him as an adventurer on account of the lowliness of his birth, while he himself believed that if he held aloof, like his master Pitt, he would be courted on all sides. The one bright spot in these years was his connection with Liverpool, whose member he was, a connection which taught him much of the commercial and democratic needs of the time. His only tenure of office was as Secretary of State for India, in which his success was as great as later at the

¹ H. W. V. Temperley, *op. cit.* p. 91.

Foreign Office, thanks to the knowledge he had gained through the Marquis Wellesley, his life-long friend. Under his direction the Mahratta States and the kingdoms of Rajputana came under the government or protection of Great Britain. He developed the internal resources of the country, and improved commercial relations between England and India. He also began the practice of appointing distinguished members of the Company to high administrative posts instead of filling them with officials sent out from England, and Munro and Elphinstone both owed him their appointments. He resigned in June, 1820, rather than take action with the Government against Queen Caroline, who had been the friend and patron of Canning and his wife in happier days. In 1822 he was about to go to the East as Governor-General of India, when Castlereagh committed suicide. Wellington and Liverpool persuaded the King that Canning ought to succeed him, and he accordingly became once more Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Canning found Europe a prey to reaction and repression. Unfortunately for the world it was Castlereagh, "who could hardly frame an intelligible sentence,"¹ not Canning, who had represented Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna. The Powers took large territories without any regard for the wishes of the inhabitants, with the sole object of making themselves secure against France, and nobody paid any heed to the Power to whom more than to any other the downfall of Napoleon had been due. An alliance was formed in order to keep down Jacobinism in France, but in 1818 at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which withdrew the allied garrisons

¹ H. W. V. Temperley, *op. cit.* p. 127.

from France and admitted her into the Concert of Europe, this alliance was changed into the Holy Alliance.

Metternich, who believed that the ideas and aspirations of the revolution could be ignored as if they had never been, tried to draw the Governments of Europe into the precursor of the League of Nations. This Concert of Europe was to prove to the forces of revolution that resistance was useless, and a Congress of Great Powers was to regulate the affairs of Europe in the interests of all. The interests of all degenerated into the interests of despotism, and Canning prevented Castlereagh from having anything to do with it by arguments which showed amazing insight. He maintained at a Cabinet meeting that it would involve England in Continental politics, whereas her true policy was only to interfere in great emergencies and then with commanding force; that it was an attempt to subjugate the smaller states by the Great Powers, and finally "that the people of this country may be taught to look with great jealousy for their liberties, if our Court is engaged in meetings with great despotic monarchs, deliberating upon what degree of revolutionary spirit may endanger the public security and therefore require the interference of the Alliance." The result was that England preserved her liberty of action and was not bound by the system of Congresses. A State Paper of May 5, 1820, is the foundation of all subsequent British policy. It is unknown whether Canning had anything to do with drawing it up, but it embodies the arguments he had used at the Cabinet Meeting. Castlereagh, at all events, adopted Canning's views, so that when Canning went to the Foreign Office his own policy had already been adopted. On March 20,

1821, Canning defined his position in a speech to the House of Commons.

Let us rather maintain a perfect neutrality; where obligations exist discharging them with strictness and rigorous impartiality, but cautious to contract new ones which it may be neither our duty nor our interest nor within the scope of our ability to discharge. He knew that it might be a task of difficulty to maintain this perfect equilibrium; the course we had to pursue was on a plank which lay across a roaring stream; attempts might be made to bear us down on the one side or the other. Our duty, however, and our interests equally prescribed to us to persevere in an undeviating path, to preserve our resources entire, until the period should arrive, if ever, when we might exercise our only legitimate right to interfere, from being called on to quell the raging feuds that threatened to distract the peace of Europe.¹

Under him, therefore, England pursued a policy of enlightened arbitration in continental affairs, very different from the isolation which had reduced her policy to impotence, so that the revolts of 1820 were crushed throughout Europe, with the exception of the revolt of Greece, without her protests being heeded.

Canning defined the position of England in his instructions to the Duke of Wellington on proceeding in 1822 to the Conference of Verona as one of "neutrality but not of indifference." Four other subjects were discussed at Verona besides Italy. They were the slave trade, and the three great spheres of foreign politics in the handling of which rests Canning's chief title to fame—the question of Spain, the question of the revolted Spanish colonies in the New World and the question of Greece.

¹ Hansard, *Parliamentary Papers*. March 20, 1821.

The condition of Spain was a deplorable one. Its King Ferdinand VII, in the words of his own subjects, had "the heart of a tiger and the head of a mule." A revolt against him in March, 1820, forced him to grant a liberal constitution. Russia proposed armed intervention, and France massed a cordon of troops along the frontier, on the pretext that yellow fever had broken out and it was necessary to prevent the spread of it to France. Canning instructed Wellington in the following words: "If there should be a determined project by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are His Majesty's Government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference, so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, and so utterly impracticable in execution that . . . I am to instruct Your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare that to any such interference, come what may, His Majesty will never be a party." Hence when Alexander had been dissuaded from active interference by the unwillingness of France to allow the passage of his troops, and had therefore agreed with the other members of the Alliance to allow France to intervene instead and to support her if necessary by the withdrawal of their Ambassadors, the Congress was met with the point blank refusal of Great Britain, and this refusal was the death blow to the whole system of Congresses.

Canning then departed from his policy of non-intervention so far as to offer England's mediation between France and Spain in order to prevent a French invasion of the Peninsula. The Spaniards would have accepted his mediation, but France, thirsting for military glory, refused his offer and invaded Spain. Ferdinand was restored and instituted such a savage war of reprisals

that even the Ambassadors of the Holy Alliance protested. Canning threatened France with war, if she touched Portugal, and this was no empty threat in his hands. "A menace which is not intended to be executed is an engine which Great Britain should never condescend to employ," he said. In spite of Canning France had been successful in Spain, since he had failed to prevent the invasion. He therefore determined to curtail the benefit which she might otherwise derive from it. "If France occupied Spain, was it necessary in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation—that we should blockade Cadiz? No! I looked another way. I sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain 'with the Indies.' I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." So ran Canning's most famous speech on December 12, 1806.

The revolt of the Spanish colonies had begun in 1813, and the cruelties which accompanied the attempts of the mother country to crush them only strengthened their desire for independence. Under Bolivar the Liberator, Peru, Columbia, Venezuela, and Bolivia won their freedom, and Brazil revolted against Portugal. Of even greater significance was the breaking down of the commercial barriers, which Spain had erected between the colonies and the outside world, during the Napoleonic Wars. England poured her commerce into South America and developed her resources, while English volunteers formed the backbone of Bolivar's armies. After the Congress of Vienna the Tsar, whose possession of Alaska made Russia an American Power,

had urged the armed interference of Europe in order to bring them again under the Spanish yoke. Castlereagh, on the other hand, had repeatedly offered England's mediation between Spain and the Colonies, but in vain. At the Congress of Verona Canning declared that he would not recognise the independence of any colony in which the conflict was still being waged, but that if Spain could not re-establish her authority, other States would be obliged to recognise the independence of the Colonies.

The first enemy of the New World was Russia, who claimed not only Alaska, but much of what is now Canada and the United States, and by a Ukase of 1821 the Tsar declared that all ships going within a hundred Italian miles of the shore would be confiscated. This claim to trade and territory brought him into sharp conflict with the United States as well as with Great Britain. But the danger from France was more real, because it was more within the province of practical politics. France was prepared not only to restore Ferdinand to the throne, but to restore to him his American colonies as well. In 1823 Canning informed France that any attempt to restore the Spanish dominions to Spain or to establish French authority in the American Provinces would be followed by war with Great Britain. France surrendered the claim, and the point was established that while Great Britain disclaimed any desire to acquire the colonies herself, she would fight any other European Power who attempted to do so. Canning had sought to induce the United States to join him in a declaration on the subject of the Spanish colonies. The result was the statement of the famous Monroe Doctrine, due more to Monroe's Secretary of State, Adams, than to the President

himself. It asserted that the American continents were not to be considered as future subjects for colonisation, in other words, it laid down the principle of the non-intervention of European Powers in America, and demanded the recognition of the United States as the leading power in the two Americas. There was little in this original declaration to warrant its expansion into the policy of later years, still known as the Monroe Doctrine. On the last day of 1824 Canning, convinced that Spain was incapable of retaining her colonies, formally recognised their independence. The new States maintained their connection with Europe and therefore were separated from an exclusive alliance with the United States, while France was deprived of an excuse for the continued occupation of Spain and withdrew her troops.

In 1821 the struggle for Greek independence had begun. Turkey suspected that Russian intrigues were at the bottom of the revolt, and by a series of insulting despatches goaded the Tsar into withdrawing his Ambassador from Constantinople. Metternich, however, kept the Tsar true to Legitimist principles and war was averted for the time. Canning refused to intervene on behalf of the Greeks in spite of the sympathy which was felt for their cause, except to demand an amnesty and a promise of good government from the Turks. Lord Strangford, the British Ambassador, tried to reconcile Turkey and Russia, but the Sultan insisted on continuing his insults to the Tsar by placing restrictions on Russian trade, in spite of warnings as to the danger of such a course. The Greek insurrection was successful in the main until the Sultan called in the help of Mehemet Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, at which point

Canning had gone so far as to recognise the Greeks as belligerents instead of rebels, but he still refused to recognise the independence of Greece until the Greeks had established a stable government.

On January 12, 1824, the Tsar suggested that the Powers should meet in Congress in order to force the Porte to accept a scheme, which turned Greece into three autonomous Principalities under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but over which he hoped to enjoy the same kind of protectorate as he exercised in Moldavia and Wallachia. Canning refused to agree, since both the Porte and the Greeks protested against the scheme. Stratford Canning was sent on a special mission to Russia, and undoubtedly did much to soothe the wounded feelings of the Tsar and his Chancellor. From St. Petersburg he went as Ambassador to Turkey with instructions to urge a speedy settlement of the Greek question and to warn the Porte that Greece would never consent to be reduced to its old position in Turkey. If the Sultan was amenable to his advice, he was to promise that Great Britain would do all in her power to prevent Russia from going to war. The Sultan, however, denied the right of any outside power to interfere in the internal concerns of the Ottoman Empire, and declined to consider any scheme of pacification from any source. Meanwhile the horrors of the Egyptian conquest of the Morea showed that Ibrahim meant to depopulate the land he had conquered and recolonise it with Mohammedans. Canning thereupon acted on behalf of the Greeks, and induced the new Tsar, who was weary of Metternich's shifty policy, to accept English mediation on the lines of Greek autonomy and freedom to regulate its own trade, while remaining under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

This understanding marks the end of the Holy Alliance. In September, 1826, Canning won over the French, and a French fleet agreed to join the British in a demonstration to Turkey that force would be used if the Sultan refused to listen to reason. The result was the Battle of Navarino, while in July, 1827, Great Britain, France, and Russia signed a treaty pledging themselves to carry out the terms of the previous agreement between Great Britain and Russia. It was at this juncture that Canning died at the early age of fifty-seven, but the independence of Greece had been secured.

The effect of his death was extraordinary. "It may be doubted whether the death of any English statesman ever awakened such ecstasies of joy or intensities of sorrow among the courts and peoples of Europe,"¹ while a contemporary once said that he could apply no better compliment to England than to call it "the land of Canning." He was buried in Westminster Abbey at the foot of Pitt's grave, surely the place of all others where he would have wished to lie. His biographer sums up his achievements in the words: "We see Portugal owing to him her security, Greece and the South American Republics their existence, Europe its peace and tranquillity. Above all the world's chief debt to him is that it was owing to his influence that the Holy Alliance was dissolved and Liberalism introduced into European diplomacy. The doctrine of nationality . . . was first advanced and asserted by Canning. . . . If England does not enshrine and hallow the name of Canning it will be a sign that it is not well with her. For of all her foreign ministers none have loved her more passionately, and none have left a name

¹ H. W. V. Temperley, *op. cit.* p. 238.

more instinct with the memories of freedom or of light, or more justly entitled to the gratitude not only of England but of mankind.”¹

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¹ H. W. V. Temperley, *op. cit.* p. 280.

STRATFORD CANNING, VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

“No one could enter into his presence, either as he sat on what may truly be called his throne at Constantinople or during the long years of his dignified retirement without feeling that they had seen a king of men. No one could hear the name of Stratford Canning named throughout the Far East without feeling that, so long as he retained his post, the honour of England was safe in his incorruptible integrity, in his magnificent liberality, in his unshaken firmness. No one could hear his influence spoken of by Christian or Musulman, Protestant or Catholic, Greek or Turk without feeling that each man knew that he was a terror to evil-doers which none could confront with impunity, a refuge for the desolate and oppressed which none could seek in vain.”—SERMON OF DEAN STANLEY.

THE life of Stratford Canning is one of the splendid failures of history. The greater part of his official career was spent at Constantinople, where his influence over the Sultan and his Ministers won for him the title of Padishah of the Padishah, Sultan of the Sultan. In that capacity he was the life-long rival of Tsar Nicholas, the Autocrat of all the Russias. Against Nicholas he was indeed successful, but he failed with regard to Turkey because he attempted the impossible. Although the Turks themselves held the opinion that “if what he directed was inconsistent with the nature of things, then possibly the nature of things would be changed by the decree of Heaven,”¹ history was to show that no man can so alter nature. In order to understand the

¹ Kinglake, *History of the Crimea*, Vol. I, p. 120.




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STRATFORD CANNING, VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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life of Stratford Canning certain aspects of Turkish rule must be considered. The Government was rotten to the core. The one man who might have saved Turkey was the Sultan Mahmud II, whose name is associated with the suppression of the Janissaries. These troops, originally recruited by the tribute of children levied on the Christian populations within the Empire, had degenerated into a hereditary military caste, which controlled the Government and set up and pulled down Sultans at its pleasure. Until their power had been broken there was no chance for the establishment of a strong central government, and nothing else could save the country from internal corruption and foreign encroachment.

The reforms of Mahmud were checked by his ill success in the Greek War of Independence and against his rebellious subject, Mehemet Ali, but nevertheless the Turks made great progress under his rule. The change that had taken place was so apparent to Stratford Canning, when he returned to Constantinople in 1832, that he became convinced that only two courses were open—either to abandon the Turkish Empire to its fate, or to continue the reforms of Mahmud and transform it into a European State. From 1842 to 1858 he used all the power which he had won during his former residences at the Porte to this one end—to make the continuance of the Turkish Empire possible by making it European. The chief obstacle to his purpose was the division inherent in Mohammedanism between the Followers of the Prophet and the Unbelievers. The Turks, although in the minority, exercised a merciless despotism over the Christian populations. A “Rayah,” as such a Christian was called, had no rights against a

Mohammedan. He was unable to bear arms in his own defence, he could obtain no redress in a court of law, since Christian evidence was not admitted, so that his life, his property, his wife, and his children were at the mercy of the ruling caste. In addition he bore the whole burden of taxation in the form of the "haratch" or tribute. The British Ambassador sought nothing less than the legal equality of Christian and Mohammedan, and he demanded equal political rights for the Turks and for the despised Rayahs. Hence Stratford Canning's claim to greatness is based on the fact that all his power was directed to a purely selfless end, so that at last even the Sultan's ministers admitted that what he spoke was the truth and that what he advised was for their own good.

Stratford Canning, a cousin of George Canning, was born in London in 1786. His father died when he was six months old and his upbringing was therefore left to his mother, a remarkable woman, who carried on her husband's banking business after his death. He was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge. In speaking of his boyhood he recalled especially that as a schoolboy he had heard William Pitt and Fox speak in the House of Commons, had been frequently to Windsor while George III was king, and had seen Nelson on the occasion of a visit which the hero of the Nile paid to Eton. His terms at Cambridge were constantly interrupted by diplomatic appointments, the third of which ended his undergraduate life. He was appointed secretary to Mr. Adair's Mission to Constantinople in 1808, the object of which was to end the war between England and Turkey, the ally of Napoleon. To the disgust of the French Ambassador peace was concluded by the Treaty of the Dardanelles on January 5, 1809,

whereupon he broke off diplomatic relations with the Porte.

The first impressions of the future reformer of Turkey are worth recording. "The government is radically bad," he wrote to his cousin, George Canning, on April 27, "and its members, who are all alive to its defects, have neither the wisdom nor the courage to reform it. The few who have the courage know not how to reconcile reformation with the prejudices of the people. And without this nothing can be effected. Destruction will not come upon this empire either from the north or from the south; it is rotten at the heart; the seat of corruption is the government itself." Later he was to write: "There is no such thing as government in Turkey. Every man according to his means and opportunities gets what he can, commands when he dares, and submits when he must." It is noteworthy that all Stratford Canning's ambitions were in the direction of a political life in his own country, and that six times he shook off the dust of Stambul from his feet with the firm intention never to return, and six times duty drove him back.

The renewed successes of Napoleon against Austria, culminating in the Peace of Schönbrunn in 1809, complicated the position of the British Mission, for once more Napoleon appeared to be invincible. Mr. Adair's plan against the Emperor was the formation of a triple alliance between England, Austria, and Turkey, to which Russia might eventually be added, but Austria's defeat at Wagram frustrated this plan and Mr. Adair gave up the struggle in despair. He left Constantinople in 1810, and Stratford Canning became Minister Plenipotentiary at the age of twenty-three. His position was a

strange one to our modern eyes. He was cut off from his Government, which left him entirely without instructions. Decisions on the gravest matters had to be made on his own responsibility and could never be referred to a higher authority. His lack of instructions was due to the weakness of the Government, who considered that the situation against Napoleon was hopeless, and they left Wellington in just the same plight in the Peninsula.

Fortunately for England in both cases the men in command were more fitted to conduct difficult and dangerous measures than was the Government, and both carried them to a triumphant conclusion. "To beard Napoleon in his dreams of universal empire was a task most men would think twice about. To withstand him alone, without a single adviser, and on one's own responsibility, must appear downright madness,"¹ but this is what Stratford Canning did. It was his business to put an end to the war which Russia was waging against Turkey, so that Russia might be detached from the French alliance. Although England and Russia were at war, he offered himself as the mediator between the Tsar and the Sultan, and the result of his endeavours was the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey on May 28, 1812. Russia, therefore, was able to concentrate her whole force against Napoleon when the invasion of Russia and the retreat from Moscow took place later in the year, and this was largely due to the genius of the young British diplomatist at Constantinople.

After this success Stratford Canning handed over his post to his successor and returned to England with the

¹ S. Lane Poole, *The Life of Stratford Canning*, Vol. I, pp. 127-8.

intention of making a political career for himself in his own country. In this aim he would probably have persisted if he had possessed private means. As this was not the case, he was obliged to accept a yearly allowance from the Foreign Office on the usual conditions, that he would accept the next diplomatic post offered him by the Government, and that he would not enter the House of Commons.

He was next sent on a mission to Switzerland. When the Congress of Vienna met, Lord Castlereagh summoned him to attend in order to watch over the interests of that country. There he met most of the great statesmen of the day, and saw the Duke of Wellington leave his first war conference with the sovereigns for the crowning victory of Waterloo, in which battle Stratford Canning lost a brother, one of Wellington's aides-de-camp. A still deeper personal grief belongs to his years at Berne. In 1816 he married Harriet Raikes, the daughter of a Governor of the Bank of England, but she died in the autumn of 1818. This loss made him all the more anxious to return to England, and in 1819 he gave up his post.

His next appointment was that of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, then a post considered more difficult than any other in the diplomatic service, and one which usually led to swift promotion. Its difficulties were not all diplomatic. It took six to eight weeks to cross the Atlantic in those days. It cost £300 when he returned alone, and when he went out he took with him two secretaries and eleven servants, all his furniture, a French cook, his cabriolet, a sort of one-horse carriage, and stores of all kinds, so that it took four days to put

the luggage on board. His object was to maintain peace during the difficult period of the revolt of the South American Colonies, and in this he was entirely successful.

In spite of his repugnance to it, Constantinople drew Stratford Canning back into her toils in 1825. Once more was he to be concerned in the relations of Russia and Turkey, this time over the question of the independence of Greece. Before proceeding to Turkey he was sent on a special mission to St. Petersburg to ascertain the views of the Tsar, and on his way thither took the opportunity to sound Prince Metternich as well. On his return his second marriage took place. His bride was a Miss Alexander, a lady less than half his age, who had fled from this masterful lover at first; but his persistence in love as in diplomacy was finally crowned with success. During his mission to Constantinople the Treaty of Adrianople was signed by which the independence of Greece was recognised.¹

From 1828 to 1842 Stratford Canning realised his darling ambition of taking part in English political life. He was the Member for Stockbridge until 1832, when, after a brief journey to Constantinople in 1831, he was appointed as Ambassador to St. Petersburg, his borough having been disfranchised by the Reform Bill. Contrary to precedent, the Tsar refused to receive him for no reason that was ever explained, but this constituted an insult both personal and national which he never forgave. After a short mission to Madrid he was again returned to Parliament in 1834 as Member for King's Lynn, a seat which he held until Lord Aberdeen offered him the Embassy at Constantinople. He

¹ See also *George Canning*, pp. 14-15.

held this last post with brief intervals from 1842 to 1858, and it was this term of office which gave him the title of the Padishah from the Turks and of the Great Elchi from his contemporaries—the Ambassador who was the unwearied supporter of the oppressed peoples of Turkey and the implacable rival of the Tsar and enemy of Russia.

It is difficult in so brief an account of his life to give an adequate picture of Stratford Canning as he appeared at this, the climax of his career. That his character was not without faults is, of course, inevitable. His impatience and hasty temper were notorious and made him an object of terror to his subordinates and to the Turks. It is said that one of his attachés stood in such awe of him that he never held converse with the Ambassador without keeping firm hold of the door handle, ready to escape. But when something had exasperated him and he had harried his servants and his staff, he was great enough to apologise for his impatience, and the best proof that in essentials he was a good master is the fact that his servants stayed with him year after year. His general tone and bearing gained for him a reputation of pride and vanity, but it was not himself but his office which he exalted. He regarded himself as the image of the Queen of England, the embodiment of his country, so that an insult offered to him was an insult to his sovereign. There was, however, the other side of the picture. “Canning the man, with his perfect grace, his manners of the old school of courtesy, his tone of *preux chevalier*, possessed a charm which was felt by all who were capable of appreciating so refined and exalted a nature.”¹ And his charm was enhanced by his

¹ S. Lane Poole, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 57-58.

personal appearance. A German wrote of him: "It is true that in all the lands that I have traversed I have never in my life encountered a countenance so noble and also so *spirituel* as his. . . . There stands the character of Sir Stratford Canning fully portrayed; the masculine energy, the courage, the majestic calm, the gravity, the unquenchable determination—and with all these an expression of benevolence, sweetness, and kindness."¹ One of his most striking characteristics was a capacity for bearing fatigue so great that his attachés were worn out long before their chief, even though they were young and he seventy years of age. In fact they complained that he worked them to death; but, on the other hand, they knew that he would support them even against the Foreign Office and shoulder the responsibility even of their mistakes.

Stratford Canning's work may be considered under two headings, the attempted reform of the Ottoman Empire and the diplomatic duel with Russia which ended in the Crimean War. In both these tasks he was given a free hand by his Government, so much so that he was allowed to draft his own instructions when he took up his duties at Constantinople. Therein it was stated that he was "to impart stability to the Sultan's government by promoting judicious and well-considered reforms," chiefly in the direction of the police administration, the position of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, internal trade and communications, and the collection of taxes. In external matters he was to use every effort to maintain peace, especially in the affairs of Egypt, Greece, and Persia.

On his arrival Stratford Canning found a desperate

¹ S. Lane Poole, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 59.

state of things. The government of Reshid Pasha, one of the most enlightened ministers Turkey ever produced, had been succeeded by the reactionary Ministry of Riza Pasha. The Charter of Gulhané, which Reshid had promulgated and which went far towards establishing the equality of Christian and Moslem, was therefore in abeyance. Canning's chief handle was the influence which he gained almost immediately over the young Sultan, Abdul Mejid, who had succeeded Mahmud in 1839. In 1845 he secured the downfall of Riza, and with him the chief obstacle to reform was removed.

His first success was the prevention of executions for apostasy from Mohammedanism to Christianity. According to his own memoirs he then slowly obtained the following reforms: the abolition of torture, the recognition of Protestants in addition to the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians, the abolition of oppressive taxes, and the enforcement of the Charter of Gulhané with the assistance of Reshid Pasha. His chief difficulty proved to be not the granting of reforms but their execution throughout the empire. A complete reorganisation of local government was necessary, and it was here that his work broke down. He would have left the control of the provinces in the hands of Turkish governors, but under them Turks and Christians were to work together. Similarly the army and the police force were to be open to Christian recruits. Much indeed Stratford Canning accomplished for Turkey, for he secured its continued existence for another span of years, but he was powerless against the internal corruption and Mohammedan fanaticism, which the central government was too weak to check. The

Turkish system remained in spite of his efforts—a by-word for misgovernment.

Stratford Canning's first skirmishes with Russia were over the Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities¹ in 1848 and over the question of the Hungarian Refugees. From 1848 to 1854 he found himself in acute antagonism to the policy of the Tsar. His chief weapon against the Tsar was the control which he exercised over the Sultan's government so long as Reshid Pasha was the Grand Vizir and Ali Pasha the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The occupation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russians and the Turks was the result of slight disturbances which had occurred in the spring of the year of revolutions; but, whereas the Sultan was in favour of moderation and reform, the Tsar urged nothing but repression. For a long time the Porte refused to agree to any of the schemes put forward by Russia. The Tsar rightly ascribed their unusual stubbornness to the influence of one man, and his personal dread of the British Ambassador dates from that time. In 1849, when Russia was all-powerful, Nicholas proposed the signature of a Convention, which would have given Russia the sole right of interference in the internal affairs of the Principalities. Canning defeated the Convention, but was powerless to hinder the signature of an Act which, though less binding than a Convention, gave Russia most of her demands.

The Tsar had won the first round, but Canning won the second. He insisted that the Sultan should turn a deaf ear to all the demands of Austria and Russia for the surrender of the Hungarians and Poles, who had taken refuge in Turkey after the War of Hungarian

¹ Wallachia and Moldavia, later to become the kingdom of Rumania.

Independence had been crushed. At first Canning acted on his own responsibility, but Palmerston backed him as soon as he knew the circumstances. His instructions were brought by Colonel Townley, who rode the 820 miles from Belgrade to Constantinople in the record time of five days, eleven hours. They authorised him to call up the fleet to the Dardanelles, and promised British support at Vienna and St. Petersburg. The result was a victory for the Sultan and his allies, France and Great Britain, for Austria and Russia resumed the diplomatic relations which they had broken off when Turkey first refused to give up the refugees, and the refugees themselves were saved.

The third round was the Crimean War. In 1852 Canning went home, "perhaps never to return," as he himself said and hoped. The diplomatic horizon was unclouded save for a dispute between France and Russia over the guardianship of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, and even this seemed in a fair way to be settled. He had hoped to have been given the Foreign Office in the Derby administration of 1852; in fact, Lord Derby had made him some kind of promise to that effect in 1851. Instead, either because his colleagues feared his imperious will in office or because it was thought that his appointment would give grave offence to Austria and Russia, he was raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. He was also passed over when the Paris Embassy became vacant, and in disgust resigned his post in January, 1853. But when the storm which resulted in the Crimean War broke over the Porte, Lord Stratford returned once more to Constantinople.

In this last act of the great Ambassador's life in the Anglo-Russian rivalry over the Eastern Question, it is

of importance to discover what were the real intentions of Nicholas I with regard to Turkey. It is difficult for this generation to realise how Russia was regarded in the nineteenth century. The Empire of the Tsars was looked upon with a fear almost superstitious in its quality, an awe due in part to her immensity and in part to her mystery. There was something terrifying in her ice-bound winters, when nothing stirred in the vast forests and boundless steppes and no sound broke the stillness save the long-drawn howl of a wolf. Moreover, fear of her might was only equalled by fear of her ambition in regard to the Near East. The question of the guardianship of the Holy Places had been dragging on ever since 1842. It developed gradually from "an affair of monks" into one in which the Sultan's rights over his Christian subjects were at stake, thanks to the obstinacy of France, for whom Napoleon III was anxious to secure something of the prestige of the First Empire. The Tsar finally sent Prince Menchikov on a special mission to Constantinople early in 1853. His avowed object was to secure the rights of the Orthodox Christians in the Holy Land, but he was also secretly to demand a protectorate over all the Orthodox Christians in Turkey. It is doubtful if the Tsar's object was anything more than a protectorate, for he had problems enough to deal with in his own vast empire, without adding to it the European provinces of Turkey by direct annexation. On the other hand, he talked openly of the approaching dissolution of Turkey and suggested a division of the "Sick Man's" inheritance. But so long as Turkey existed he probably would have preferred to be "the *de facto* suzerain of the Sultan rather than the possessor of his dominions."¹

¹ See *State Papers* on the Eastern Question, Despatches of Sir Hamilton Seymour from St. Petersburg in 1853.

When Lord Stratford returned to his post, he found that Prince Menchikov had demanded a general protectorate, as well as a settlement of the question of the Holy Places, and that his demands were backed by a Russian army under marching orders on the Pruth and a fleet at Sebastopol ready to sail at a moment's notice. He found, too, that the British Chargé d'Affaires had sent for the British fleet from Malta, and that the French fleet had proceeded to Salamis in case the Russians attacked Constantinople. The Turks had definitely rejected the proposed protectorate, but were still negotiating about the Holy Places. With consummate skill Lord Stratford divided the two claims and settled the latter difficulty to the complete satisfaction of Russia, thereby forcing the Tsar to fight in a cause that put him in the wrong in the eyes of Europe. Menchikov thereupon broke off diplomatic relations with Turkey. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of Lord Stratford's activities throughout the negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities and the entry of France and Great Britain into the Crimean War. As was to be expected, when anything was wanted from the Turks it was he who persuaded them in the way they should go, so that, while the war lasted, his life was one of superhuman activity.

The Peace of Paris made Turkey safe from Russia. She was admitted into the European system and the Black Sea was neutralised, so that the danger of sudden attack by a powerful Russian fleet was prevented for the future. But it was the end of the reform of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan granted a Firman for the amelioration of the condition of the Christians in Turkey, but the Powers declined to enforce it and gave

up all their claims to interfere in the internal administration of his empire. Lord Stratford's warnings were unheeded, with the result that his opinion was justified. He had said again and again that unless the Powers were given the direct right of interference on behalf of the Christians, the privileges granted by the Sultan would not be worth the paper on which they were written. With the decline in Abdul Mejid's character due to his excesses, and the substitution of French for British influence at the Porte, he realised the hopelessness of his dreams for the reformation of the Turkish Empire. If his dreams had become reality the Eastern Question would have been solved without the bloodshed which its settlement later entailed. His despatches to Lord Clarendon written at this time are a pathetic testimony to the futility of his work in the Orient. They show that he was convinced of the hopelessness of "effecting any real reform in Turkey without a continued pressure from the Powers of Christendom," and prophesied that "the Powers of Christendom will find it sooner or later impossible to look with indifference on the continued weakness of the Ottoman authorities and their practical adherence to a system of corruption, injustice, oppression, and religious domination." He declared that the unchecked working of such elements was worse for the empire than Russian encroachments.¹

In 1858 Lord Stratford retired from diplomatic life, but he lived on until 1880. The last twenty years of his life were in many ways the happiest. He was a regular attendant at the debates in the House of Lords, and always spoke when great foreign questions came before

¹ Stratford to Clarendon. April 18 and June 1, 1856. Turkish Embassy Archives, Public Record Office.

the House. He also took an active share in public affairs connected with the East, such as the Euphrates route to India. His private life was spent first at his house in Grosvenor Square, and later at Frant, near Tunbridge Wells. There he reverted again to the writing of poetry, an art which he had never allowed pressure of work to crowd out entirely. He was, too, a great classical scholar. "A friend once found him busily engaged in turning a collection of nursery rhymes into Greek Iambics, and he confessed that 'Little Jack Horner' had nearly baffled him, from the pagan indifference of the Greeks to the merits of Christmas pie!"¹ His mind never lost its vigour to the very end of his long life. Sir Robert Morier, the son of one of his old friends, wrote thus of him, a fortnight before his death: "His intellect was as clear, his speech as incisive, his interest in poetry and politics as keen, as when I last saw him, three years ago. It was a beautiful English summer afternoon; a warm sun lit up his pale features, which fully retained their splendid outlines. . . . He seemed some grand old Titan majestically sinking to his rest in all his glory, as if he knew the Infinite was waiting to receive him with all due honour."² He died in August, 1880, at the age of ninety-four. Thus he lived to see yet another attempt to solve the Eastern Question by the united wisdom of Europe at the Congress of Berlin, but that settlement was not destined to be the final one, any more than that of 1856, which he had done so much to bring about.

¹ S. Lane Poole, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 460.

² Preface by A. P. Stanley to *The Eastern Question* by Lord Stratford, p. 14.

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THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 AND 1849 IN HUNGARY

IN order to understand the significance of the lives of Kossuth and Jelačić it is necessary to know something of the races which they represented within the Austrian Empire. Kossuth was a Hungarian or Magyar, Jelačić was a Croat. Originally Hungary and Croatia were separate kingdoms, and in the nineteenth century they still possessed separate constitutions, although they were both part of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Croats are Southern Slavs, but differ from their kinsmen, the Serbs, in that they belong to the Roman Catholic Church instead of to the Orthodox Communion, and write their language, a dialect of Slavonic, in the Latin instead of the Cyrillic script. The Hungarians speak Magyar, a language Eastern in character and akin to Turkish. Their object was to dominate and subjugate the non-Magyar races of Hungary, which included the Croatian, an ambition due to pride in their own nationality so intense that it does not recognise that there can be anything good which is not Hungarian. Adam is a Magyar name, they say, therefore the first man must have been a Magyar.

Closely akin to the Croats were the Serbs in Hungary and Austria and the Slovenes in Slovenia. One section of the Austro-Serbs lived in the Military Frontiers protecting the Austrian Empire against the Turks. Their

land was held under the old system of military tenure and they were governed directly from Vienna. The other section of the Serbs lived in the Banat and Bačka districts in Hungary. They were the descendants of 36,000 families who had migrated from the Turkish provinces in 1690 on the invitation of Leopold I. He had promised them extensive rights of self-government and freedom of religious observance, but their rights were soon infringed, thanks to Jesuit influence at court, so that the only ones left to them were religious freedom and the election of their own Patriarch.

LOUIS KOSSUTH ¹

"The Magyars outdistance most other races in the ardour, but also unhappily in the narrowness of their patriotism . . . loyalty to tradition, race and language is in the Magyar the most pure and exalted patriotism, in the Slav it is treason and infamy." ²

By a strange trick of fate four of the most famous names in Hungary belong by birth to the Slav races : Zrinski, who composed the first epic poem in Magyar, was a Croat, his nephew was Rakócsky, whose march has become the national anthem of Hungary ; Petöfi, the greatest of all the Hungarian poets, was a Slovak, and Lojos or Louis Kossuth, the patriot who hated everything that was not Magyar, was of pure Slovak parentage. As a child he used to spend his holidays with an uncle, who was a Slovak author, and on one occasion he fell into a deep and muddy ditch, in which he would have been drowned if his aunt had not happened to pass, and

¹ *ss* in Hungarian is pronounced *sh*, so Kossuth should be pronounced Koshút.

² R. W. Seton Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary*, p 58.

she pulled him out. Afterwards she used to exclaim, "If only I had left him where he fell!"

Kossuth was born in 1802. His father was Andreas Kossuth, a gentleman belonging to the untitled nobility, an advocate by profession, who had come from the village of Kosóty to settle in the Hungarian county of Zemplén. His son possessed the qualities of both his parents, for he had the feminine tenderness of his mother and the stern inflexibility of will and keen sense of justice which characterised his father. Andreas brought up his son to follow his own profession, and after young Louis had been through the college of Epérics he joined his father for a time. As a preliminary to entering public life all Hungarians were obliged to attend the High Court of Law at Pest, and thither also went Kossuth. After graduating as an advocate he returned to his father's practice and soon after took his seat as a "Nobilis" in the county meetings of Zemplén, where before long he gained a reputation for eloquence. He became the lawyer of the Countess Szápary, a great landowner in the neighbourhood, and so learnt the evils inherent in the position held by the nobles of Hungary with regard to the peasants, who were practically their serfs. His position in the county soon became such an outstanding one that he became the delegate for the Countess Szápary and some other magnates to the Diet at Pest. Although as a delegate he had no vote, he was able to learn the duties of a statesman and to meet the noted personalities of the day at a very critical period in the history of Hungary, which culminated in the Revolution of 1848 and the Hungarian War of Independence. The emperors of Austria wished to centralise the government of the whole empire at Vienna, but there was a serious



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LOUIS KOSSUTH.

obstacle in the way, the existence of old constitutions, of which the Hungarian was the most powerful. From the moment when a Hapsburg had been elected King of Hungary in the sixteenth century, a struggle began between the defenders of the Hungarian Constitution, who rightly regarded their country as an independent one, united to Austria by the personal tie of a common sovereign, and the Imperial Government, which used the Slav races against the Magyar in order to make Vienna the centre of the empire.

At the close of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 the Hungarian Constitution was in abeyance, and Hungary had sunk to the position of an Austrian province. The old ideals were, however, kept alive in the county assemblies, which in 1825 brought so much pressure to bear that the King¹ was obliged to summon a Parliament or Diet to meet at Pressburg.² Its leader was Count Stephen Széchenyi, the "greatest Magyar," who carried through a series of reforms, abolishing the exclusive privileges of the aristocracy. In this he was associated with Francis Déak, the leader of the liberals. But he was averse to a conflict with the dynasty and with Austria, because he did not think the country was strong enough to win such a contest. In this, and in his desire to spare the feelings of the non-Magyar races in Hungary, he differed from the most extreme of the liberals, in whose ranks was the brilliant young advocate, Kossuth. The era of reform lasted from 1825 to 1844. It was symbolic of this period that the use of Latin was banished from public life. When all the business of

¹ The Emperor of Austria in Hungary was always referred to as King of Hungary.

² Pressburg is the Austrian name of the town called Poczóny in Magyar, and now that it is in Czecho-Slovakia, Bratislava.

government was carried out in Latin the constitution belonged solely to the nobility. The substitution of the Magyar language made it a part of the people. Unfortunately this also brought it into conflict with the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary, and a persistent attempt was made to Magyarise them, first by persuasion and then by force. By 1844 Kossuth had become the leader of the extreme radical party in the Diet and in the country, and the two planks of his programme were the establishment of a democracy and complete national independence. Such a programme might easily pass the bounds of reform and develop into revolution, and this is what happened. It was Kossuth who threw Hungary into revolution.

As was to be expected the Austrian Government did not allow the reorganisation of Hungary to go unchallenged. It first waged war on writers and orators, and Kossuth was among those who were imprisoned for infringing the laws regulating the Press. He published secret reports of the debates of the Diet in order to educate public opinion, whereas all such publication was prohibited by Royal decree. In 1837 he was secretly arrested and kept in solitary confinement for two years without a trial. He was tried in 1839 and sentenced to four more years imprisonment in the fortress of Buda, but his punishment was made more bearable by the use of books, which were permitted, provided they were not of a political character. He chose Shakespeare as his companion, by which means he learnt English. In 1840 the Government needed recruits for the army, but the Diet, led by Déak, refused to vote them until all political prisoners had been released and pardoned, and the rights of freedom of speech and the liberty of the

Press had been granted. Kossuth was then released from prison, but the extreme views which he had adopted brought him into conflict with Széchenyi, because they were likely to lead to a struggle with Austria. By this time, however, Kossuth, by the matchless eloquence which made him able to sway the Diet and the people at will, had achieved greater popularity than his aristocratic rival.

At this point Metternich determined to undermine the strength of the Opposition by taking over the work of reform for the Government. Count George Appónyi was appointed Hungarian Chancellor with instructions to win over the majority in Parliament. He altered the constitution of the counties, by turning the head of each county into an official, who was the extraordinary Commissioner of the King. This change introduced a bureaucracy into Hungary, and all parties united against the "Appónyi Administrators," being further exasperated by Appónyi's attempts to rouse the Croats and Serbs against the Magyars. In 1847, therefore, the Opposition won a sweeping victory at the elections. Its object under the leadership of Kossuth was to establish a parliamentary system of government and to vindicate once and for all the claim of Hungary to be an independent kingdom. Kossuth had also gained overwhelming influence among the people. By his editorship of the *Pesti Hírlap*, the Pesth Gazette, he spread his views throughout the country, and so great was its fame that many of the illiterate peasants formed clubs for its purchase, where they used one of the better educated of their class to read it aloud to the members. Moreover his oratory exercised scarcely less influence upon them than his writings. "All who heard him

were at once won as if by magic with his powerful reasoning and divine eloquence ; he appeared to enchain his hearers and infuse into them his will and energy at pleasure."

The debate on the Appónyi administrators proceeded with a bitterness which grew from day to day. The nature of the struggle was thus defined by Kossuth in November, 1847 : " The War, Honourable States, is fought, not between the Government and the Opposition, and not between the political parties of Hungary ; it is fought between Autocratic Austria and the Constitutional Nation of Hungary." When news came of the February Revolution of 1848 in Paris, he rose for a last stand against the system of Metternich, his purpose being to establish responsible government in Hungary and constitutional government in Austria. His text was the new French Revolution. " A noisome mist envelops us," he cried, " from the crypt of the Vienna system blows a deathly wind, destroying our nerves and paralysing the flight of our souls. . . . The Dynasty must choose between its own welfare and the maintenance of a system of government covered with the rust of ages. A Dynasty, which is founded upon the freedom of the people will always excite enthusiasm, for a faithful heart can only belong to a free man. . . . It is my conviction that the future existence of the Dynasty is bound up with the brotherhood of the different peoples belonging to the empire, and this brotherhood between nationalities can only be cemented by constitutional forms of government, which will awaken the feeling of one family. Bureaucracies and bayonets are miserable ties. . . . He will be the second founder of the House of Hapsburg, who will reform the system of government

in a constitutional direction and found the throne of his august house on the liberty of his peoples." If Kossuth himself had only remained true to these principles of brotherhood in dealing with the other nationalities, the whole course of the revolution might have been very different.

Ten days later Metternich fell from power, and on March 17 a Hungarian deputation, which included Kossuth, gained the Emperor's consent to the March Laws, embodying the reforms passed by the Diet at Pressburg, whereby the Press and the peasants were freed, and taxation and military service made universal. They further provided for the establishment of an independent and responsible ministry in Hungary under the presidency of Count Louis Batthyány. These laws made Hungary independent of Austria, except that they both possessed the same sovereign, and hence a bloodless revolution had been accomplished. At this difficult juncture Batthyány and Déák wished to pursue a course which kept strictly within the bounds of legality, but they had been obliged to include Kossuth in the ministry, and he and the extremists soon gained the upper hand. As Déák said at the end of March, one could not reason with a drunken man, and the Diet was drunk. The Hungarian patriots were indeed filled by their success with an astonishing optimism. Kossuth told the British agent, Blackwell, that they would *never* consent to any concessions to Vienna; but Blackwell showed a truer estimate of the dangers ahead, for he said, "They must organise an army of a hundred thousand men without a moment's delay, or they are lost." Whether the Hungarian revolution could have succeeded, even if it had not taken a course which ruined its chances, is

doubtful. The central Government was bitterly jealous of the concessions which Hungary had obtained, and there is no doubt that as soon as its hands were freed in Italy and Bohemia and in Vienna itself, it would have tried to withdraw them. Day by day the party, headed by the War Minister, Latour, who wished for a centralised government at Vienna for the whole of the Austrian Empire, grew in strength.

The real reason for the failure of Batthyány's Ministry was not that like most coalitions it lacked unity of purpose, but that it pursued a suicidal policy with regard to the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary. During the last century Kossuth and his friends were regarded as martyrs suffering for their country's wrongs, and the reports which they spread about the Serbs, Croats, and Rumanians were widely accepted. For Kossuth as the defender of the liberties of his countrymen nothing but admiration can be felt, but there is also the picture of Kossuth, the typical Hungarian, who refused to allow other races to share in the privileges which he claimed for his own, and this bitter intolerance armed Serbs and Croats against him and ruined whatever chance of success the revolution may have had.

In 1840 a campaign had been started for the enforcement of the use of the Magyar language, not only in Hungary proper, but in the Slav lands as well. So intense was the conflict that the use of Slavonic was banned in the schools and even in the services of the Church, so that the Slavs had to worship in a language which they did not understand. The struggle was all the more bitter because during the 'thirties the work of Gaj and Vuk Karadžić had made of Slavonic a literary language, known as Illyrian, and had begun a Slav

literary revival, which strengthened a sense of nationality and kinship among the different branches of the Southern Slavs. In 1840 Déak rebuked Gaj in the Hungarian Diet for his work. His answer was a memorable one: "The Magyars are an island in the Slav ocean. I did not create the ocean nor excite its waves; see ye to it that they do not break over your heads and engulf you."¹ Later, in 1847, when the Croat delegates to the Diet of Pressburg protested against the enforcement of the Magyar tongue as an outrage to Croatian nationality, Kossuth retorted, "I know no Croatian nationality."

For a moment, when the revolution first broke out, it seemed from Kossuth's speech of March 3 that he had learnt the lesson of equal rights for all the nationalities, but this was only a dream. When the Serbs, who lived in a part of Pesth, petitioned for the use of their own language in their own affairs, the Ministry answered that the Hungarians would not endure that any other nationality save the Hungarian should exist in Hungary. Later, when a deputation came from the Serbs of Novisad (Neusatz), its leader told the Hungarian House that, while the Serbs did not want to be separated from Hungary, they desired protection for their national language and customs. Kossuth answered that the Magyars would do their best to respect national feeling, but insisted that only the Magyar language could bind the diverse nationalities together. Stratimirović, another member of the deputation, impulsively declared that, if that were so, the Serbs would look for recognition elsewhere. Kossuth's answer was, "In that case the sword must decide," which met with the retort, "The Serbs were

¹ R. W. Seton Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*, p. 30.

never afraid of that." A similar fate befell the demands of another Serb deputation from Karlovitz, and the result was a resort to arms, so that in July war, marked by hideous atrocities on both sides, broke out in Southern Hungary. The same intolerant attitude drove the Croats to join the Emperor against the Magyars, and their leader, Ban Jelačić, became the leader of the Austrian armies in Hungary.

At the beginning of July, when the first national Hungarian Diet met, it seemed as if the Emperor was prepared to defend Hungary against the attack of the nationalities, but Kossuth from the first suspected his good faith and believed that the Emperor's ministers were secretly encouraging the Serbs and the Croats. Accordingly, when the Emperor demanded more troops for the war in Italy, a grave difference of opinion divided Kossuth and Batthyány. Kossuth made an amazing speech in the Diet, though he was so weak with illness that he had to be supported by two deputies. As Minister of Finance he demanded a grant of 200,000 soldiers and the necessary funds for their equipment, and when the request had been granted, he ended with the words, "You have all risen to a man and I bow before the generosity of the nation, while I add one more request: let your energy equal your patriotism, and I venture to affirm that even the gates of hell shall not prevail against Hungary." He wished to keep these troops in Hungary for the defence of the country, but at length allowed himself to be overruled by Batthyány and they were sent to Italy. Kossuth again and again offered to resign, when his views came into conflict with those of his chief, but the Ministry could not have existed without him, so great was his ascendancy over

the people. His financial policy was a successful one. The country rallied round him so enthusiastically, the nobles sacrificing their silver plate, that when the Kossuth notes came into circulation, they had sufficient backing to prevent depreciation.

Kossuth was right in his distrust of the good faith of the Emperor's ministers. After the victories of Radetsky in Italy had freed Austria from its most pressing danger, the March laws were declared null and void at the end of August. A deputation was thereupon despatched on September 9 to lay the Hungarian demands before the Emperor, but it returned to Hungary, when it heard that Jelačić had been reinstated in all his dignities and offices,¹ for its leaders realised that Hungary had been duped. The same night that the deputies returned to Pesth, Jelačić crossed the Drave, the river between Croatia and Hungary, with his army, and Batthyány and his colleagues resigned. The Diet called upon Kossuth to lead Hungary. "He alone," they cried, "can save the country; let him be named Dictator." The words were taken up by the crowds outside the Parliament House, but more prudent measures prevailed for a time. Kossuth became head of a Provisional Government, pending the King's consent, and he at once proceeded to measures for the defence of Hungary, now threatened by the advance of the Croatian army. New levies were raised, called Honvéds—defenders of the country. The Archduke Stephen, the Palatine of Hungary, made a last attempt to settle the differences between the Croats and the Magyars and between Hungary and Austria, but the attempt was a failure and he resigned on September 15. Kossuth now roused the people to arm for their own

¹ See *Life of Jelačić*, p. 59.

defence. The concluding words of his proclamation ran: "He who has influence in a county, or even in a village, let him raise his banner; let no music be heard upon our boundless plain but the solemn strains of the Rakóczy March; let him collect 10, 50, 100, 1000 followers, as many as he can gather, and marshal them on the way to Vécziprim (where Jelačić was encamped). Between Vécziprim and Weissenberg the women shall dig a deep grave, in which we will bury our enemies, or the name, the honour, the nation of Hungary. And on this grave shall stand a monument inscribed with the record of our shame, 'So God punishes cowardice,' or we will plant on it the tree of liberty, eternally green, from out whose foliage shall be heard the voice of God, speaking as from the fiery bush to Moses, 'The spot on which thou standest is holy ground—thus do I reward the brave.' To the Magyars freedom, renown, well-being, happiness."

The next step of the Viennese Cabinet was to appoint Count Lamberg commander-in-chief of all the troops in Hungary, whether Croat or Magyar. He was murdered by a street mob in Budapest, because the people believed that he was attempting to garrison the fortress of Buda with Austrian troops. Although the Diet condemned the murder, Batthyány fled to Vienna, and Ferdinand thereupon declared that the Hungarian Diet was dissolved and Hungary in a state of siege, and he appointed Jelačić as his Vicegerent in Hungary. Jelačić was advancing on Budapest, when news reached him of the outbreak of another revolution in Vienna, and he therefore marched towards the capital in order to prevent a Hungarian army joining the insurgents. Kossuth sent an army to help the revolution in Vienna, but it

was defeated at the battle of Schwechat on October 20, and the next day Vienna fell. On December 2 the Emperor Ferdinand abdicated and his nephew, Francis Joseph, succeeded him, although he was not crowned King of Hungary until 1867. The struggle then resolved itself into one between the Hungarians, fighting as they said on behalf of King Ferdinand, to whose deposition they had not consented, and the rest of the empire. It was fought out mainly on Hungarian soil with a skill and patriotism on the part of the Hungarians, which called forth the admiration even of their enemies.

It was difficult for moderate men to consider the struggle a constitutional one any longer. All civil power was in the hands of Kossuth, and the course of events had placed the Emperor and the Magyars in direct opposition to each other. The effect of this was most noticeable in the case of the officers, many of whom felt that it was against their military oath to take up arms against Austria. Accordingly Kossuth made a clean sweep of the old generals. Görgei was appointed commander of the army of the Upper Danube, and Bem, a Pole, undertook to crush the rising in Transylvania, where the Rumanians had taken up arms against the Magyars. At first the Imperial troops were successful. Windischgrätz entered Budapest on January 5, 1849, so that Kossuth was obliged to move the seat of government to Debréczen. Kossuth also attempted to secure the help of England, and sent Batthyány, Déak, and three other prominent Hungarians to treat with Windischgrätz in the name of the Diet. The Prince refused "to treat with rebels," and placed the whole deputation under arrest, afterwards releasing all of them except Batthyány. On February 26-7 he won the battle of Kapolna, which

made the Austrians masters of the country up to the Theiss. But this marked the turning point of the struggle. The Hungarian levies gradually became a match for the Austrian troops in discipline and experience. Bem conducted a marvellous campaign in Transylvania, in which his deeds belong rather to the realm of fiction than of sober history. On one occasion, after he had been worsted in a battle, he saw some Austrians making off with a battery of his guns. He rode up to them, armed only with a whip, exclaiming, "These are my guns, you scoundrels. Leave them alone," and so cowed them that they ran away. By the end of April the other Hungarian generals, Pérczel and Görgei, had been so successful that the Hungarians were masters again of their own country, with the exception of three fortresses, Arad, Buda, and Temesvár.

Meanwhile the victory of Kapolna had been followed by a manifesto, annulling the ancient constitution of Hungary, and annexing the kingdom to the Austrian Empire. On March 4 a new constitution was issued for the whole of the Austrian Empire. But by it the Slavs as well as the Magyars found themselves betrayed, and some skilful diplomacy on the part of Kossuth might have saved the situation. He decided, however, to play a bolder game. On April 14 he issued the Declaration of Independence, which proclaimed the deposition of the Hapsburgs, and made Hungary a republic with himself as governor. This was a disastrous move, for it alienated the moderates, so that Déak deserted him, the conservatives joined the Emperor and many of the officers in the Hungarian army resigned their commissions. Another fatal mistake made by Kossuth was his use of Polish generals and officers in the

army, and his openly avowed intention of creating an independent Poland to be the ally of independent Hungary. It was this which precipitated the intervention of Russia, and that intervention ended the struggle. To add to the difficulties of the situation Kossuth quarrelled with Görgei, and even deprived him of his military position. But when all was lost he reinstated him, so that it was Görgei who made the final surrender at Világos to the Russians on August 13. For this surrender Kossuth declared Görgei was a traitor, but there is no shadow of truth in the charge. Further resistance was only a futile sacrifice of life, and the incident was only another instance of the wiser judgment which Görgei had shown throughout the struggle. For instance, when Kossuth maintained that if Hungary declared herself independent, England, France, Italy, Turkey, and Germany would join her, and that Poland would follow suit and provide her with an ally, Görgei answered, "Our Fatherland can only be saved by deeds and not by words, and for those deeds we must look to nobody but ourselves. On the contrary, whole armies will be set in motion to prevent this, since a glorious Polish-Hungarian Alliance would disturb the balance of power in Europe." Moreover, Görgei would have made some compromise with Austria, in which course lay the only chance of saving the constitution.

After Világos Kossuth, and as many of the Hungarian and Polish leaders as escaped, fled to Turkey. Those who were in the hands of the Austrians received no mercy. Batthyány was shot, with four other generals, while the remaining nine suffered the indignity of hanging. These executions all took place on October 6, a day still kept as one of national mourning in Hungary.

The administration of Hungary with all its various nationalities was centralised, until Déak, more successful than Kossuth, with the help of Andrassy, established the Dual System in 1866.¹

The remaining years of Kossuth's life were spent in exile. He was released from Turkey in 1851 with the other refugees, whose presence in the Sultan's dominions had agitated all the chancelleries of Europe, and spent some time in England and America. Napoleon III appears to have meditated action on behalf of Hungary as well as of Italy, and in 1859 he had an interview with Kossuth. The upshot was that a Hungarian Legion was formed at Genoa during Napoleon's campaign in Italy, until the Peace of Villafranca put an end to the hopes of both the Italian and the Hungarian patriots. From 1859 Kossuth lived in Italy until his death at Turin in 1894. He had refused to accept Déak's compromise with Austria, for he was unwilling to accept anything short of the complete independence of Hungary. Similarly he refused to return to Hungary under the general amnesty which was one of its provisions, although he was elected a Member of the Diet in 1867. His body was, however, taken back to Pest, and he received a public funeral, so great was the spell of his personality over his countrymen.

Perhaps the most striking testimony to Kossuth's work for Hungary occurs in the book, which vindicates Görgei and makes Kossuth responsible for the failure of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and 1849. "Without Kossuth the nation would never have risen to the height of appreciating its innate power. Without his enthusiastic soul and without his irresistible oratory,

¹ See *Life of Andrassy*.

nothing could have been done. . . . Kossuth's flag was followed with religious devotion. The people surrounded it enthusiastically wherever it was unfurled. He led them where he would, and at his word and desire old and young gathered together under his banner. It was only through the fascination of that name that the land of the Magyars was roused to self-defence in the days of its peril."¹

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¹ T. Duka, *Kossuth and Görgei*, pp. 7-8.

JOSEPH JELAČIĆ, BAN OF CROATIA

Sto Bog daje i sreća junacka—"What God sends and a soldier's fortune."

In loyalty and patriotism Jelačić knew no equal.¹

Joseph Jelačić was born in 1801, the son of Baron Franz Jelačić von Bužim. He was a member of a family which for two hundred years had supplied officers to the Austrian frontier regiments. These regiments of the Military Frontiers held a unique position in the Austrian Empire. They held their land on the old feudal system of military tenure; hence they were in a sense professional soldiers from the cradle, and were always reckoned among the bravest and most loyal troops in the Austrian Empire, and the champions of the House of Hapsburg against the Magyars. Baron Franz had a record of distinguished service against Napoleon, in fact it was he with his three Croat regiments who held back Napoleon's army at Feldkirch in Tirol. Joseph was born two years later in the grim border fortress of Peterwardein in Southern Hungary, a fortress associated with the names of Prince Eugene and Jan Capistrano, the heroes of the struggle against the Turks. Born in such surroundings and with such a father it is not surprising that Jelačić grew up a soldier. The story goes that "His first book was the Iliad, and his first plaything a sword."

¹ M. Hartley, *The Man who saved Austria*.

NOTE.—č=tch. ċ=ch.

In 1809, the year before he died, Baron Jelačić took his son to Vienna in order to interest Kaiser Franz in his future career. The Emperor was free of access to all his subjects, and readily granted the request of his old officer to give the boy a military training. He accordingly sent him to the Theresianum, the school founded by Maria Theresa for the sons of nobles. So great was his eloquence that his teachers wished him to become a jurist, but all his ambitions lay in a soldier's life. In 1819 he was given a commission in the 3rd Dragoons. For four years he flung himself into his army life with unbounded enthusiasm. "His gaiety and spirits never seemed to fail; the days were always too short for the work and fun to be crammed into them, and the nights were used unsparingly to carry on the game. No difficulties, weather, distance or the like, stopped him if sport were in prospect, and his friends laughed and followed, carried away by his inexhaustible energy."¹ But his constitution could not stand the strain of the demands which he put upon it, and for a year he lay, apparently dying from a disease of the throat, in his mother's house in the Turopolje, not far from Zagreb. The long fight with death, however, gave his character a depth and strength, which it might otherwise have lacked.

In May, 1825, Jelačić rejoined his comrades, and in 1830 was gazetted Lieutenant-Captain in the Ogulin regiment, in which his father had served. It was a wrench to part with his old regiment, but it had the compensation that it gave him four years' service with Radetsky in Italy. Radetsky, Vater, or Papa Radetsky, as his soldiers called him, was a chief to inspire an

¹ M. Hartley, *The Man who saved Austria*, p. 22.




Photo : Exclusive News Agency.]

JOSEPH JELAČIĆ.

From the statue in the Chief Square of Zagreb.

enthusiastic soldier. He was said never to forget the face and name of any man who had served under him, and a thousand stories were told of his recognitions and of the delight which they caused. Radetsky formed a high opinion of Jelačić, for he said, "I expect the best of him; never yet have I had a more excellent officer." The Ogulin was one of the Frontier regiments, and on its return from Italy it was occupied with the peace of the border. "According to their custom, the Turkish frontiersmen broke into our adjacent country to sack and burn. Our frontiersmen returned the 'Turks' pleasure with goodwill." Such were normal conditions on the frontier of Bosnia, and the border service of Jelačić was to bring him into contact with the new aims and aspirations stirring among the Southern Slavs.

Zagreb (Agram), where the mother of Jelačić and his two brothers now lived, had become the centre of an important movement. The work of Gaj united the Slav dialects into one tongue, which he called Illyrian. In 1834 he founded two journals, the *Croatian Gazette* and the *Daystar*, which became later the *National Gazette of Illyria*. These journals spread, not only the new literary language, but also his dream for the union of the Southern Slavs. In 1837 Jelačić gained a wider experience of the Southern Slav movement than would have been possible on the border, by his appointment as adjutant to the new Military Governor of Dalmatia, under whom he gained an insight into administrative and not purely military activities. In this capacity he won the friendship of the Vladika of Montenegro, and learned a great deal about the sufferings and needs of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

In 1841 his chief died and Jelačić returned to the frontier as Lieutenant-Colonel of the first Banal Regiment. This commission put him at the same time in charge of the militia Sereshans, the inhabitants of the Military Frontiers. He had to see that an efficient patrol was kept against Turkish raids. Even to-day the little stone forts stand on every eminence, the ground cleared round them to guard against a surprise attack, a memorial to the dangers of life on the border. A story told of Jelačić reveals his constant care for his men. One cold winter morning they were drawn up for inspection by a general. The general found the inn fire more pleasant than the freezing temperature outside. After waiting for an hour Jelačić sent his men back to barracks, and reported the angry general for not being present on duty. It is perhaps proof of his value as a soldier, that no bad results came from an action so contrary to Austrian military etiquette. On the frontier Jelačić was responsible for government as well as for military discipline, and his name has become a legend among the border people. "He punished all violence strictly, and every villager met with a hearing, even if he knocked at his window at midnight. Small indeed is the house in which Jelačić has not been either on a christening or wedding day. Always he was at the head of us, even in the kolo."¹ Such were the words of an old shepherd, when he recalled the days of his youth and his service with Jelačić.

Meanwhile the language struggle between the Croats and the Magyars was becoming more bitter, and matters came to a head in 1847. On October 20 the Croatian Diet assembled at Zagreb; three days later it decided that

¹ A national dance.

the Croatian language should be used in schools and offices. Further, it moved an address to the King, asking that a Hapsburg should be sent as Governor or Ban of Croatia, and that the administration should be entirely separated from that of Hungary. Delegates were sent also to the Hungarian Diet at Pressburg. They were to insist on the free use of the national language, a national administration, and that Zagreb should be raised from a bishopric to an archbishopric. The Hungarian Diet adopted an unyielding attitude, and the linguistic claims of the Croats resulted in an open breach with the Magyars. To the reiterated demands made by one of the delegates, Kossuth at length retorted, "Only the sword can decide between us." The news of the February Revolution in Paris, and the March Revolution in Vienna and Budapest had far-reaching results in Croatia and the Serb lands. For the moment there was unity among the champions of freedom, hitherto separated by racial antagonism, but unfortunately this union sprang from a hope that could not be realised, that the Germans and Magyars would join in extending to each of the Slav races within the empire the separate national freedom which they had won for themselves. When the Magyars showed that they would not admit the claims of the other nationalities, war broke out between them and the Serbs, and the Croats appealed to the Emperor. The ministers were beginning to think that Hungarian pretensions might be checked through the Croats, whose regiments were famous for their loyalty to the House of Hapsburg. Accordingly, when Baron Kulmer went to Court on March 16, 1848, to propose the name of a man who would be acclaimed by all Croats, and who was at the same time a soldier of long service

in the Imperial Army, Baron Joseph Jelačić von Bužim, the Emperor made him Ban of Croatia on March 23, without referring to the Hungarian Diet.

On March 25 the Croat delegates came flocking to the opening of the National Assembly in Zagreb. Gaj read the first resolution that a Ban should be appointed, and said that the Emperor had appointed Jelačić to that office. Perhaps the most astonished man in Croatia was the new Ban himself. In a letter of March 26 Jelačić wrote to his brother: "Indeed we live in extraordinary days. That I am Banus, Privy Councillor, and General you will know already. Let me tell you how it all happened. The night before last, as I was going straight to my respectable bed, some one knocked and gave me the news that the national assembly wanted me to be Ban. I said to Herr von Kuschland, 'What shall I say? I can forbid no one to nominate me; but if they ask me whether I wish to be Ban, then decidedly I say No!!'" On his way to protest to the Assembly against his appointment, he was met by the Imperial decree creating him Ban of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, and he bowed to the inevitable. The letter to his brother ends with the words, "I shall have no more peace in this world. . . . Good-bye; pity me, and may a peaceful lot be yours."

The appointment of Jelačić was one of the decisive factors of the revolution, for it united the southern provinces of the empire against Hungary, and cut off Hungary from the sea and therefore from outside help. He himself was the incarnation of two ideas, loyalty to the Hapsburg dynasty, and the national ideal. He believed that he could achieve the second by means of the first; that, if he did his duty as a soldier of the

Emperor, the Emperor would accede to the demands of his loyal Croats. There was nothing to be gained from an intolerant Hungary, but under a centralised government all nationalities might obtain equal freedom. Unfortunately, the Hapsburgs were not worthy of the loyalty which they inspired. The Central Government eventually treated all the nationalities alike, but only by sweeping away all the individual rights which they had possessed for centuries, and in that destruction Hungarian, Croat, Serb, Slovak, Italian, and Bohemian suffered alike, those who had supported the central authority and those who had fought against it.

The appointment of Jelačić was an act of defiance against the Hungarian Diet, which maintained that the Ban of Croatia was always a Hungarian magnate. On the other hand, the Ban emphasised his independence of Hungary by taking the oath to the Emperor, but omitting the usual oath of the Ban to the Hungarian Government. His first proclamation gives a full statement of his position, but is too long to quote in full. The most significant parts are as follows :

The desires that the nation has expressed and presented before the kingly throne, echo also in my heart. The good of the people and country ; that is my wish and my sole aim. I desire that our country may be strong and free. . . . In all my thoughts and deeds I will be the true expression of the nation's will and deeds, I will be the true expression of the nation's will and thoughts. Therefore I intend to walk and continue in the path, which shall lead our country to happiness and glory.

The revolution has shattered and overthrown the old foundations of social life and the national and governmental relations, especially those with our old ally,

Hungary—therefore, remembering our ancient league with the crown of Hungary, it is necessary to renew the connection in a spirit of freedom, self-respect, and equality, and to form a basis worthy of a free and heroic nation, though on our side all relations with the present Hungarian Ministry must be broken off. . . . We have a great work before us in the regeneration of our nation. I shall not be equal to this task unless the people—fervent and whole-souled patriots—aid me with their honest counsel, united endeavours and self-sacrifice, or if we, sons of one mother, should lack peace, union, love, and brotherhood among ourselves. . . . No longer must the difference of belief and Church make a gulf in social and official life between members of the same nation, for equality is declared. . . . To all dwellers in our fatherland and to the neighbouring Slavs outside the three kingdoms, I send love and salutation. God save our King and our Nation! Long live unity, freedom, and fraternity among us!

JELAČIĆ (Ban).¹

Jelačić entered into relations with the Serb National Assembly at Karlovitz, so that when he opened the Croatian Diet at Zagreb early in June, seventy Serb delegates came to the capital, and Rajačić the Serbian Patriarch, attended High Mass in the Roman Catholic cathedral, which was sung not in Latin but in Old Slavonic. The dignitaries then passed from the Latin to the Orthodox Church, in token that the peace of God had come at last. At the opening of the Diet Jelačić made an impassioned speech, in which he summed up future relations with Hungary. "The fraternal union of eight hundred years promises us a friendly solution of

¹ Quoted in M. Hartley, *The Man who saved Austria*, pp. 142-145.

the prevailing dispute. But should the Magyars assume the rôle of oppressors against us and our kinsmen in Hungary, then let them know . . . that we shall prove to them with weapons in our hands, that the time is long past when one nation can rule over another. Away, then, with the Magyar *régime* of compulsion—we did not recognise it even before March 15, but after the March Revolution we broke and annihilated it.”¹

The doings of the Croatian Diet so alarmed the Magyars that Count Batthyány obtained from the Emperor, then a fugitive at Innsbruck and too weak to withstand him, a decree suspending Jelačić from his offices. On June 16 Jelačić arrived in Innsbruck, two days after the departure of Batthyány, and convinced the Court, although the Emperor would not listen to his demands, that the empire might be saved by using the Croats against the Magyars. “The men of State and the patriots standing round heard a new doctrine—Imperialism—preached with the fervour of an apostle and the imagination of a poet.”² He ended with the words, “These gentlemen may live, if they wish, when the empire has fallen; but I—I cannot.” On his way back the news of his suspension reached him, but so certain was he of the real sentiments of the Court, that he ignored it and continued his work as if nothing had happened. He also at this juncture ensured the loyalty of the Croat regiments, without which Radetsky’s victories in Italy would have been impossible. A last attempt to reconcile the Croats and the Magyars was made at the end of June, when the new War Minister, Latour, brought Jelačić and Batthyány together at

¹ R. W. Seton Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*, pp. 33–34.

² M. Hartley, *op. cit.* pp. 179–180.

Vienna. Few people were sincere in making this attempt, and when Jelačić refused to accept the proposals of Batthyány, the Hungarian exclaimed, "Then we meet on the Drave." "Say rather on the Danube," replied Jelačić, and they parted knowing that war was inevitable.

The victory of Radetsky at Custozza freed the hands of the Emperor and his ministers, and in September Jelačić was reinstated in all his offices and proclaimed Dictator of Hungary. On September 11 he crossed the Drave at the head of 40,000 men, including the wild Sereshans. This army had been organised by Jelačić after his return from Innsbruck and it was destined to help the Serbs, who were already fighting the Magyars. When the Diet at Zagreb suggested that troops should be sent to their assistance, Jelačić answered, "I am quite ready to organise your army . . . but give me money with which to maintain and equip them. . . . Let each man lay his contribution on the altar of his country, as he is able. When the day of battle comes I will be there and I will lead you." The Deputies thereupon poured out money before the Ban, ladies from the gallery contributed their jewels, and a poor old priest offered Jelačić his gold cross and chain, as all he had. Jelačić said, "No one is worthy to carry this Holy Cross, save the man who so nobly offers it. Therefore, gentlemen, I return it, but in its place I put these fifty ducats."

Jelačić marched his army without meeting any resistance as far as Lake Balaton. There the Archduke Stephen, the young Palatine of Hungary, came to make a last effort to reconcile the Croats and the Magyars. Both parties were, however, so suspicious of treachery, that the Magyars would not allow the Palatine to land, and the Croats would not allow Jelačić to go on board,

so that they never met. When the Croats were only two days' march from Budapest, news came that the populace of Vienna had risen again, and that the Emperor was a fugitive at Olmütz. They therefore halted and turned aside to cut the communications between the Magyars and the Viennese insurgents, and joined General Auersperg's army, which was encamped outside the city. Prince Windischgrätz—having put an end to the revolution in Bohemia—and a Hungarian army were both marching on Vienna, but the Prince got his guns into position before Moga, Kossuth, and Görgei arrived. The combined Imperial armies defeated the Hungarians at the battle of Schwechat and Vienna surrendered on October 30. Unfortunately the Imperial generals remained in Vienna for some weeks, instead of pursuing the Magyars into their own country, and so gave them time to prepare for a long resistance. On December 2 the Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his nephew, Francis Joseph, and it was not until after they had taken the oath to the new Emperor, that the generals once more turned their attention to Hungary.

On December 15 Jelačić again crossed the frontier of Hungary, but his actions were continually hampered by the cautious tactics of Windischgrätz, who had been appointed the Commander-in-Chief. Over and over again the Croats might have won a decisive battle if they had received proper support. Although the Imperial troops occupied Budapest, the Hungarian army was still intact, so that the war was as far off being ended as before. One or two anecdotes will serve to show Jelačić under fire. His men said of him, "The Almighty protects him wherever he goes ; in the hail of bullets and balls, never a bullet or ball for him. He has never been

wounded, and never will be, for the hand of God is on his head." On December 18 he had a skirmish with the Magyars near Altenburg. He came upon them unexpectedly and found them in superior numbers. The Ban sent for reinforcements, and to check the confusion wrought by the enemy's fire he galloped on his famous black horse to the head of the cuirassiers in the front rank, ordering them to reform and stand fast. He then reined up and stood where the fire was thickest. One of his officers tried to shield him, but the Ban ordered him back with the words, "I need no shield between me and the enemy." The halt continued for twenty minutes until the reinforcements arrived, and during that time Jelačić sat his horse as at a review, with the bullets whistling round him and cannon balls rolling on the frozen ground. On another occasion, as the Ban entered a village he was met by the sight of every hen in the place being chased by his soldiers with drawn swords. Here, as often happened, he paid for his men's supper out of his own pocket. No wonder his men followed him whose first thought was always for their comfort, whose one object was to come up with the enemy and fight him whatever the odds, and who was credited with a charmed life.

After the Hungarians had turned the tables on the Imperial armies, Windischgrätz returned to Vienna, and the armies were divided into the Southern Army under Jelačić, and the Northern Army under Haynau, known for his brutality in Italy as the Tiger of Brescia. At the end of May the Southern Army marched across the vast plain of Hungary until it encamped in a strong position on the Titel plateau between the Theiss and the Danube. On June 2 Pérczel tried to storm the position,

but was driven back to the terrific shouts of "Živio,¹ Jelačić Ban." But though the army was safe from the Magyars it suffered terribly from the heat, which engendered typhus and cholera, and from lack of food, for the land was a desert after nine months' fighting. Jelačić stormed and took Novisad (Neusatz), but a desperate offensive, which he began in July, was not successful. The end of the war was, however, in sight. Russian armies came to the rescue and Görgei's surrender at Világos on August 13 put an end to the fighting. Peterwardein, his birthplace, surrendered to the Ban on September 6, and on the 10th he issued a last order to the army which he had led for so long.

To his brother, Count George, the Ban wrote, as soon as the war was over, "The lighter part of the work is done now that we have satisfied the sword; but next the labours of Sisyphus begin." These labours were directed to satisfying the aspirations of the Croats, but all the efforts of Jelačić were in vain. The Emperor rewarded their loyalty by treatment very little better than that meted out to rebellious Hungary. German was to be the official tongue, and the country was governed by a centralised bureaucracy.

On July 23, 1850, Jelačić married the Countess Sophie von Stockau. He was forty-nine and his young bride was only sixteen. Perhaps this happiness was some compensation for the bitter disappointment of his hopes for his country. The rest of his life was spent in fighting the officialdom of Vienna, but even he at last came to the conclusion that it was a hopeless struggle. In May, 1859, he died, worn out and embittered, and was buried in the little chapel of his country house, Novi Dvori,

¹Živio = Long live.

outside Zagreb, by the side of his only child, a daughter, who died of cholera before she was two years old. Croatia received neither her deserts nor her desires at the hands of the Emperor for whom she had sacrificed so much.

The value of the work done by Jelačić for Austria appears most clearly in the writings of a distinguished British diplomatist. Sir Robert Morier wrote to his chief, Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at Vienna, in 1857, that, in his opinion, the main cause which had enabled the Hapsburg Monarchy to emerge triumphant from the events of 1848-49 was the action of Jelačić and his Croats, for they paralysed the unity of action amid the different parts of the Hungarian monarchy, which would have swept everything before it, and kept true the allegiance of the army in Italy. He therefore bitterly condemned the Emperor's lack of gratitude and the policy of his Government. Neither in his person nor in his country had the Ban received the rewards which he deserved. He says of the Austrian settlement of Croatia, "A more wholesale act of injustice, ingratitude, and bad faith, a display on a larger scale of a mean and paltry spirit, grosser fraud, more clumsily veiled, it would be difficult to meet with in all the pages of history." After stating that 11,000 Croats had died in Italy and Hungary, he concludes, that in return for such devotion "Not only has there been taken from them those additional guarantees of their old liberties granted in '48 . . . but the ancient liberties themselves have been cut down root and branch, the proud old citadel itself, which the Magyars, in the wildest moments of their national fever, would never have laid hands on, was razed to the ground after having

been treacherously entered into by the supposed allies, themselves saved from utter ruin by the desperate sortie of the garrisons. . . . Amidst the ruins there rose up, in all the meagreness of its modern outlines, the huge fabric of absolutism, supported on bayonets and administered by bureaus, which now for the first time established its intricate uniformity over every portion of the Austrian Empire alike.”¹ And as Kossuth, the great rival of Jelačić, had said, “Bureaucracies and bayonets are miserable ties.”

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THE UNION OF ITALY

Cavour, Mazzini, Garibaldi; three—
Her Brain, her Soul, her Sword.

MEREDITH.

GUISEPPI MAZZINI

This man found his mother dead and slain,
With fast sealed eyes,
And bade the dead rise up and live again,
And she did rise.

“WHERE there is no vision the people perish,” are the words quoted on the title-page of the best life of Mazzini in English. His work in the resurrection of his country, the Risorgimento, as the Italians themselves call it, was to give his people the vision without which they were dead indeed. From the Alps to the island of Sicily iron despotism lay on the land like a blight. The system of 1815 had given Lombardy and Venetia to Austria, and the other states to their former rulers. If their subjects showed signs of dissatisfaction with the blessings of things as they had been in the beginning and were then, Austrian armies were at their disposal to ensure that so they should continue to be, world without end. Death was the penalty for possessing the Italian tricolour, the banner of revolution, and thousands of obscure patriots died or languished in Austrian, Papal, and Neapolitan prisons for daring to protest against the

tyranny which crushed the life from their land. No wonder Swinburne could write of the flag, now the standard of the Italian Kingdom,

This is the banner, thy gonfalon, fair in the front of thy fight,
Red from the hearts that were pierced for thee, white as thy
 mountains are white,
Green as the spring of thy soul everlasting, whose life-blood
 is light.

Gather it close to thee, song bird or storm bearer, eagle or
 dove.
Lift it to sunward, a beacon beneath to the beacon above,
Green as our hope in it, white as our faith in it, red as our
 love.

Mazzini was above all else a visionary, an example in the prosaic days of the nineteenth century of the faith that can move mountains. In face of the whole world's mockery he created a united Italy, at first with a few followers, insignificant like himself in wealth and worldly power, sowing the seed in the soul of a nation and in the soul of Europe, which raised up other men to bring the work to completion. What they achieved was not the Italy of his dreams, for statesmen, generals, emperors, and kings built the edifice, whose foundations Mazzini had laid, and the finished building bore no resemblance to his ideal republic. To the cause of Italy he devoted his life, his happiness, his health, his friends, and his family. Imprisonment, exile, poverty, sickness made up his earthly lot, but the man, whose gentleness tamed the birds and made them his friends, possessed also the unconquerable will and the burning zeal of a prophet of old, so that he saved the people of Italy and created a nation.



Photo : Elliott & Fry, Ltd.]

GUISEPPI MAZZINI.

Guiseppe Mazzini was born at Genoa on June 22, 1805. His father was a Doctor and Professor of Anatomy at the University, while his mother possessed the virtues, dignity, and the appearance of a Roman matron. He mentions four influences which made him a democrat : his parents' courtesy to men of all ranks, memories of the French republican wars which he heard in his home, the study of the Latin Classics, and some old French newspapers which he found hidden behind his father's books, belonging to the first period of the French Revolution. Even in childhood he was impressed by the misery and degradation of Italy under the system of Metternich, but he says himself that it was in 1821 that he became conscious of the mission of his life. While walking one Sunday with his mother and some friends, they were stopped by a "tall, black-bearded man, with a severe and energetic countenance and a fiery glance that I have never since forgotten. He held out a white handkerchief towards us, merely saying, 'For the refugees of Italy.' . . . The idea of an existing wrong in my own country, against which it was my duty to struggle, and the thought that I too must bear my part in that struggle, flashed before my mind on that day for the first time, never again to leave me." ¹

From that time Mazzini dressed always in black, a sign of mourning for his country, whose condition so preyed upon his mind that his mother feared he would commit suicide. At the University he soon gained an ascendancy over his fellow students by sheer force of character. "That clear high soul, untouched by self, not knowing fear, passionate for righteousness, gave him even when a

¹ Unless otherwise stated quotations in inverted commas are the actual words of Mazzini.

lad the power that belongs only to the saints of God.”¹ In appearance he was slim and graceful, with classical features, a high and prominent forehead, and dark eyes to whose beauty everybody who met him paid tribute. “His eyes were the most remarkable feature of his face,” Mrs. Hamilton King wrote: “They were extremely large, luminous, of a velvet darkness, and full of fire and passion; every emotion was expressed in them; but their habitual expression was that of a grave, tender, brooding melancholy.”² A group of friends at Genoa, under Mazzini’s leadership, formed a society to study literature and politics and to smuggle in forbidden books, for half the masterpieces of European literature were then banned by the Censor. His favourite books were the Bible, Dante, Shakespeare, and Byron. His first love indeed was literature, and it was only after a severe struggle that he abandoned a literary career for political work. He was an ardent defender of the Romanticists as against the Classicists, for it was the aim of the former to give Italians an original national literature. But he early realised that this ideal was impossible without political freedom and unity. “It was better for us to consecrate our lives to the solution of the problem, Are we to have a country? and turn at once to the political question. If we were successful, the art of Italy would bloom and flourish over our graves.”

At the close of his university career Mazzini joined the Carbonari, a secret society imbued with revolutionary principles and working in close accord with the French liberals. He speaks of this as his “first great sacrifice,” for he hated the underhand means by which it was driven

¹ Bolton King, *Life of Mazzini*, p. 7.

² Mrs. Hamilton King, *Recollections of Mazzini*, p. 115.

to work, but it was the only revolutionary organisation in the country. Soon after the July Revolution of 1830 he was trapped by a Government spy into performing a piece of ritual for the Carbonari in his presence, and was imprisoned in the fortress of Savona. His father protested, but was informed that the Government were not fond of young men of talent, the subject of whose musings was unknown to them. After six months he was tried for conspiracy and acquitted, but was nevertheless banished from Italy. He then went to Lyons, because many other Italian exiles had made it their home.

In 1831 Charles Albert succeeded to the throne of Sardinia. His accession roused new hope among Italian patriots, because he had formerly had dealings with the Carbonari. Mazzini addressed to him his famous "Letter to the King," which was a passionate appeal to Charles Albert to establish "laws and liberty, independence and union," and "to liberate Italy from the barbarian." It concluded with the cry, "Unite us, Sire, and we shall conquer." The only answer of the King was the order that if Mazzini attempted to cross the frontier into Italy he should be arrested. But the people read the appeal and flocked to join the association of Young Italy, which Mazzini had founded after the failure of the Carbonari. Their attempt at revolution in 1831 had come to nothing, partly because they relied on a French force which occupied Ancona, but was totally inadequate for the task it had to accomplish, and partly because they would not face the fact that the Austrians would have to be driven out before anything could be done.

Mazzini had evolved the plan of Young Italy during his solitary confinement in the fortress of Savona, when

his only companion was a bullfinch he had tamed. The guiding principles of the new society made of social reform and patriotism a religion. He himself was great enough to see that there is a greatness in ordinary men and women which will respond to an appeal for sacrifice in a noble cause. "Young Italy"—so ran its statutes—"is a brotherhood of Italians, who believe in a law of Progress and Duty and are convinced that Italy is destined to become one nation." The means whereby this end was to be achieved were "education and insurrection, to be adopted simultaneously." The Austrians were to be driven out, but Mazzini warned his followers never to rise "in any other name than that of Italy and of all Italy." As a republican he intended to make Young Italy educate the people in that doctrine, but there was to be no coercion. When unity had been achieved the final form of government was to be left to their own choice. The new association spread rapidly from end to end of Italy, and the work it did for the Risorgimento is incalculable. It is not too much to say that it made the work of Cavour, Victor Emmanuel, and Garibaldi possible.

Mazzini made three attempts to put his work to the test before he found a permanent home in England in 1837. The first attempt in 1831 was unimportant, but the second in 1833 was a widespread plot in Piedmont, in which the army was implicated. It was discovered before it had time to materialise, and Charles Albert, made pitiless by fright, waged a terrible vendetta against the patriots, the memory of whose sufferings haunted him to the end of his life. Among the victims was Mazzini's dearest friend, Jacopo Ruffini, who committed

suicide in prison, lest under torture he should betray his friends. No other loss throughout his life hurt Mazzini as did this one, for he felt personally responsible for sending Ruffini and other friends to torture and death. So terrible was his anguish that his health and his mind nearly broke down. The next revolt was organised from Geneva, and was the occasion of the first meeting of Mazzini and Garibaldi. It, too, came to nothing, and after this failure of the cause on which he had staked his all, Mazzini, hunted from village to village, passed through the most terrible crisis of his life; for he began to doubt his own mission. "How many mothers had wept because of me! I could not give them back their sons. How many more must weep if I persisted in the attempt to rouse the youth of Italy to strong deeds to meet the need of our common fatherland. And if this fatherland, this Italy, should be only an illusion! . . . It was not only the overthrow for an indefinite period of every Italian hope . . . and the accumulation of almost insurmountable material obstacles between me and the task I had set myself to do. It was the falling to pieces of that moral edifice of faith and love, from which alone I had derived strength for the combat; the scepticism I saw rising around me upon every side; the failure of faith in those who had solemnly bound themselves with me to pursue unshaken the path we had known at the outset to be choked with sorrows; the distrust I detected in those most dear to me as to the motives and intentions which sustained and urged me onward in the evidently unequal struggle. . . . To see myself suspected of ambition . . . by the one or two beings upon whom I had concentrated my whole power of attachment, prostrated my soul in deep despair. . . .

Then in that moral desert doubt came upon me. Perhaps I was wrong and the world right? Perhaps my idea was indeed a dream? . . .”

Doubt, however, passed and from that moment Mazzini never wavered. It was in truth the final struggle. “I bade a long sad farewell to all individual hopes for me on earth. I dug with my own hands the grave, not of my affections, but of all desires, exigencies, and ineffable comforts of affection, and I covered the earth over that grave, so that none might ever know the Ego buried beneath.” God, Progress, Life as a Mission, Duty as its final law became creed. “When a man,” he wrote at this time, “has once said to himself in all seriousness of thought and feeling, ‘I believe in liberty and country and humanity,’ he is bound to fight for liberty and country and humanity as long as life lasts, fight always, fight with every weapon, face all from death to ridicule, face hatred and contempt, work on because it is his duty and for no other reason. . . . In the words of the Polish poet, Skarga : ‘The threatening steel flashes before our eyes, wretchedness awaits us on the path ; yet the Lord hath said : “Onwards, onwards without rest.” But whither go we, O Lord ? “Go on and die, ye who are bound to die ; go on and suffer, ye who are bound to suffer.” ’ ”

From 1837 to 1848 Mazzini lived quietly in England, which, he wrote, “became to me almost as a second country.” Events in Italy in 1848 recalled him to his fatherland. Whereas men still differed as to the means of securing the union of Italy, whether through the Kingdom of Piedmont or through Pio Nono, the “liberal” Pope, all were agreed that Austria must go. With the fall of Metternich it seemed as if the hour of

Italy's deliverance had struck. Unfortunately Italians were not yet united in heart and mind and so Italian unity was delayed for another ten years. Mazzini himself, while he was in Milan, from which the populace had driven the Austrians, made it impossible for his followers to unite with the moderates. His intolerance of other methods for attaining the ends to which he had consecrated his life, is one of the saddest features in his history. Not only did it cripple the cause of Italian unity, but it saddened and embittered the last years of his life, when he saw his work being accomplished by other men and other methods. The Moderates denounced the system of petty revolts, which Mazzini supported, on the ground that they were a futile waste of life. Mazzini, on the other hand, was also in the right when he denounced the federalist policy which they advocated. Union was the object to be achieved, and he declared that he was willing to waive his republicanism if Charles Albert or the Pope would declare for unity. Hence in 1847 he wrote a letter to the Pope on the same lines as his previous letter to the King of 1831.

Mazzini's entry into Milan was a triumphal procession for "the prophet once cast out and stoned, who had preached in the wilderness what was now a commonplace on every tongue."¹ He blundered, however, in not going straight from Milan to Rome, for he could do little to make Charles Albert a capable commander, and his presence merely strengthened the factions in the Piedmontese army and its volunteers. At first he had declared a truce to party struggles so long as the war with Austria lasted, but unfortunately he was not

¹ Bolton King, *op. cit.* p. 116.

loyal to his own professions of political neutrality, and openly declared for a republic, while the Piedmontese army, on whom the success of the struggle depended, were solid for their King. Meanwhile the fortune of war turned in favour of the Austrians; for none of the Italian generals could compete with the master strategist, Radetsky. He gradually won back Lombardy until only Venice held out in the North, and forced Charles Albert to grant an armistice. Mazzini escaped from Milan when the Austrians re-entered it, and joined Garibaldi and his three thousand "Red Shirts," whose flag bore his own motto, "God and the People." Garibaldi extricated his little force after a terrible retreat in mid-winter, and proceeded to Central Italy where the revolution had not yet been crushed.

The Pope had fled from Rome on February 9, 1849, and a Republic had been proclaimed. Mazzini was elected a member of the Roman Parliament and entered Rome on March 5. News that the struggle was still being maintained in Central Italy drove Charles Albert to one more attempt against the Austrians. He renewed the war, but was crushed at the battle of Novara on March 23. On the evening of the same day he abdicated and his son, Victor Emmanuel, became King. Meanwhile Mazzini and Garibaldi had been preparing to carry on the war against Austria, and 10,000 men had actually started for the North, when the news of Novara came. They were at once recalled and all efforts were directed to saving Central Italy. The Romans made Mazzini a Triumvir and practically Dictator. Against Austria he might have succeeded, but when the French army came to the rescue of the Pope, so that Louis Napoleon Buonaparte might secure the support of the powerful

Clerical party in France, the contest was a hopeless one. Mazzini's organisation of the government was the most striking tribute at once to his idealism and his power over men. "His was a pure spiritual ascendancy, that made a populace, demoralised by bad government and charity, rise to something of his own moral height and dare to bear and die. There were some, at all events, to whom Rome, hallowed by a great ideal and noble rule, had become as the city of God."¹ But the forces against the Republic were too strong. After Oudinot's men had been repulsed at the first onset, and terms of peace settled between de Lesseps and Mazzini, the French treacherously renewed the attack and Rome stood a siege of nearly a month. Mazzini from the first knew that resistance was hopeless, but Rome had to become the central and capital city of the future. "It was essential to redeem Rome; to place her once again at the summit, so that the Italians might again learn to regard her as the temple of their common country. . . . Since we were destined to fall, it was our duty, in view of the future, to proffer our *morituri te salutant* to Italy from Rome." He succeeded in his aim. Rome through her Republic, with its internal order and outward heroism and the Stoic virtues shown by her people, regained her position as the centre of Italy, and those who worked for the union of Italy were not content until Rome had become her capital. On June 2 Garibaldi left with his three thousand men, but Mazzini, who was not on good terms with him, remained behind. For some days he stayed in the city, unmolested, so great was the love that the Romans bore him, and at last escaped to Marseilles without a passport, and

¹ Bolton King, *op. cit.* p. 132.

thence, eluding the vigilance of the French police, to Geneva and London.

Mazzini's part in the Risorgimento was over. From 1849 to his death in 1872 he flits at intervals like a pale ghost along the roads and through the alleys of the towns of Italy, preaching revolution, engaged in futile plotting. A rising in Milan in 1853 and one in the South in 1857 came to nothing. He joined Garibaldi after the Expedition of the Thousand and urged him to attack Rome, and re-establish the Republic; but Garibaldi was too wise, and laid Naples and Sicily at the feet of Victor Emmanuel. Although his banishment had never been rescinded, the Government connived at his presence in Italy, except in 1870, when he tried to organise a rising in Sicily. For a time he was imprisoned at Gaeta. When he was released he was a dying man. He reached Pisa and there died in the house of friends on March 10, 1872, with the great confession of his life on his lips: "Si, si, credo in Dio."

Except for the revolutionary years of 1848 and 1849 and occasional visits to the Italian cities, England was his home for thirty-five years. At first he suffered terribly from poverty, but by degrees he managed to earn a living by writing. He gathered round him a circle of devoted friends—the Carlyles, the Ashursts, and others—who did no small work for Italy in educating public opinion in England in her favour. Although dreaming of national redemption and working incessantly by propaganda for it, he did not neglect the "little Italy" at his doors. "Italian hawkers, organ boys, workmen, fellow exiles came all within the circle . . . his purse was the bank on which the refugees were ever drawing; he stripped his rooms and left himself bare of

necessities to meet their claims ; he organised a school for the peasant boys . . . and he taught almost nightly in the school.”¹ It was well that he gathered round him so warm a circle of friends. In 1852 he lost his mother, the inspiration and confidant of his life, and his father had died in 1848. He thus had few personal ties with his native land. England also taught him a deeper insight into social problems than he could have gained in Italy, where political problems were all absorbing, and as a political thinker Mazzini was a prophet, who, as was said of Abraham Lincoln, belongs to the ages.

Before his death Mazzini's dream of a united Italy with Rome as its capital had been accomplished by Cavour, Garibaldi, and Victor Emmanuel, by men whom on the whole he hated and by methods which he despised. Therein lies the tragedy of his later life, accentuated by the social tendencies of the people. For this great democrat was the enemy of Socialism. He feared the bitter strife of classes, and he hated the materialism which was taken as the standard of progress. And so he writes that “Italy was not the Kingdom of God,” which he had set out to establish on earth, and designates it as “this medley of opportunists and cowards and little Machiavellis, that let themselves be dragged behind the suggestion of the foreigner—I thought to call up the soul of Italy, and I only see its corpse.”

Mazzini's political creed is to be found in his *Duties of Man*. The title is significant. Surely the man who preached to mankind not the Rights of Man,

But this more sacred, more invincible,
Duties of Man, and Law of life in God,²

¹ A. Rudnam, *Mazzini*, p. 85.

² Mrs. Hamilton King, *The Disciples*.

and who wrote, "What we want, what the people want, what the age is crying for, that it may find an issue from this slough of selfishness and doubt and negation, is a faith, a faith in which our souls may cease to err in search of individual ends, may march together in the knowledge of one origin, one law, one goal," has a message for post-War Europe. He started with the same premises as Karl Marx, but while Marx preached class war, Mazzini set his face against class hatred, basing the ultimate triumph of mankind on his theory of Duty. He repudiated the materialism which makes material happiness its aim, saying that it tended to substitute the problem of humanity's kitchen for the problem of humanity. Instead he preached as Christ had taught. "When He came and changed the face of the world . . . He did not speak of utility or self-interest to a race corrupted by self-interest and utility. He spoke of Duty. He spoke of Love and Sacrifice and Faith. He said that He only should be first, who had helped all men by His works. And when these words were whispered in the ear of a dead society, they gave it life, they won the millions, they won the world, and advanced the education of mankind one step onward." By his own life he proved the truth of this last statement. He appealed to the highest in mankind; he realised that men will never be inspired by an appeal to anything but their unselfish motives; that only when some great principle is at stake will they sacrifice all that they hold dear. He remained an individualist, both in acknowledging the rights of property, and in believing that each man's life was his own concern. But again how different was his conception of individualism from that of his own day and from ours. "God will not ask us, what hast thou

done for thy own soul? but what hast thou done for the souls of others, the sister souls I gave thee. . . . He who sunders faith from works, thought from action, the moral man from the practical or political man, is not in truth religious. He breaks the chain that binds earth and heaven."

And so Mazzini was a great idealist; but more than that, a saint, who translated into daily life his own ideals of duty and love and sacrifice. Like one of the greatest of his countrymen, whom men have called saint, he shared all he possessed with the poor and needy, he renounced all the outward joys of life, sacrificing them to an inward vision and the work of a mission for his own country and for humanity with a ruthless treading under of self. Even the birds supply us with an analogy. "Visitors would generally find a bird or two perched on his head or shoulders or hopping among his papers, inured to the thick tobacco smoke, in which they and he lived."¹

His tomb is inscribed with the words, "Guiseppe Mazzini, l'uomo, che tutto sacrifico, che amo tanto, e molto compati e non odio mai."²

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CAMILLO BENSO DI CAVOUR

"Who was Cavour?" asked a young Prince of Victor Emmanuel III, as they were driving through the streets of Rome, on seeing over a door the words, CAVOUR BARRACKS. "I know. It must be the name of the architect." "Precisely," replied the King. "He was an architect—a celebrated architect; it was he who built Italy."¹

CAMILLO DI CAVOUR, the Brain of the Risorgimento, began his work for Italy in 1849, when that of Mazzini, the Soul of the movement, was over. The revolutions of 1848 and 1849 had discredited alike the republican ideal and the Papacy. There remained only Piedmont, with its King, its Army, and its Constitution, and Piedmont possessed also a statesman of the first order, who distinguished clearly both the task which awaited his country and the means by which it might be accomplished. That statesman was Cavour.

In 1848 Charles Albert of Piedmont had granted a Constitution to his people. So too had the other rulers of Italian states, but there was a difference. Whereas they had been driven to grant liberal institutions by the forces of revolution, the constitution of Piedmont had been granted on February 8, before the revolution had broken out, and was due to the peaceful pressure of public opinion. On the night after the battle of Novara Charles Albert abdicated, and went into voluntary exile in Oporto, where he soon afterwards died, having

¹ From the Preface to Maurice Paléologue's *Life of Cavour* (French Edition).



CAMILLO BENSO DI CAVOUR.
From a contemporary print.

in vain sought death on the field of battle. Victor Emmanuel's first act as King, therefore, was the acceptance of the Austrian conditions of peace. They would have been much lighter if the King had allowed Radetsky to persuade him to reintroduce absolute government into Piedmont, and to annul the constitution. "Marshal," he said, "sooner than subscribe to such conditions I would lose a hundred Crowns. What my father has sworn I will maintain. If you wish a war to the death, be it so ! I will call my nation to arms once more, and you will see of what Piedmont is capable in a general rising. If I fall it shall be without shame. My house knows the road of exile but not of dishonour." Thus while the rest of Italy was given over to reaction, Victor Emmanuel and his Prime Minister, d'Azeglio, reorganised the Sardinian Kingdom and carried out wide constitutional reforms. In 1850 d'Azeglio included Cavour in his Ministry in spite of the King's warning—"Look out what you are doing. Cavour will soon be master of you all ; he will dismiss you ; he will never be content till he is Prime Minister himself." The prophecy was fulfilled within two years. In 1852 Cavour became Prime Minister.

Cavour was born at Turin in 1810, the younger son of the Marquis Michele Benso di Cavour, the head of an old Piedmontese family. In the Palazzo Cavour, besides his parents lived his grandmother, a daughter of the Marquis de Sales, and his two maternal aunts, daughters of a Count de Sellon of Geneva, who belonged to an old Huguenot family. The régime of his grandmother, a *grande dame* of the old school, saved him from the narrowness of outlook and culture which marred the Piedmontese nobility, while his grandfather,

the Count de Sellon, was a liberal and taught his grandson all that was best in the ideas of the French Revolution. It was a strange coincidence in view of the later connection between Cavour and Napoleon III that he should have been held at the font by the Princess Pauline Borghese, the daughter of Napoleon I, whose husband, then Governor of Piedmont, was standing as his godfather.

As a child Cavour was distinguished by a hatred of books and, according to his French biographer, "a gorgeous plenty of animal spirits."¹ It was not until he realised the reality behind the drudgery of his lessons that a change took place. At the age of ten he entered the Military Academy at Turin, being destined, like all younger sons of the nobility, for a military career. While there he acted as page in the household of the Prince of Carignano, Charles Albert, afterwards King. He hated the duties, however, and conceived a great aversion for the person of his future sovereign. The result was that he was sent back to the Academy in disgrace. When a friend asked him what livery the pages wore, he answered, "How do you suppose we could have been dressed except as lackeys, which we were? It made me blush with shame!" At the age of sixteen he received a Commission in the Engineers, his early promotion being due to his brilliant scholarship. The only gain, according to himself he derived from the Military Academy was a sound knowledge of mathematics, which taught him to think logically and clearly. On the other hand, he bitterly deplored the lack of literary education from which he had suffered, and which he could only partially remedy by reading.

¹ Paléologue's *Cavour*.

After service at Ventimiglia, Cavour was sent to a fort near Modane on the Mont Cenis Pass. It was here amid the Alpine snows that he was first filled with sorrow for his country ; for in 1829 he wrote to an English friend, " While all Europe is walking with a firm step in the path of progress, unhappy Italy is always borne down under the same system of civil and religious despotism." In 1830 he was appointed to Genoa. There he made the acquaintance of the lady, who was the one real love of his life, the Marchesa Anna Schiaffino-Guistiniani, the wife of the President of the Board of Health at Genoa. She was a republican and her influence increased Cavour's love of liberalism, which had already brought him into trouble at home. In Genoa he expressed his views so openly that the military authorities became alarmed and sent him to meditate on his dangerous opinions in the lonely Alpine fort of Bard. In 1832, when this duty was ended, he resigned his commission, and left the army.

Cavour then became a gentleman farmer, and administered some of his father's estates. Successful as he proved himself to be as an agriculturist, although at the outset he hardly knew the difference between a turnip and a cabbage, he was only waiting for an opportunity to enter political life. This seemed an impossible dream while Charles Albert lived, but so strong was his belief in his destiny that he wrote to a friend at this time : " I am very grateful to you, Madame, for the interest you are kind enough to take in my misfortunes, but I can assure you that I shall make my way notwithstanding. I own that I am ambitious—enormously ambitious—and when I am Minister I hope I shall justify my ambition. In my dreams I see myself already Minister of the Kingdom of Italy." The monotony of his life was

broken by visits to France, Switzerland, and England. In Paris he could have had a distinguished career, but he refused to desert his country. "No, no," he said. "It is not by fleeing from one's native land because she is unhappy that one can reach a glorious end. . . . Happy or unhappy, my country shall have all my life. I will never be unfaithful to her, even though I were sure of finding a brilliant future elsewhere." These years of waiting were by no means wasted. In them he learnt the management of men and affairs, and busied himself in commercial schemes, such as the building of railways, which were to bear fruit in later years. He also became known as a writer; for he contributed frequent articles to the Press, chiefly on economic subjects, and in 1847 in conjunction with his political friends he founded a newspaper called by the arresting title of *Il Risorgimento*, whose object was to create a moderate liberal party in Italy. Above all, the idea of Italian independence was becoming more and more the ruling passion of his life.

Meanwhile Charles Albert, the "rabbit king," as Mazzini called him, was slowly coming to the conclusion that national independence ought to be the first aspiration of all Italians, and that he ought to prepare to fight Austria. He was even induced to grant the constitution mentioned above, although his indecision on this subject earned for him the title of the *Re Tentenna*—the Wobbling King. When, early in January, 1848, the Genoese sent a deputation to Turin to demand reforms, the journalists of the capital met to decide how far they should support it. Cavour declared that what they ought to demand was a constitution, rather than piecemeal reforms, and Charles Albert gave way. Cavour

failed to secure election to the first Chamber established by the new constitution, but he was successful in June, 1848, and again in July, 1849. He therefore shared from the first in the reconstruction of his country, undertaken by the young King and his minister, d'Azeglio, as soon as peace had been concluded with Austria. The difficulties to be surmounted were enormous, but Cavour was optimistic as usual. "We have lost thousands of brave soldiers, we have wasted many millions, we have had disastrous campaigns and from all sides we have reaped one single thing—we have got the Italian tricolour as our standard instead of the flag of Savoy. Well, in my opinion, we have not paid too dear a price. . . . As long as liberty survives in one corner of the Peninsula, I shall not despair for the future. As long as Piedmont keeps its institutions safe from despotism and anarchy, we can work at national regeneration."

In 1850 Cavour joined d'Azeglio's Government as Minister of Commerce and Agriculture. In that capacity he used the experience he had gained to push on economic and financial reform in order to increase the industrial resources of the country until it was in a position to bear the sacrifices demanded of it. In 1852 he resigned as the result of a parliamentary crisis, but on November 4 he became Premier. The very same day the French Senate was called upon to deliberate on the re-establishment of the French Empire. Cavour and Napoleon III had arrived. D'Azeglio was one of the finest types of Italians, cultured, artistic, literary, but he detested politics, and had only taken part in them from a sense of duty to his country. He was therefore only too thankful to relinquish his place to Cavour, whom he

described as "a man of diabolical activity, powerful in body and mind. To him it is something of a pleasure."

When he became Premier, Cavour thus outlined his programme. "Piedmont must begin by raising herself, by re-establishing, in Europe as well as in Italy, a position and a credit equal to her ambition. Hence there must be a policy unswerving in its aims but flexible and various as to the means employed, embracing the exchequer, military reorganisation, diplomacy, and religious affairs." If this programme were carried out, Piedmont would have sufficient prestige to secure an ally against Austria; for patriots were beginning to see that it was impossible to conquer Austria without outside help.

The two most difficult problems were ecclesiastical reform and the state of the finances. In ecclesiastical affairs Piedmont was faced with the problem of Henry II of England in his quarrel with Becket. Eighteen thousand people in the small kingdom were subject solely to clerical jurisdiction, and hence there was no equality before the law. Siccardi was sent to negotiate with the Pope, but the Pope refused to allow any reforms. The Siccardi Laws, as they were called, were accordingly passed in 1849 without his consent. This was the beginning of the breach between the King of Sardinia and the Pope, which widened until both the King and Cavour were excommunicated in 1860, after the destruction of the temporal power in the Romagna and the other Papal States. In 1855 Cavour brought in a law for the suppression of certain religious communities, but this led to a bitter struggle with the King. Within a month Victor Emmanuel had lost mother, wife, and brother, and the priests said that this visitation was the hand of God in punishment of his impiety.

The bishops offered him a sum for the exchequer equal to the amount it would have received from the dispossessed lands. The King accepted the offer and ordered the Bill to be withdrawn. Cavour thereupon resigned, but d'Azeglio came to the rescue, and in a famous letter to the King showed him how great a risk he was running in yielding to clerical pressure. Four days later the King recalled Cavour and the Bill became law. Cavour and the King were never on the best of terms. While they agreed on questions of public policy, they did not like each other privately. Although the soul of Victor Emmanuel, so writes M. Paléologue, was noble and chivalrous, his tastes were vulgar, while Cavour, in spite of his bourgeois exterior, was a man whose habits and manners were always distinguished. He gave bitter offence to the King when he prevented him from marrying the daughter of a drum major, who had long been his mistress, after the death of his wife. "Only my position prevented me from calling him out," the King said with regard to Cavour's intervention.

Cavour took the finances of the country under his own control when he became Premier, while the King and La Marmora reorganised the army and the fortifications of the country. As Minister of Finance he increased the burden of taxation although the country was poor and insolvent. A grave crisis occurred in 1853 owing to the failure of the corn, silk, and vine harvests, and an angry mob besieged Cavour's palace. Nevertheless, such was the success of his measures for promoting industry that the country in a few years was in a position of financial stability. One of the most fruitful of his schemes was the construction of railways. The first between Turin and Genoa was opened in 1854, and in all he devoted

two hundred millions to this purpose, his most gigantic achievement being the Mont Cenis tunnel. He further encouraged banking enterprise, settled consulates wherever he could send a ship, established a line of steamships between Genoa and America, and supported all kinds of private enterprise. In fact, Cavour's policy, both at home and abroad, can be summed up in the words, "L'audace, l'audace, et toujours l'audace"; for it was a bold plan to enter into the expenditure of vast sums of money in a practically bankrupt state. An equally bold stroke was his entry into the Crimean War. Two years before he had shown of what stuff he was made. Early in 1853 there had been an outbreak in Milan, organised by Mazzini, as the result of which many refugees fled to Piedmont. Austria sequestered the property of the refugees, now subjects of Victor Emmanuel, whereupon Cavour protested against this violation of international law, broke off diplomatic relations when Austria refused to give satisfaction, and in a Memorandum to the Powers protested openly against the tyranny of Austria.

In 1855 the Western Powers were seeking allies against Russia. At first the Piedmontese Government demanded guarantees, but the Powers, being unwilling to offend Austria, refused to enter into any pledges on Italy's behalf. Cavour thereupon accepted the alliance without guarantees. The Radicals denounced it as "economically reckless, militarily a folly, politically a crime," while the majority of Italian patriots did not see that fighting with the Turk against Russia was going to help Italian unity. Events, however, proved that Cavour and the King, who shared his vision and foresight, and who supported him through thick and thin, were right. By its conduct at the siege of Sebastopol

the army wiped out the shame of Novara, so that General Simpson in an order of the day wrote, "In this battle the Sardinian army has shown itself worthy to fight by the side of the greatest military nations of Europe." At the end of 1855 Victor Emmanuel visited his allies in Paris and London, and took Cavour and d'Azeglio with him. Cavour, therefore, was able to state the case of Italy to the British and French ministers. Napoleon III asked him what he could do for Italy. Cavour suggested, since war with Austria was impossible at that moment, that the Romagna should be freed alike from the Austrians who had occupied it, and the Pope who governed it. This struck at both the predominance of Austria and the temporal power of the Pope, the two chief obstacles in the way of united Italy. From that visit dates Cavour's conviction that Napoleon III was to be the means of driving out the Austrians, rather than Great Britain, the ally he would have preferred.

At the Peace of Paris Cavour seemed to have gained little in return for the sacrifices his country had made. In reality he had secured three things: the admission of Sardinia as an equal to the deliberations of the Great Powers, the raising of the Italian question before the Congress disbanded, and the interest of Napoleon III and to a lesser degree of Lord Clarendon, one of the British Plenipotentiaries. To both Cavour explained the whole situation and showed that Austria was the obstacle to any improvement in the condition of Italy.

Another thing, of incalculable value for the future, had been achieved in Italy itself. Piedmont was recognised as the future head of Italy by parties hitherto irreconcilable. The great Venetian patriot, Daniele Manin, declared in September, 1855: "The republican

party, so bitterly calumniated, performs a fresh act of abnegation and sacrifice for the national cause. Convinced that before everything else it is necessary to make Italy . . . it says to the House of Savoy : Make Italy and I am with you, if not, not. And it says to the constitutionalists : Give your thoughts to the making of Italy and not to the aggrandisement of Piedmont ; be Italians and not provincials, and I am with you ; if not, not. . . . I, a Republican, plant the unionist standard. Let it be joined, surrounded, defended by all who wish that Italy may be, and Italy shall be." In 1856 Cavour and Garibaldi met for the first time, and the two men thenceforward worked together for unity. The same is true of La Farina, a Sicilian exile, who used to visit Cavour, like a conspirator of the Middle Ages, in the dead of night, and keep him informed of the feelings of patriots throughout the peninsula.

The next years were the most anxious of Cavour's life, but his public utterances reveal little of the burning earnestness of purpose, which he hid under a veil of banter. In a private letter, on the other hand, these words appear : " All my strength, all my life are consecrated to one task alone—the emancipation of my country," and he was convinced that its emancipation depended on the will of one man, Napoleon III. He had left the Congress of Paris more than ever certain that war with Austria was inevitable, and with the words of the Emperor in his ears, "*J'ai le pressentiment que la paix actuelle ne durera pas longtemps.*" It lasted three years. For the first two years matters remained in abeyance. Then on January 14, 1858, Felice Orsini, an Italian refugee of the Romagna, tried to blow up the Emperor and Empress on their way to the opera. They

escaped, but the incident had far-reaching results. At first it embittered relations between France and Sardinia, but after reflection the Emperor withdrew the demands he had made to Victor Emmanuel to which no independent State could have consented, and came to the conclusion that his life would never be safe until the Italian question was settled. Because he had sacrificed the Roman Republic in order to achieve the throne of France for himself, he was the most hated man in Europe in the eyes of the Italian revolutionaries. Orsini's letters written in prison are now generally supposed to have been drawn up at the Emperor's instigation and then presented to Orsini for his signature. Be that as it may, Napoleon sent them to Cavour for insertion in the *Official Gazette*, and towards the end of May, 1858, he sent a secret invitation to Cavour to meet him at Plombières in July.

On July 21 the momentous interview took place, which resulted in the alliance of France and Piedmont for the purpose of turning the Austrians out of Italy. Cavour's instinct had been sound when it had selected the Sphinx-like nephew of the man who had first united Italy to carry out its final union. None of the Emperor's ministers knew anything about the alliance until it was formally signed at the beginning of December. They even thought it necessary to notify their master of the presence of M. de Cavour in Plombières in case he wished to receive him. The alliance, cemented by the marriage of Victor Emmanuel's daughter to Prince Napoleon, fell like a bombshell on Europe, and the neutral Powers exerted all the pressure they could bring to bear on Napoleon in order to avert the war. Cavour was in despair, for he thought that France was

about to withdraw. Then at the critical moment Austria, exasperated by the pin pricks to which Cavour constantly subjected her, sent an ultimatum to Sardinia demanding disarmament as a preliminary to the Congress suggested by the Powers. At the end of the three days allowed for his decision Cavour returned a negative answer to the Austrian envoys. When they had left the Palace, Cavour turned to the other ministers, who had been present at the audience, with the words, "It is done. *Alia jacta est*. The dice are thrown. We have made some history, now to dinner."

The King put himself at the head of his troops with the words, "I have no other ambition than to be the first soldier of Italian independence. Viva l'Italia." During the victorious campaign of the French and Italian armies, Cavour united in his own person the control of the internal affairs of the country, and during the absence of General La Marmora at the Front, of the War Office as well. "We have a government, a chamber, a constitution," the Piedmontese used to say. "The name for it all is Cavour." When the Emperor Napoleon made the Peace of Villafranca behind the back of his allies, Cavour had a terrible scene with the King, for once allowing his feelings to get the better of his judgment, and resigned rather than consent to the terms. The King, though cut to the heart, was wiser. He saw that "the political unity of Italy, since Novara a possibility, has become since Villafranca a necessity."

Before Cavour returned to power on January 20, 1860, he had recovered not only his serenity, but also his optimism. "We have followed one road," he said. "It is now cut off. Well, we shall take another." The new way was to rely on the diplomatic support

of England under the Whig Government of Lord Palmerston, and to unite the scattered members of the Italian nation round the House of Savoy. Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Roman Legations were annexed by general plebiscite to the new Kingdom of North Italy, but in return for Napoleon's acquiescence the King and Cavour consented to part with "the cradle of the race," and Savoy and Nice were annexed to France. In spite of a terrible outcry the first Parliament of the new Kingdom sanctioned the cession. The next step was the liberation of the South. This was the work of Garibaldi and the Thousand. Cavour and the King connived at this expedition, though they could not support it openly. After Palermo had been captured, Cavour threw off the mask and devoted himself to frustrating the attempts of European diplomacy to stop the insurrection. Great Britain was his only ally. "I have the whole corps diplomatique on my back, Hudson¹ excepted," he wrote. "I let them have their say and I go on." While Garibaldi was freeing Sicily and Naples from the rule of their Bourbon King, Victor Emmanuel and his army marched into the Marches and Umbria after warning the Pope that if he did not put a stop to the massacres, which his mercenary troops daily committed in his States, he would be obliged to interfere in the cause of order. The people promptly voted for union with the Kingdom of North Italy, and a plebiscite in Naples and Sicily induced Garibaldi to lay the two provinces, won by his genius, at the feet of Victor Emmanuel. Cavour at once insisted on the introduction of constitutional government into Southern and Central

¹ Sir James Hudson, the British Minister at Turin, who supported Cavour acting under instructions from his Government.

Italy, when perhaps a dictatorship was more in keeping with the political condition of the people. But, as he said, "Anybody can govern with a state of siege." On February 18, 1861, the first Italian Parliament assembled at Turin. It forthwith proclaimed the Kingdom of Italy and granted to Victor Emmanuel the title of King of Italy. Thus twelve years after Novara Cavour's dream had been translated into reality, and he was the first Prime Minister of United Italy.

Venice and Rome were still outside the Kingdom. It was Cavour's foresight which made the alliance with Prussia, so that in 1866 Venetia was united to Italy after the Austro-Prussian War. But the more difficult problem was that of Rome. While the success of Garibaldi's expedition was still uncertain, Cavour declared in Parliament on October 11, 1860, "Our destiny, Gentlemen, I declare it to you openly, is to bring it about that the Eternal City, on which twenty-five centuries have heaped every kind of glory, shall become the splendid capital of the Italian Kingdom." He did not live to see that consummation. On May 29, 1861, he was stricken with fever and died a week later, worn out by his superhuman labours. A friar was found on his estates who braved the excommunication and administered the last sacraments, for which act he was severely punished by the Roman Curia. Before his death Cavour spoke of his life, disjointedly, half in delirium. "Italy is almost made. They are no longer Lombards, nor Piedmontese, nor Romagnuols, nor Tuscans; we are all Italians. But there are still Neapolitans. There is much corruption in their country! It is not their fault, they have been so badly governed. They must be educated, uplifted, taught liberty. Above all, no state of siege, no

state of siege ! This brave Garibaldi, I do not bear him any ill-will. He wishes to go to Rome and Venice, but so do I ! As for Tyrol and Istria, that is another matter ; that will be for another generation. We have done enough—*nous autres*—we have made Italy.” His last words were addressed to the friar, who stayed with him to the last, and embodied the only possible solution of the relations of the new Italy to the Papacy. “Frate, frate—libera Chiesa in libero Stato—Brother, brother, a free Church in a free State.”

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LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

“ The generation of the 'nineties gave to France the finer things of the Revolution ; in art Horace Vernet, Scheffer, Corot, and Delacroix ; in literature, Lamartine, Scribe, de Vigny, and Balzac ; in the schools, Villemain, Victor Cousin, Augustin Thierry, Mignet, Auguste Comte, and Michelet ; in the tribune of the government and in the Press, de Rémusat, Carrel, Duvergier de Hauranne, and Adolphe Thiers. These were the heirs of the Directory, and these were the men who were to continue the Revolution. To them, in great part, France owes her nineteenth-century renaissance.”¹

MARIE-JOSEPH-LOUIS-ADOLPHE THIERS was born at Marseilles in April, 1797. His father was the worthless son of a worthy father, that same M. Thiers who rebuilt the streets and reorganised the sanitation of the city of Marseilles, until the Revolution deprived him of both his office and his fortune. The father deserted his infant son and his wife, Marie Madeleine Amic, within two months of the child's birth, and did not appear again until his son had become a prominent figure in Paris society, until, in fact, there was something to be got out of him. His mother's parents and a paternal aunt undertook the expenses of his education, first at a day school and then at the Lycée of Marseilles. His curriculum was in accordance with the dictates of the Emperor Napoleon, and its object was the attainment of a practical, scientific, military education. In his own words : “ The Government took possession of me . . . and put

¹ J. M. S. Allison, *Thiers and the French Monarchy*. London, 1926.

me into a military school, from which the seniors were drafted off every year, the few who had distinguished themselves to be made officers, the rest to be spent in the next campaign. 'The life was very hard, but its hardships instead of killing me, as had been most probable, gave me in a couple of years an iron constitution.'¹ Accompanied by his mother, he left Marseilles, a busy port seething with revolutionary doctrine, in order to study law at Aix-en-Provence, a dreamy old town, where the return of Louis XVIII to the throne of France had just been welcomed with enthusiasm. He soon became one of a small circle of liberal thinkers, who were viewed with suspicion by their fellow townsmen, and it was during one of his many rambles in the hills round Aix that he met his lifelong friend, Mignet.

In 1817 he began to write for two reasons, to make money and to become known to a wider circle outside the little university town. His first success was a prize essay on a local moralist, who had lived at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In it he laid down the law, which was to govern the whole of his own life. "Be active, that is the great maxim; act, but act according to your nature. Let every one take stock of himself, and if he finds that he has nothing, then let him stay where Nature has placed him. But if he feels himself a warrior, let him run to arms; a poet, let him sing; an orator, let him speak; a philosopher, let him meditate. It is God who commands him and who will punish him with enemies, ennui, and unhappiness, if he fails to act according to his inspirations." In 1818 he and Mignet were admitted to the Bar at Aix, and began to practise there. Thiers soon won a reputation for eloquence and

¹ Thiers, *Notes et Souvenirs*, p. 34.



Photo : Rischgitz.]

LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS.

lucidity of argument, but he had physical disabilities, a short stature and a high-pitched, falsetto voice, which made his ultimate success doubtful, and he accordingly left Aix for Paris in 1821 to pursue a literary career. His grief at parting with his mother and grandmother, and from a lady called Émilie Bonnefoux, with whose father he fought a duel in 1824, his feelings having changed with regard to her, was very bitter and he was full of anxiety for the future.

Thiers and Mignet shared a room in a small hotel, and had a great struggle to keep body and soul together. At first Thiers took whatever hack work came his way, but his liberal friends at Aix had given him introductions to some of the liberal leaders in Paris, and they found him a place on the staff of the *Constitutionnel* in November, 1822. This paper was hostile to the Bourbon restoration, but Thiers turned it into an Orleanist organ. His brilliant style made him one of its leading men, and won for him the acquaintance of the most noted artists and writers of the day. The Spanish Revolution brought him into the limelight. After a tour of inspection on the frontier, he published a pamphlet, *Les Pyrénées et le Midi de France pendant les mois de novembre et de décembre*, 1822, which took Paris by storm, and brought its author to the notice of Talleyrand. The exact relationship between them is shrouded in mystery, but it is known that from the time of their first meeting the old (statesman) became the friend and adviser of the young journalist, so that it was very often the views of Talleyrand that appeared in the political articles of the *Constitutionnel* from the pen of Thiers. By the kindness of friends he was able to buy a share in the paper, and became a familiar figure in the social life of Paris. "In

the circle of the Liberals and of the *Doctrinaires* he became a frequent visitor ; a short little man with eyes singularly bright, so bright in fact that they seemed to illuminate the large glasses which covered them ; his mouth twisted into that dry little smile that became so familiar to France, and that was so dreaded by his enemies, talking with an unparalleled vivacity and *esprit* on all subjects from finance and astronomy to religion.”¹ At the same time his political creed was beginning to take a shape different from that of his Liberal friends. He became the upholder of constitutional monarchy, and his enemy was therefore not the Monarchy, as was the case with the republicans, but the principle of “Legitimacy,” and to overthrow this, the right of the restored Bourbons to rule as Louis XVI had done, he spent the next seven years of his life.

The years 1822–1824 saw the advance of the counter-revolution in France, and reaction steadily gained ground, a fact which strengthened the forces of anarchy and the wilder revolutionary spirits. In 1824 the King died and was succeeded by the Count of Artois, Charles X, an Ultra of the Ultras, who had learned nothing from the Revolution save hatred of all its principles. He was determined, with the help of his ministers, Villele and Polignac, who believed in the divine right of kings, to re-establish all that had been taken away from the Crown in 1789. If Charles had been an abler ruler this policy might have been successful ; for his opponents were weak and divided. But he failed to reckon with the forces let loose by the industrial revolution, of which, politically, the most important was the strength of the bourgeois class to whom Thiers and the Liberals belonged. It

¹ J. M. S. Allison, *op. cit.* p. 42.

was at this psychological moment that Thiers published his *History of the French Revolution*, a work recalling at the same time the vices of the system, which Charles was trying to restore, and the evils of mob rule as revealed by the Terror. Thiers was preaching a sermon on Moderate Liberalism, and all that was best in the Revolution.

The opposition to Charles X was centred in the *National*, the paper founded by Thiers, Mignet, and Armand Carrel in 1829. They were backed by Talleyrand, Laffitte, the Liberal leader, and financially by Baron Cotta of Cottendorff, the head of the famous Cotta Press. It preached Representative Monarchy on the English system, and its object was to instruct the public in this new type of monarchy and to expose the character of the existing government. It had to walk warily on account of the Press Laws, and, as Lamartine said of Thiers, "There is enough saltpetre in that little man to blow up ten governments." As time went on Thiers grew bolder, and preached a bloodless revolution, entailing a change in the person of the monarch. In the elections of 1830 the Liberals gained the majority. The King therefore carried out a *coup d'état*. By four Ordinances the liberty of the Press was suspended, the Chamber was dissolved, the electoral system was changed to the exclusion of the bourgeoisie in favour of the great landowners, and an election was ordered under the new system. The *National* promptly published a Protest, drawn up by Thiers and signed by the leading members of the Paris Press, which declared that the recent acts were a violation of the law and need not be obeyed. "As for France," it ran, "let her decide how far she ought to carry resistance against tyranny." The printing presses

were destroyed by Royal officers, but mechanics in the crowd set them up again. Thiers printed a last protest and fled from Paris.

France decided that she ought to carry resistance to revolution. The July Days were the result, and their outcome was the Monarchy of Louis Philippe. A meeting was held at Laffitte's house on July 29. Thiers, who had returned as soon as the Bourbons had been driven out, suggested the Duke of Orleans as an alternative to republicanism. When asked as to ways and means, he answered, "Compromise him without consulting him." It was therefore Thiers who wrote the poster extolling the virtues of the Duke, and who set out to make him King. When he reached the Duke's house, whither he had been sent to persuade him to accept the crown, he found only Madame Adelaide and his future Queen. But he was able to convince them that the Duke's acceptance would be the best solution for France, and Louis Philippe became King. This change of monarch was accompanied by a change in the life of Thiers. He gave up journalism, reluctantly, if we are to believe his own words, and entered politics. Speaking of the change he wrote, "I am not defending this monarchy for what it has profited me. For it I abandoned my studies, I forsook my tranquillity, and I have had to endure recriminations; I have forsaken a quiet existence for an uncertain and troublesome career."

Aix elected him as its Deputy soon after the revolution, and once in the Chamber his old ambitions were aroused to make himself a name as an orator in spite of his physical disabilities. From the first he allied himself with the most conservative members of the Government,

and after Laffitte fell in 1831, he broke with him and with many of his old friends politically ; for he was convinced that the Republican Party, the Party of the Left, was a danger to France. It was during the Périer *Résistance* Ministry that he won fame as an orator. His first great speech was a defence of the Laffitte administration, of which he had been a member, especially in the realm of its foreign policy. From this time also dates his practice of finding supporters among the "floaters" in the Chamber, deputies who were not ardently attached to any political party, which won for him the nickname of "l'oiseau sur la branche." Thiers was in office during most of the first ten years of the reign of Louis Philippe. From 1832 to 1836 he was Minister of the Interior, and in that capacity he was chiefly responsible for the failure of the movement in Lyons, originated by and associated with the name of Louis Blanc. It began by being an industrial movement, but it soon developed political and revolutionary objects and spread to Paris. Thiers cut off the disaffected Faubourgs from the rest of the city of Paris by means of barricades, and insisted on directing the operations in person, in spite of the fact that his costume as minister made him so conspicuous a target that his secretary was struck down at his side. The swift victory of the Government was made easier by the increased prosperity of France, which the ministers of Louis Philippe had done a great deal to foster ; for they found that the industrial situation was a most unsatisfactory one when they first took office.

As Minister of Public Works Thiers began the beautifying of the city of Paris, afterwards completed by Napoleon III and Hausmann. In 1834 he was elected a member of the Academy, and made his inaugural

address the opportunity to explain his political views, which he declared to be patriotic and anti-revolutionary in politics, in philosophy, and in literature. His ideal form of government was the English Constitution, and in defiance of Guizot, with whom he agreed on many other points, he maintained that the King ought to choose his ministers in accordance with the will of the people, as expressed by the majority in the Chamber. Both Guizot and Thiers belonged to the Centre Party, but this Party had split into three parts. Guizot led the Right Centre, Thiers the Left Centre, and between them was a small group headed by Dupin ; but all three sections were agreed in their hatred of Legitimacy and of Republicanism. They could all three have used the words of Thiers in his first speech to the Chamber on becoming its President in 1836, " I remain what I have been, the faithful friend of the July Revolution. But I am convinced of this great truth, that to save a revolution you must prevent it from going too far." Both the first and second ministries of Thiers were short and both came to grief over foreign politics, in which his views differed from those of the King.

In 1836 Thiers wished to revive the prestige of France by alliance with England and Austria, and tried to bring about a marriage between the young Duke of Orleans and one of the Austrian Archduchesses. The scheme, however, broke down, because an attempt on the life of Louis Philippe, which took place at the critical moment, made Metternich feel that the French throne was still an insecure one. The plans of Thiers were too ambitious for the timid King, and Thiers resigned, being unwilling that the King should govern as well as reign. Again, in 1839, he was prepared to

go to great lengths against Mehemet Ali in alliance with England. But the King would not allow Thiers to ask for a credit for 500,000 men to support French demands, and Thiers resigned. Although his ministry had been such a short one, he had been busy laying the foundations for a greater France, by the building of railways, the development of the port of St. Nazaire, and the French marine to North and South America, the colonisation of Algiers and the reform of the army.

From 1840 to 1863 the great work of Thiers was literary, not political. During those years he wrote the *History of the Consulate and of the Empire*. Napoleon was his hero, and it was he who had been instrumental in bringing the remains of the Emperor from St. Helena to the tomb in the Invalides. His writings contributed to the downfall of the Orleanist dynasty and to the establishment of the Second Empire. There was nothing to satisfy the desire of the French for glory in a king who carried an umbrella, and whose aim was peace and commerce, while his manipulation of the Chamber by bribery and tricks outraged his subjects. During these years Thiers only intervened before 1848 on special occasions, to defend or explain the acts of his last ministry, and after 1848 to rally against the Republic all the forces of monarchical opposition and to rescue the menaced social order from the extremists of the republican party. But, as a contemporary observed, "M. Thiers is tremendously powerful when he is not a minister." In 1833 he had married Mlle. Dosne, who belonged to a rich bourgeois family, and who possessed a remarkable mother with great social ambitions. The Dosne-Thiers salon accordingly became one of the chief political centres of Paris. Moreover, the spell

woven by Thiers as an orator was always a force to be taken into account. At first "the short stature of the orator, his Provençal accent, the very freedom of his manners, so complete that they seemed affected, were far from winning for him the sympathy of all his hearers."¹ But these faults were only superficial, for a contemporary wrote: "Never has the French tongue, the true language of affairs and of diplomacy, been used with more dexterity and more charm, and at the same time with more power and persuasiveness, than by this native of Marseilles, who became the most Parisian of Frenchmen."²

When the February Revolution of 1848 took place the King sent for Thiers and formed a Thiers-Barrot Ministry, but things had gone too far by the time this step was taken. Thiers wrote himself: "This was the rôle that I played in this terrible catastrophe. Called when all was lost, I came, for my honour's sake, to offer my useless presence to a dynasty, whose elevation I had beheld and whose downfall I would have prevented. I came and I carried away with me only pain and sorrow."³ After the Revolution he constituted himself the defender of social order, menaced by demagogues or by preachers of anarchy, like Proudhon, and was personally responsible for the election of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte as President. At first he was the chief councillor of the Prince President, but when he too evinced a desire to govern as well as rule, Thiers joined the ranks of the monarchical opposition, though he still fought the Mountain, the republican party, and thereby saved the

¹ E. Zevort, *Thiers*, p. 81.

² *Ibid.* p. 112.

³ Thiers, *Notes et Souvenirs*, p. 60.

principles, which he thought to be in danger. At the same time, however, that he killed the Republic he made way for the Second Empire. He seems to have been blind to the trend of events, although he made a memorable speech attacking the Prince President for his dismissal of General Changarnier, the chief obstacle to the formation of the empire. He was imprisoned, when the *coup d'état* took place, but was allowed to withdraw into exile a few days later. The next year permission was granted for his return to France, and he then devoted himself to the *History of the Consulate and of the Empire*, taking no part in political life until 1863. He was then sixty years of age, when most people think of retiring from active life. Thiers, however, was destined to become the first President of the Third Republic.

In 1863 Thiers consented to stand as Deputy for Lille, and became the leader in the Chamber of those who were fighting for liberal principles, although they did not desire the downfall of the empire. He spoke frequently between 1863 and 1870 and his oratory was always didactic. "M. Thiers, a pontifical little figure, with gleaming spectacles and a wintry smile, enlightened his countrymen in speeches of enormous length upon the march of progress; there were understood to be five 'libertés nécessaires'—of the individual, the Press, the vote, the deputy, and the Chamber."¹ In foreign politics he opposed the Mexican adventure, because he feared that it would prove the Spain of the Third Napoleon, and he fought against Italian unity because he thought that it would inevitably be followed by German unity. Again and again he warned the Government of the dangerous course it was pursuing with regard

¹ P. Guedalla, *The Second Empire*, p. 337.

to Germany, and in 1870, only fifteen days before war was declared, he went so far as to maintain that France was not in a fit state to go to war, and that "La guerre mal fait est celle qui coûte le plus." He made a last attempt to avert the catastrophe on July 15, but he was howled down and accused of having sold himself to Prussia, while his house was threatened by the mob shouting "À Berlin."

After the fall of the empire Thiers was made a member of the Commission for the defence of Paris, but he refused to have anything to do with the revolution or with the government it set up. Nevertheless Jules Favre besought him to visit the other countries of Europe in order to secure an armistice for France. His mission was fruitless, for he found nothing but sympathy without practical help for his country in its extremity. On February 18, 1871, he was elected practically unanimously by the National Assembly which met at Bordeaux, to be the executive head of the French Republic, and on August 30 his title was changed to that of President. His first act was to go to Versailles with Jules Favre, his Foreign Minister, to negotiate the terms of peace. He was obliged to submit to the cession of Alsace, part of Lorraine and to the payment of an indemnity of five milliards, guaranteed by a graduated military occupation of the country. His only victory was to save Belfort. In the words of Jules Favre, "Je le vois encore, pâle, agité, s'asseyant et se levant tour à tour; j'entends sa voix brisée par le chagrin, ses accents suppliants et fiers, et je ne sais rien de plus grand que la passion de ce noble cœur, éclatant en plaintes, en menaces, en prières, s'irritant par degrés en face d'une injuste résistance."¹

¹ E. Zevort *op. cit.* p. 222.

The Assembly ratified the peace terms, and Thiers then turned his attention to the reconstruction of France. In twenty-seven months everything was remade, the Commune was vanquished, the indemnity was paid, French territory was delivered from German occupation, the army was reconstituted, and all branches of the administration reorganised. Nevertheless the bulk of the Assembly was monarchical in feeling, and put M. Thiers in a minority on May 24, 1873. He therefore resigned and Marshal Macmahon became President. With the people his downfall only increased his popularity, so that nobody else save Thiers was allowed to bear the title of the Liberator. The overthrow of Macmahon in 1877 came too late for him to resume office; for he died very suddenly in the midst of writing a book on philosophy and in full command of his faculties.

His funeral was a sign of the affection and veneration in which the French people held the little man, of whom his biographer wrote: "Great journalist, great orator, great historian, statesman of the first rank, and great patriot, M. Thiers filled this century with his fame and his works." He had the faults of the politician, and was an adept at withdrawing from an untenable position, so that half of his epitaph may be called in question. *Veritatem coluit, patriam dilexit.* "I am not certain that he always cultivated truth. . . . But I am certain of this, that he always loved, cherished, preferred his country above all. I have known, obscure or glorious, patriots who were as ardent, but among them all I have never known a better." ¹

¹ J. Reinach, *Récits et portraits contemporains*.

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COUNT ALBRECHT VON ROON

"Scharnhorst was the 'Waffenschmied'¹ of German freedom, Roon the 'Waffenschmied' of German unity."

"So long as we make known to our children the great achievements of our past . . . so long will Roon's name remain inseparable from the names of Bismarck and Moltke—and let us add—that of his great and noble Emperor."—From the *Kölnische Zeitung*.

ITALIAN unity was the work of four men, Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi, and their King, Victor Emmanuel, and they all came from Piedmont, with the result that the united Kingdom of Italy was a constitutional one. German unity was also the work of four men, Bismarck, Moltke, Roon, and their King, William, and they were all four Prussians, and the history of Prussia was predominantly military. Hence the union of Germany was accomplished by "blood and iron," and the other aim of the national movement, constitutional government, was crushed in the process. Outside his own country the fame of Bismarck the statesman, and Moltke the general has eclipsed that of Roon the War Minister, but without him the diplomacy of Bismarck and the strategy of Moltke would have been impossible. Without a weapon the strongest fighter is no match for a fully armed man. It was Roon's mission to forge the weapon, which made Prussia invincible in battle. Perhaps something of this may have been in Wagner's mind,

¹ Waffenschmied = armourer, but its literal translation reads better—the smith or forger of weapons.

when he wrote the first act of Siegfried. Siegfried, the young hero, wanted a sword. Mime, the dwarf, spent his life in trying to forge one strong enough to bear the test to which Siegfried submitted it, a blow with full force across the anvil. Each sword so treated broke to pieces in his hand, just as the Prussian army during the reign of Frederick William IV proved its helplessness whenever it was mobilised. At length Siegfried found the fragments of his father's sword, the magic Nothung, and forged his own sword from them, so that when he tried its edge upon the anvil, the anvil split in half. The triumphant notes of the sword theme may well have been inspired by the triumph of the German army, whose military glory so intoxicated the German people that they were willing to forego liberty.

It must be emphasised that to a Prussian the army was sacred. In a land without natural frontiers it had been the sole defence of the Mark of Brandenburg and the Kingdom of Prussia, until the people had come to look upon it as their only safeguard, and the King regarded its well-being as the main trust of his life. The belief which Roon shared with the finest elements in the army had in it the spirit of Cromwell's Ironsides. He had a religious belief in the destiny of Prussia and of Germany, and a conviction that the Prussian army was God's chosen instrument for shaping that destiny. Hence his struggle for the army against Prussian liberalism was to him a matter of religion, in which motives of self-glorification had no part.

Albrecht von Roon was born on April 30, 1803, at Pleushagen, near Kolberg, on the eastern frontier of Brandenburg. His playground was the stretch of sand dunes which ran down to the sea. He was descended

from a Flemish family, who had fled from the Spanish tyranny in 1555. His boyhood was one of great poverty. His father, who had been an officer in the Prussian army, lost everything as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, and died when his son was eight years old, leaving him to the care of his invalid mother. She found a shelter with her own mother in Alt-Damm. The boy owed much to this capable and patriotic lady; for besides providing him and his mother with the necessities of life when food was so scarce owing to Napoleon's campaigns that she had hardly enough for her own family, she gave her grandson his first training and education. She died in 1813, and he was left uncared for until an uncle took charge of him in the following year. This uncle was the Captain von Franckenberg, and he prepared the young von Roon for entrance to a Cadet School, so that he might be a soldier in accordance with the family tradition.

In 1816, at the age of thirteen, he entered the Cadet School of Kulm in Poland, where he had the good fortune to win the favour of his tutor, von Chappnis, who became a father to the fatherless cadet, and exercised a great influence in the formation of his character; for he imbued him with his own sense of duty and fiery patriotism. In May, 1818, he was one of the Kulm cadets to be sent to the Cadet School at Berlin, and there he received his first introduction to Court life, for the cadets took it in turns to act as pages to the King. His progress was so rapid that he received his Commission in 1821 before he was eighteen, and from that time, in spite of his poverty, by dint of hard work and sheer force of character, he advanced until he became one of the greatest men in Prussia. His path to promotion was by

perfecting his knowledge of all military subjects, so that in 1828 he was appointed as instructor to his old Cadet Corps at Berlin, a position he held until 1848.

Von Roon gained a reputation outside the army by his writings on history and geography until he became the recognised authority in those subjects. In 1831 he was promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant in a regiment, which formed part of a Corps of Observation sent to the frontier, in case war broke out between France and Holland, and there he was appointed to the staff of the general commanding the corps. In this capacity he gained his first experience of the administrative side of a soldier's life, and at the same time he discovered how unsatisfactory was the condition of the Prussian army. In 1833 he was appointed to the Topographical Bureau of the General Staff, an appointment which took him long journeys into all the corners of the Prussian dominions. In the course of one of his journeys, on a summer's day in 1834, he made the acquaintance of a young student, who was a friend of his nephew Maurice von Blanckenburg at the University of Göttingen. The friendship which began at that meeting lasted to the end of Roon's life, and was fraught with momentous consequences; for the youth of nineteen was the future Imperial Chancellor of the German Empire, Otto von Bismarck, who was to owe his appointment as the Premier of Prussia to the representations of the War Minister Roon to his royal master.

During a short visit to Schleswig, Roon had met the family of a Lutheran minister, and had fallen in love with one of his daughters. His marriage with Anna Rogge accordingly took place in 1836. Soon after his marriage Roon nearly lost his sight, which he

had tried by too close study, and for a time it seemed as if he would be obliged to give up his career in the army. Fortunately for Prussia his sight recovered and his capacity for work seemed as boundless as ever. By the time that he became the tutor of the fifteen-year-old Prince Friedrich Karl, in 1843, besides his work at the Cadet School, he was editor of the military paper which appeared weekly, the Director of the history division of the General Staff, the Director of the Secret Archives and the Library, the Censor of all military writings in the province of Brandenburg and Berlin, part author of the General Staff work on the Seven Years' War and editor of the *Year Book of Scientific Criticism*. When Prince Friedrich was eighteen Roon accompanied him to the University of Bonn as his tutor for military studies, and it was this appointment which first brought him to the notice of Prince William of Prussia, afterwards the Prince Regent, King and Emperor. This connection was strengthened during the revolutions of 1848 and 1849, for Roon became the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Corps, which had been sent to preserve order in the Rhine Province and the Palatinate. Prince William became the Governor-General of these provinces at the same time, and Roon became one of his intimates. Together they realised the deplorable state of the army and the need for drastic reforms, before Prussia could be strong enough to hold her own in the Counsels of Europe. This conviction was strengthened by a general mobilisation of the Prussian army in 1850, when there was the possibility of war with Austria, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg. Though individual officers like Roon might do wonders with their own corps, the whole system of military service needed reorganising in all its

branches, and this was out of the question as long as Frederick William's feeble rule lasted.

In 1857 the King became insane, and Prince William was made Regent until his brother died in 1861, when he succeeded to the throne. That his relations with Roon must have been on a very intimate footing appears from a letter, when Roon was transferred to Posen, in which he said, "Personally your departure is very painful to me, for it breaks our intimate discussions, which is a grievous loss." At all events, when the Prince had the reins of government in his own hands, he knew where to turn for the man who shared his views, and who was capable of effecting the reformation of the Prussian army.

On June 25, 1858, a momentous interview took place at Babelsberg between Roon and Prince William, in which the Prince declared that Roon was the only man he could trust to carry out his plans for the army, and the conference ended with the request that he should draw up a scheme for the reorganisation of the army and then submit it to the Prince. Roon shut himself up for nine days, and then emerged with the whole scheme cut and dried in a memorandum, which was a model of lucidity. In 1859 the army was mobilised during the Italian campaign of Napoleon III against Austria, and the same confusion and inefficiency appeared as at the previous mobilisations. As a result the generals of the army advised the Prince that nobody but Roon was capable of carrying out the scheme which he had drawn up, and Roon became Minister for War on December 5, 1859. Outside the army he was known chiefly as a writer, and in the army he was known as a general of great force of character and iron will. In

politics he was an extreme conservative, and therefore at variance with the rest of his colleagues, who were liberal. William reassured him on this subject by telling him that politics were not his business. His own most earnest conviction was that Prussia could only become a Great Power through the sword, and to that end the sword must be tempered and sharpened. "What I see," he wrote in 1864, "in history is force. . . . The Schleswig-Holstein Question is not a question of law or of pedigrees ; it is a question of force, and we (Prussians) have it."

It has been said of Roon's work for the army that no other military change of the kind is so directly and so completely traceable to the insight and persistence of individual administrative genius. For the sake of army reorganisation he sacrificed military glory proper, forced himself to become a speaker and debater of remarkable power, although he hated parliamentary politics, and fought a bitter fight against the Prussian Assembly. In outline Roon's scheme was to extend the period of service to three years, with four years spent afterwards in the reserve, and to enforce strictly the universal liability to military service. There was also to be a thorough reorganisation in all branches of the army, and the needle-gun was to be introduced as the weapon of the infantry.

In the general elections of 1861 the party of progress won a large majority. It thereupon demanded a great number of liberal reforms, including the reduction of the term of military service to two years. In September, 1862, Roon called on the Assembly to vote his new measures *en bloc*, a proposal which they rejected by an overwhelming majority. The War Minister, however,

regarded himself as the "Greek horse introduced by Providence into the Liberal Troy, and he was determined like George II, 'to keep the army free from the interference of the scoundrels of the House of Commons.'"¹ The struggle went on until the success of the Austro-Prussian War won over the Assembly. In the long fight between the Crown and liberalism Roon daily reminded William that the army as a monarchical institution was at stake, and that a Hohenzollern who betrayed the army betrayed himself. He also suggested that if the King's ministers refused to do their duty and defy Parliament, there was at St. Petersburg an experienced diplomatist of the name of Otto von Bismarck, who could be trusted to do the King's business. The King feared that his appointment meant a fight with Austria, and though Bismarck was summoned to Berlin several times on "sick leave" by his friend, nothing came of it. The quarrel meanwhile grew more intense and the King drew up a plan for abdication. Roon persuaded him to send for Bismarck, who was disporting himself at Biarritz on leave. The King agreed and Roon sent a telegram, which summoned Bismarck to Berlin with the words, "Come. The pear is ripe. *Periculum in mora.*"

On September 22 the King interviewed Bismarck at Babelsberg, and tore up his abdication, while Bismarck promised to fight for the rights of the Crown and the royal scheme for the reorganisation of the army to the last gasp. The following day the *Official Gazette* announced the appointment of Herr von Bismarck Schönhausen as temporary Minister-President of Prussia. On that same day the budget for 1862, providing for the

¹ C. G. Robertson, *Bismarck*, p. 80.

army under the new scheme, was rejected in the Lower House by 273 to 68 votes. Bismarck, in his interview with the King, had refused to bind himself by any programme of policy such as the King had drawn up, and described the situation in the following words: "The question now at issue is not between conservative and liberal, but whether the regime in Prussia shall be monarchical or parliamentary. If needs must, parliamentarianism should be withstood by a period of dictatorship. . . . I will rather perish with the King than leave Your Majesty in the lurch in the struggle with the Parliament."¹ We may add to that statement that the crux of the struggle was the question whether the army should remain under the control of the King or of the Parliament. At first Bismarck was conciliatory to all parties, but a speech made when he had hardly been minister a week showed the way in which he regarded the rôle Prussia was destined to play in the union of Germany. It was the famous and oft-quoted "blood and iron" speech.

While disclaiming the intention imputed to him by the Press of going to war in order to distract attention from internal quarrels, he continued: "It is true that we can hardly escape complications in Germany, though we do not seek them. Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to her power. The South German States would like to indulge in liberalism, and therefore no one will assign Prussia's rôle to them! Prussia must collect her forces and hold them in reserve for a favourable moment, which has already come and gone several times. Since the treaties of Vienna, our frontiers have been ill-designed for a healthy body politic. The great

¹ E. Ludwig, *Bismarck*, English edition, p. 213.

questions of the time will be decided, not by speeches and resolutions of majorities (that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849) but by iron and blood.”¹ This speech outraged every one, friends as well as foes, for Roon said to him on the way home, “Phrases like that are racy digressions.” Bismarck himself acknowledged that he had made a blunder, while disclaiming that his speech was an appeal to force, and describing it rather as a warning to Vienna and Munich. Nevertheless, though often sorely puzzled by Bismarck’s diplomatic manœuvrings, the scope of his genius being too great for Roon’s more limited vision, Roon remained the staunch friend of the Man of Iron, one of the few men who relieved the loneliness of soul in which Bismarck lived. He was, also, one of the few men who dared to speak the truth to Bismarck. Once Bismarck said to him, “I do not know what it is, I do my best to content the King, but I succeed worse every day. And nevertheless I have all the qualities to please him, and to do what he wishes. I am a Junker, I am a soldier, and wish to obey him.” “Oh yes,” replied Roon, “you wish but you don’t.”

Backed by the King and Bismarck, Roon continued the reorganisation of the army with the help of Moltke as Chief of the General Staff, since they were both convinced that only an appeal to the sword could settle the fate of Prussia and Germany with regard to Austria. Roon indeed saw in history “nothing but the blessing of Providence on the big battalions.”² His work was first tested in 1864 in the war with Denmark over the Schleswig-Holstein Question. Mobilisation was carried out with astounding quickness and precision, and the

¹ E. Ludwig, *Bismarck*, p. 220.

² C. Grant Robertson, *Bismarck*, p. 169.

commissariat and ordnance departments were equally efficient. He accompanied the King throughout the Danish and Austrian Wars, and at the end of the war of 1866 he rode, with the King, Bismarck, and Moltke, at the head of the troops, when they entered Berlin in triumph. The first war did nothing to solve the internal conflict. The Parliament still refused to vote supplies for the army, and the taxes were levied none the less.

The war of 1866 was the work of one minister, Bismarck, who dragged along the cabinet, the King, even the generals in his wake. When the battle of Sadowa had been won by the timely arrival of the Crown Prince, an aide-de-camp summed up the situation: "Your Excellency," he said to Bismarck, "you are a great man . . . now. If the Crown Prince had come too late, you would now be the greatest of rascals!"¹ Bismarck himself had answered the Crown Prince's suggestion that Prussia might be defeated with the words, "What does it matter if I am hanged? Enough if the hangman's rope should tie your throne firmly to the new Germany!"² There was one other war before the new Germany came into being, but the war of 1866 finished the constitutional struggle, and indemnification was passed by the Assembly for all the illegal acts of the Government. Bismarck had urged the necessity of union in the words: "Hardly anywhere in Europe will you find a power glad to further the establishment of this new and generalised life for Germany. . . . Therefore, Gentlemen, our business is to ensure the unity of the whole country, both in fact and in appearance. . . .

¹ E. Ludwig, *op. cit.* p. 291.

² *Ibid.* p. 290.

I beg you to keep your eyes turned abroad, and not to forget how necessary it is that we stand shoulder to shoulder facing outwards.”¹

The three makers of modern Germany were dining together in deep despondency in July, 1870; for it seemed as if the quarrel with France over the Hohenzollern candidature to the throne of Spain had been settled, and war averted with the chief obstacle to German unity. The telegram from Ems, the result of the mistake France had made in not leaving well alone, put a new complexion on affairs. Roon's comment was typical of the man. “Our God of old lives still, and will not let us perish in disgrace.” The three met William at the station, when the King returned from Ems. The King's first words were of the army. “Everything is ready, Your Majesty. There is no difficulty about that,” was Roon's answer, and mobilisation was decided upon before the King left the station. The telegram ordering a general mobilisation was despatched the same evening, and Roon was able to write that the next fortnight was the idlest that he had spent in his life, so perfect was the organisation he had created. As in the two previous wars, he accompanied the King to the front. At the battle of Sedan one of his sons was mortally wounded, so that the triumph of his army was balanced by his own personal grief. At a dinner on the day after the capitulation of Sedan, William acknowledged the debt which Germany owed to Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon. “I must to-day out of gratitude drink to the welfare of my brave army. You, Minister of War von Roon, have sharpened our sword; you, General von Moltke, have led it; and you,

¹ E. Ludwig, *op. cit.* p. 302.

Count Bismarck, by your guidance of the policy for years, have raised Prussia to its present high position."

The close of the war brought Roon more honours. He was made a Count, raised to the rank of Field Marshal, and in 1873 became Minister-President for a short time, thus taking Bismarck's place and relieving him of some of his burden of office. But such a pair could not run smoothly in harness. Bismarck stood for the German Empire, and Roon for Prussia, and it was, besides, almost impossible for any man to work with Bismarck. In the differences which arose between them, Roon appears as the noble-hearted gentleman he had always been. "A shrewder and kindlier man than the other Junkers, satiated with power, he was not ashamed to admit that he was no more than a second. He was accustomed to speak of himself as the shield upon which Bismarck had been uplifted."¹ Rather than break the friendship between them he resigned, with the words, "Allow me, once more, to call to you from a full heart. . . . Forward, brave hero! I shall continue to do so until the end of my life, which perhaps is near; shall continue to do so whether I am on the stage or in the auditorium." Bismarck's answer was equally fine, "I shall be rendered lonely by your withdrawal, for among all the ministers you are the only man with a feeling heart. . . . In the yellow sessions-room, no one can fill the gap where you used to sit on the sofa, and when I look at your place I shall think: 'I once had a comrade.'"²

In 1879 Roon came to see the Emperor on his birthday, just after the Emperor had escaped assassination. While he was in Berlin he caught inflammation of

¹ E. Ludwig, *op. cit.* p. 451.

² *Ibid.* pp. 456-457.

the lungs. The old Emperor of eighty-two paid a last visit to the old Field-Marshal of seventy-six, coming unannounced from the Palace just across the way to the hotel where Roon was staying. Deeply moved, he took Roon's right hand in his left, for his own right was still in a sling, and said, "Do I indeed find you like this, my old friend?" and then after a pause, "I have much, much to thank you for." Later he drew his right hand out of the sling, and pointed it to heaven with the words, "But we shall meet again. Give a word of greeting to my old comrades. You will find many of them there!" Thus they met for the last time, the two old men, whose stern sense of duty and simple piety made them representatives of all that was best in old Prussia. They had indeed more in common than had either with Bismarck or Moltke. Bismarck was a genius and as such transcended his native type, Moltke was by birth and upbringing a Dane, but Roon and the Emperor William were Prussians both in their virtues and in the narrowness of their outlook. A liberal paper thus described him: "Next to Count Bismarck the most noticeable figure is the Minister for War, Herr von Roon, a strong, manly, soldierly figure, the type of the higher Prussian military caste, solid, square built, stiff, although on the whole less stiff and unbending than the majority of his colleagues. His beautiful broad forehead and dark, expressive eyes showed a high level of intelligence, while his sharp, clear-cut face with the brown moustache showed him to be possessed of an energetic will, great perseverance, and tenacious endurance."¹ He died on February 23, 1879, "a nobleman by disposition."

¹ *Gartenlaube*, 1867, p. 287. *Photographien aus dem Reichstage*.

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COUNT JULIUS ANDRÁSSY

“As for me, I have never had any feeling either in the past or in the present than that of having done my duty.”

“If we have lost freedom, although we may still talk Hungarian grammatically, we are no longer true Hungarians. Our mission is simply to spread and naturalise true and genuine freedom in this part of the earth ; if we betray it, there can be no real existence for our isolated race in Europe.”—*Sayings of Count Andrassy.*

THE Hungarians recall their famous men by commemorating them in the streets and squares of their capital, and by erecting many beautiful monuments. Their names are strange to English ears, although they played a great part in saving Western civilisation from the Turk. The main street of Budapest is called the Andrassy Ut, and outside the Parliament House is the statue of a man on horseback with a drawn sword in his hand. The sword points across the Danube to the hill of Buda, whereon stands the Coronation Church instinct with memories of the past glory of Hungary, and the fortress, so long the shield of Christendom against Turkish onslaughts. The statue is of Count Andrassy, who fought for the freedom of Hungary and therefore was condemned to death as a traitor, but who afterwards became the first constitutional Minister-President of Hungary and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Count Julius Andrassy was born on March 3, 1823, in the town of Kassa in Upper Hungary. He belonged

to one of the oldest and most distinguished families in the kingdom. His mother was the Countess Etelka Szápary, one of the richest heiresses in Hungary, who fell in love with the handsome Count Charles Andrassy, and insisted on marrying him, although her parents had determined that she should marry the Duke of Coburg. The young couple were for a time so poor that she was obliged to sell the pearls she had inherited from her grandmother; Count Charles seems to have been a man worth the sacrifices of the Countess Etelka. Their son grew up in a household where the rights of Hungary were held sacred. Before his sudden death in 1845 his father had imbued Count Julius with the determination to carry on the work, in which he himself had taken part, of finding a solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem conducive to the good of both countries. During his most impressionable years therefore the boy lived in an atmosphere charged with the ideals and aspirations underlying the constitutional struggle between Austria and Hungary. Count Szechenyi shared with his father the chief influence in his development, and appears to have formed a high opinion of his character. When Andrassy was very ill at Pest at the age of sixteen, the Count said to the doctor, "Do you know that you can render no greater service to the country than by restoring the health of this young man."

Andrassy was educated in the Sáloralja-Ujhelyer Gymnasium and at the University of Pest, where he studied law. There he gained more fame as a horseman, dancer, and sportsman than as a student. After travelling in France, England, and Spain he returned to Hungary in 1844 and began to take part in the political life of his own county of Zemplén. After the



Photo : Stanley's Press Agency.]

COUNT JULIUS ANDRASSY.

appointment of the Appónyi Administrators he joined the Opposition, and wrote against the more moderate views of Déak in the *Pesti Hírlap*. When he was elected as delegate for his own county to the Lower House in October, 1847, he became one of Kossuth's supporters; for, as Szechényi said, "Kossuth drew all young men to his side." From that day to the end of his life Andrassy remained a Hungarian, never an Austrian, and the establishment of an independent Hungary in alliance with Austria was the object of his devotion. As early as 1848 he uttered the following opinion: "Within the borders of our fatherland dwell peoples of many tongues; there is one ground upon which these now divided peoples can be united, the ground of constitutional freedom, for which the Hungarian nationality is the only condition and guarantee. Without it there can be no Hungary. But on this foundation we can be one from the Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea. Without it there can be no free, independent Hungary. But on the basis of independence we can be united under the same sovereignty to the Austrian State. Unity gives strength."¹

When war broke out between Hungary and the rest of the empire, Andrassy became a Honvéd Major and Adjutant to General Moga, who described him as an excellent officer. Kossuth, however, had other work for him than fighting. He wished Hungary to be represented in foreign countries, and in April, 1849, he sent Andrassy to Constantinople with instructions, not only to secure the help of Turkey, but to win over Lord Palmerston to the Hungarian cause through Sir Stratford Canning, whose sympathies were known to be with the Hungarians. After a long and dangerous journey,

¹ E. von Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrassy*, Vol. I, pp. 14-15.

Andrássy reached Constantinople at the end of June. Although great secrecy had been observed, the Austrian and Russian representatives knew of his arrival and demanded of the Porte his expulsion with that of two other Hungarian emissaries. The Porte expelled one of them to save its face, but Andrássy remained. The Sultan allowed the purchase of arms for the Hungarians, but otherwise his mission was a fruitless one. Canning received him frequently, but only on the understanding that he did so in a private capacity; for as Ambassador he could not countenance a policy which would lead to a collision between the Russian and Turkish troops in the Danubian Principalities, and possibly to a European War. Andrássy remained, after the war in Hungary had been ended, until he saw that he could do nothing further for the other Hungarian refugees, and then, fearing lest he too should be interned in Asia Minor, left at the end of November, 1849, for Marseilles and Paris. He remained in the French capital until 1857 when he was pardoned by the Emperor and allowed to return to Hungary. In 1850 he was summoned to Pest to be tried for his share in the Hungarian revolution. Wisely enough, he refused to appear, and in his absence he was convicted of high treason, condemned to death, hanged in effigy, and his estates confiscated.

In 1856 he married the Countess Katinka Kendéffy, a member of an old Transylvanian family, whose beauty caused a sensation even at the Court of Napoleon III. This marriage was one of the factors which led to his return to his own country, and another was the attitude he himself had taken up with regard to the affairs of Hungary. Instead of becoming a republican, he separated himself from Kossuth and joined Francis

Déak, who wished to effect a reconciliation between Austria and Hungary, and who would have nothing to do with revolutionary schemes.

Andrássy spent the years 1857-1867 working for an independent administration for Hungary, so that she might become the partner of Austria, instead of being her dependent. Much had to be accomplished before the Dual Monarchy was established by the "Ausgleich" or Compromise of 1867 and the coronation of Francis Joseph as King of Hungary. "For ten years (1850-1860) the Bach System lay like an evil nightmare upon the Hapsburg Monarchy,"¹ until it collapsed after the Italian campaign of 1859, whereby Austria lost Lombardy. This system, which bore the name of the Minister of the Interior, established absolute government for all the nationalities comprising the empire. Bach's object was to centralise the government, to administer it through a bureaucracy and to enforce it by the army, which was entirely loyal to the person of the young Emperor. Hence he established "a hierarchy uniform throughout administering a law uniform throughout,"² and carried Germanisation into the most remote corners of the State. Hungary was reduced to a province of the Austrian Empire by a Proclamation of October 17, 1849, which ran, "The former constitution of Hungary is annulled by the revolution." Andrássy, therefore, returned to a country deprived of all its liberties.

A change for the better came when Bach was replaced by Schmerling. An Imperial Patent of April 19, 1860, removed some of the chief grievances of the Magyars, and the October Diploma of the same year was intended

¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*, p. 52.

² L. Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867*.

to provide the empire with a federal system of government on constitutional lines. This scheme proved unworkable and the Government then issued the Patent of February 16, 1861, which was a return to the former centralist, bureaucratic system. On April 6 a Parliament met at Pest. Déak rose to defend the rights and traditions of the nation, and on June 5 moved an Address to the Crown, which refused to recognise the February Patent, or the jurisdiction of the Reichstag therein established, insisted on the laws of 1848 as the sole basis of accord, and reminded the Emperor that an uncrowned King was no true sovereign of Hungary. Before anything else could be done the Diet was dissolved. Andrassy was constantly associated with Déak from the moment of his return to Hungary, and supported Déak in his resistance to the Patent. A speech, which showed that it was a violation of the liberties of Hungary, ended with the words, "For eleven years, not right but force has ruled in this country; does one among us believe that the nation to-day has less rights because those rights have been abused during eleven years? The only rights which can be considered to have perished are those which the nation itself renounces."

The next action of the Hungarian patriots was to abstain from attending the Reichstag, but in the meantime the Emperor was beginning to sympathise with the Hungarians. In December, 1863, he opened the Hungarian Diet in person, and resumed negotiations with Déak, which continued up to the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War in 1866. But the Peace of Prague changed the whole situation. Instead of having the German Confederation at their back, the Austrian Germans were reduced to numerical equality with the

Hungarians. Moreover, Déak made things easy for the Emperor in the hour of his humiliation. "What does Hungary demand?" the Emperor asked. "Nothing more after Sadowa than before it," was the answer of Déak and Andrassy, who had been summoned to Vienna. Another factor in their favour was the appointment of the Saxon minister, Count Beust, as Imperial Chancellor. Beust wanted a strong unified Austria in order to carry out his policy of revenge against Prussia, and for that purpose it was essential that Hungary should be reconciled. Hence Déak the lawyer, and Andrassy the diplomatist, triumphed.

On February 18, 1867, the restoration of the Hungarian constitution was publicly announced in Parliament, and a responsible ministry formed with Andrassy as Premier. Shortly afterwards the "Ausgleich" was sanctioned by the Hungarian and Austrian Parliaments, in spite of the extremists in Hungary and the party in Austria, who could not bear that Budapest should be put on an equality with Vienna. In practice the Compromise and the Dual System, which it established, was the coalition of the two strongest races in the empire, the German and the Magyar, against the rest, and its logical outcome, given the intolerance of the Magyar for any other nationality, is the map of Central Europe as it appears to-day. It secured to Hungary the absolute control of her internal affairs, although foreign politics and the army were controlled by the Emperor. On the other hand, Hungary in practice was the dominant partner, so that it was her point of view which inspired the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy in the East and made it anti-Slav.

The years between 1867 and 1871 were devoted by

Déak and Andrassy to the regeneration of Hungary and to securing the harmonious working of Dualism. He said himself, "The path, which must be followed, is as narrow and dangerous as that knife edge, across which, according to the Koran, the followers of Mohammed enter Paradise." It was largely owing to his diplomatic skill that the "Paradise" of Dualism was reached, and when reached made acceptable and permanent. His programme was its frank acceptance and the restitution of the Monarchy at home and abroad by the alliance of a constitutional Austria with constitutional Hungary. These aims raised Austria-Hungary once more to the rank of a Great Power.

Croatia was induced to agree to an "Ausgleich" with Hungary, which left her with considerable internal autonomy, while the other nationalities secured the Law of Nationalities. If this law had been carried out fairly, it would have satisfied many of their aspirations. Déak and Andrassy restrained Magyar Chauvinism, but when their rule was over, the attitude of the Magyars grew steadily more intolerant, and the provisions of the law were left in abeyance. In other directions there was an outburst of legislative activity after the stagnation of nineteen years. Taxation was reorganised, Chambers of Commerce were instituted, sums were voted for the building of railways, equal toleration was granted to the different Churches, State Education was established, the Press was freed, and the county administration was reorganised, all while Andrassy was Premier. He was, therefore, able to say, when he left Hungary for the Foreign Office at Vienna, "All is quiet on so firm a basis that even my eleven-year-old son could be Minister-President of Hungary." His amazing success in his

new capacity would have been impossible if Austria-Hungary had not gained all and more of her former strength as the result of the Dual System, which he had done so much to establish.

Andrássy was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs after the fall of Beust. Between the years 1871 and 1879 his name is associated with the League of the Three Emperors (the *Drei Kaiser Bund*), the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, which, by the inclusion of Italy, had become the Triple Alliance at the outbreak of the Great War. But even before his appointment he had exercised considerable influence over foreign policy. In 1870 Beust would have allied himself with Napoleon III in an attempt to avenge himself on Prussia for Prussia's treatment of Saxony, his native State, in the Austro-Prussian War. As a Hungarian Andr  ssy had no feelings against Prussia. For him the Eastern Question was of paramount importance, and his object was to oust Russia from her predominant position in the Balkans. "The blood always rose to his face when he heard the Emperor of all the Russias spoken of as the only defender of the Christian population of Turkey," and he once said, "the most astounding thing is that when mention is made of the Orient, it never comes into anybody's head to think of that Monarchy as well, which has shed most blood in the East. . . . Hungary under the leadership of the Hungarian Kings was the most famous power in the East." Hence Andr  ssy neutralised Beust's efforts and Austria-Hungary remained a spectator in the Franco-German War.

In his first Circular Despatch to the European

Chancelleries Andrassy declared that Austria-Hungary did not desire conquests nor extension of frontiers, but rather peace for the development of her internal resources. His first act was the appointment of colleagues, whose views were the same as his own. Thus Apponyi went to Paris, Langenau to St. Petersburg, and Karolyi to Berlin. At the special desire of the Emperor Beust was appointed to London, where he used his position to pursue a policy other than that contained in the instructions sent him by Andrassy. All Andrassy's efforts to establish a good understanding with British statesmen were therefore fruitless. His first plan was an alliance with Great Britain, in which Germany and Italy were to be included.¹ The result of his failure to induce Great Britain to abandon her policy of non-intervention was the formation of the Drei Kaiser Bund.

A foreign policy based on Dualism, which entailed the predominance of the Germans over the Slavs in Austria and of the Magyars over the Slavs in Hungary, was bound to be anti-Slav and anti-Russian, at least in the Balkans. This fact was not realised by the authors of Dualism, and Andrassy from the first sought to establish a good understanding with Russia. Russia had never forgiven what she called the ingratitude of Austria during the Crimean War, so that the relations between the two powers had been very strained, and Russia had remained a spectator in the Italian, the Austro-Prussian, and the Franco-German Wars. Beust and Prince Gortchakov had been on very bad terms, so that the former's fall from power had been welcomed at St. Petersburg.

¹ Despatch of Bulwer to Granville, December 27, 1871, from *Series Austria*, in the Public Record Office.

Andrássy seems to have created a good impression from the first, in spite of the fact that he was a Hungarian, who had fought in the Hungarian War and who was suspected of Polish sympathies. This impression was strengthened by one or two incidents which, though small in themselves, showed that Austria was prepared to consider the susceptibilities of Russia, so that the way was paved for the meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin in August, 1872. They were attended by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and the meeting was a personal triumph for Andrásy. Gorchakov paid him the greatest compliment of which a vain man is capable; for he said to a lady of his acquaintance, "It seems to me as if I see in him my own image in the mirror of youth. So long as the Austrian Emperor leaves him in his place, we are certain of peace," while Bismarck said that he was the only man on whose honour he could absolutely rely.

The Drei Kaiser Bund sprang from that meeting. Bismarck began from the old friendship between Prussia and Russia. On April 24, 1873, he concluded with Russia a military convention binding both contracting parties to assist each other in arms against an attack from any quarter, and then offered the Treaty to Andrásy. Andrásy would not accept it, for he was unwilling to sign any bond which would have obliged Austria to fight in the interests of others, such as the defence of Alsace-Lorraine against France, or the Tsar against England or Turkey. He managed to substitute an agreement more in accordance with the interests of Austria. By the Convention of Schönbrunn between the Tsar and the Austrian Emperor, the two rulers in the interests of peace bound themselves to take counsel

together if disagreements arose between their two countries, so that they might impose the maintenance of the peace of Europe ; to come to a preliminary understanding if a third power took aggressive action ; to sign a special convention if military action should be necessary to enforce peace, and to give two years' warning before breaking the agreement. To this document the Emperor William acceded, and peace was therefore kept in Europe in spite of a war scare between France and Germany until a rising in Bosnia and Hercegovina, which Turkey was powerless to crush, reopened the Eastern Question, and showed how divergent were the objects of Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. As early as 1876 the Tsar asked Bismarck the embarrassing question, Would Germany remain neutral if war broke out between Russia and Austria-Hungary? Bismarck gave the Tsar to understand that Germany would never allow Russia to crush Austria-Hungary, and the Tsar therefore proceeded to come to terms with Andrassy before he embarked on the Russo-Turkish War.

Andrassy wished Turkey to carry out reforms in the Balkans, so that her rule there might be preserved, and so that the lot of the Christians might be a more tolerable one. If Austria was instrumental in securing reforms, she would win for herself the prestige which Russia had formerly held. If reforms were impossible he wished for the formation of Christian States, independent of the Tsar and relying on Austria to safeguard their economic and cultural progress. Hence from the beginning he would have preferred that Turkey should keep Bosnia and Hercegovina, but when the Sultan proved too weak to check the revolt, he was determined that they should

not go to Serbia or Montenegro, and therefore he kept them for Austria.

When the revolt of Bosnia and Hercegovina ¹ first broke out, the efforts of the Drei Kaiser Bund were directed to putting an end, not only to the revolt, but to the conditions which had caused it, by inducing the Sultan to grant reforms, so that the grievances of the two provinces might be removed. Further, the Powers were anxious to localise the trouble by preventing the intervention of Serbia and Montenegro in the struggle. The conduct of negotiations was left in the main to Andrassy up to the end of 1875. On December 30 his scheme for a settlement, known as the Andrassy Note, was presented to the world, having previously received the approval of the Tsar. Faced by united Europe the Sultan accepted the Note "with bland acquiescence, as he had accepted similar expostulations before," but he had not the slightest intention of putting either it or a Firman of reforms, which he himself had issued, into practice. A settlement, therefore, seemed as far off as ever. The next attempt to bring the Sultan to reason was the Berlin Memorandum of May, 1876, but the longer the revolt continued the greater were the difficulties of the situation. Feeling in Russia was rising against the Turks, while Andrassy, as the spokesman of the Dual System, was unable to make too great concessions to the Slavs. On the other hand, the fanaticism of the Turks was growing, and led to the murder of the French and German Consuls at Salonika on May 12, 1876, and the Bulgarian Massacres in the same year.

On June 30, Serbia declared war on Turkey and was followed by Montenegro on July 1. The Montenegrins

¹ For Russian policy, see the Life of Gorchakov.

won many successes but the Serbians were beaten, so that only Russian pressure prevented the Turks from marching on Belgrade in October. It was becoming very difficult for Russia to refrain from coming to the help of her Slav brethren, so excited was public opinion on their behalf in Russia. The Tsar therefore came to an agreement with Austria-Hungary, so that, if he was forced into war, he might be free to prosecute it knowing that his ally would put no hindrances in his way. On July 8 the Conference of Reichstadt took place between the Tsar and Francis Joseph, accompanied by Gorchakov and Andrassy. Here for the first time the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary was mooted. If Turkey was beaten these two provinces were to go to the adjacent empire, Russia was to get back Bessarabia, which she had lost in the Crimean War, Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Albania might become autonomous States, Greece was to annex Thessaly and Crete, while Constantinople with its surrounding territory was to become a free city.

This agreement put an end to the danger of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, which Bismarck had been using all his influence to avert. The verbal agreement of Reichstadt was carried out in the Secret Military and Political Conventions of Budapest,¹ which were both dated January 15, 1877. Russia bound herself to treat Serbia, Montenegro, and the land between them as a neutral zone in return for a free hand in the rest of European Turkey, and promised that no great compact Slav State was to be set up, if Russia was

¹ The text of the Memorandum drawn up at Reichstadt and the terms of the Conventions of Budapest are to be found in A. F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, 1894-1914, Vol. II, Appendix A.

victorious. It was this Convention of Budapest which made Andrassy exclaim, when he heard the terms of San Stefano with its creation of a great Bulgaria, "Russia has played us false," and this which broke up the Drei Kaiser Bund. Russia was obliged to submit the results of her victorious campaign against Turkey to a European Congress, and the Congress of Berlin was a triumph for Austrian policy.

Before the Congress met, the chief points had been settled by preliminary agreements. The Vienna Convention of June 6 laid down the mutual interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, and hence what were the points on which they were to insist. The difficulties between Russia and Great Britain were settled by the Salisbury-Shuvalov Convention of May 30, and on June 4 a Convention was signed between Great Britain and Turkey. Bismarck offered Berlin as the meeting place of the Congress and himself as "honest broker" to mediate between his two allies. In practice he supported Austria-Hungary, so that she gained more through the skilful diplomacy of Andrassy, than Russia had gained by the great sacrifices of blood and treasure that she had made. Bosnia and Hercegovina were handed over to Austria-Hungary for political occupation, and she was allowed a military occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar, which cut off Serbia from Montenegro. Serbia was brought within the sphere of Austrian influence, and great Bulgaria was divided into three. That these terms constituted a triumph for Andrassy was not recognised by his countrymen, for he was welcomed from the Congress with an "outburst of cats' music." Nevertheless he had brought Austria-Hungary out of the turmoil of the crisis in the Eastern Question without war, and

with a prestige in Europe, which she had not enjoyed since the days of Metternich. He seemed to be at the zenith of his power, but it was at that point that he retired into private life.

Andrássy's last act was the conclusion of an alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany. In this final diplomatic duel of his career Andrássy got the better of the Iron Chancellor, and forced him to accept the alliance on his own terms. It was in form simply a defensive alliance, for Andrássy had refused to engage to assist Germany against France. Austria-Hungary and Germany both undertook to assist each other if attacked by Russia, but to preserve a benevolent neutrality if the other was attacked by an outside Power. The alliance was successful in keeping Russia quiet, but in the long run it estranged Russia from Germany and threw her into the arms of France.

The resignation of Andrássy was the result of the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Instead of annexation he had only gained the right to occupy the provinces, so that the Emperor's desire for "more acres" was only partially satisfied. The Germans of Austria were against it, because it added to the Slavs and destroyed their numerical superiority, and so they refused military credits for the military operations necessary to overcome the resistance of the inhabitants to the transfer, a resistance Andrássy had not foreseen. The Emperor then caused the liberals to be crushed in the elections of 1879, and the new Reichsrat¹ was inimical to the Dual System, though it was not strong enough to overthrow it. It, however,

¹ Reichstag = Imperial Diet or Parliament.
Reichsrat = Austrian Parliament.

governed in accordance with the will of the Emperor, and the constitutional majority, on which AndrÁssy had depended, was destroyed. Moreover, he was sick to death of the work, and physically worn out. "After thirteen years of the most strenuous work it seemed to me time to withdraw, not indeed from political life, but from the position and responsibility of a minister," he wrote to Count KarÁlyi, and he signed his last official letter to Bismarck on October 10, 1879, "in the 13th year of my 'reign,' and in the first of my freedom." He was succeeded by Count Haymerle for two years and then by KalnÁocky, whose policy filled him with anxiety. During the long and painful illness, which preceded his death, he wrote to a friend, and after describing his sufferings said, "I should bear everything easier if I could feel that I would never be wanted again. Wherefore it is lamentable that I have proofs to the contrary every day, and the thought is torture that I perhaps will be a useless cripple, just when I could be of use." His last years were spent in administering his estates, and in constant attendance in the House of Magnates in the Hungarian Parliament. His last public utterance was a protest against the Chauvinism of the extreme Magyar party, who were trying to introduce the use of Hungarian into the Austro-Hungarian army. He died on February 18, 1890, and with him died one of the greatest statesmen Austria-Hungary ever produced.

AndrÁssy was a typical Hungarian. His coolness, courage, openness, uprightness, and chivalry showed all the best characteristics of his race. In defiance of diplomatic practice he always said what he meant, and he never broke his word, so that he won the trust of such widely divergent personalities as his Emperor, the Tsar,

Gorchakov, and Bismarck. He seemed to know how to talk to every man with whom he came in contact, from the peasants on his estates to the Autocrat of all the Russias. As a statesman he knew exactly what was within the bounds of possibility, and he had therefore no use for unattainable ideals. From his love of nature he learnt to hate all shams, and his simplicity of address was the result. He could think best on horseback, and made most of his plans to the accompaniment of the galloping of his horse. Although politics occupied him for so many years of his life, they never absorbed his devotion. His home and his family were nearer to his heart, and his labours had always the peaceful background of a wholly satisfactory private life, so that he once said, "No schoolboy can more rejoice in holidays than I."

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PRINCE ALEXANDER GORCHAKOV

“ His Serene Highness, Prince Gorchakov . . . Minister of Foreign Affairs, was at the height of his glory and self-satisfaction. The glory did not last, but his self-satisfaction lasted as long as he did, and I am inclined to think that even to-day in his heavenly abode he spends his time in self-admiration and a longing to preside at all costs at a world conference of nations. Thanks to his self-love, in spite of his real intelligence, he had the knack of making himself ridiculous.”¹

ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH GORCHAKOV was born in 1798, and was educated at the Lyceum of Tsarskoe Selo, the school where the youthful aristocracy of Russia was brought up to adorn the higher circles of society, and where classical studies were considered too heavy a burden for the graces of social life. He left the Lyceum an expert in languages, strangely enough Latin among them, a source of never-failing astonishment to his fellow students. Among their number was the famous poet, Pushkin, and it is to the credit of Gorchakov that, when the poet was exiled to an obscure village in the depths of the country on account of his political opinions, he was one of the only two of his companions, who ventured to visit him and to express his sympathy. At an early age he entered the Foreign Office, and was attached to the suite of the Chancellor Nesselrode at the Congresses of Laibach and Verona. He did not come to the notice of the Emperor until he was over fifty years of age, when he was Minister-Plenipotentiary to the small German Court of Würtemberg. It was he who arranged

¹ *Memoirs of Baron Wrangel*, London, 1927.

the marriage of the Grand Duchess Olga, the daughter of Tsar Nicholas, to the heir to the throne of Würtemberg. There was a good deal of opposition to the match, but Gorchakov showed great dexterity and skill, so that eventually the difficulties were overcome. He hoped to have been given the coveted Ambassadorship to Vienna as a reward, but instead he remained at the Court of the young Grand Duchess for another eight years. While he was at Stuttgart he found means to gain a knowledge of the chief threads of European diplomacy, and was able to inform his Government of many things outside his own small charge. Then came the years of revolution, and the vicinity of Stuttgart to Frankfort brought him into contact with all the currents seething in Germany at the time. In 1849 the Parliament of Frankfort constituted a German Empire, from which Austria was excluded, and offered the crown to Frederick William IV of Prussia. The King refused to accept it, but the peoples of the various States tried to force the new constitution upon their rulers, and there were riots at Würtemberg, as in most of the other German States. The King of Würtemberg declared that he would never consent to be the vassal of a Hohenzollern, though this is what actually happened in the person of his son, a consummation that Gorchakov helped to bring about by the support he later gave to Bismarck and his policy.

By the end of 1850 the German Confederation had been re-established on the old terms with Austria at the head of it, and Gorchakov became Russian Minister to the Diet of Frankfort, where he shone in the reflected glory of Tsar Nicholas, whose commanding position in Europe was due to the part

he had played in crushing the forces of revolution. At Frankfort Gorchakov was especially fond of the society of his Prussian colleague, a young lieutenant of the Landwehr, a novice in the art of diplomacy but whose name was Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen. There too the poet Jukovski had a salon, of which Gogol was a member, and there Gorchakov's scepticism met with a mystic belief in the Mission of Holy Russia to replace the Cross on the Mosque of Santa Sophia at Constantinople. Gogol hoped, as he wrote to the Tsar, that "the great Tsar would profit by the power God had placed in his hands and solve a problem before which the Crusaders had recoiled: that is to say that he would drive the infidel from Byzantium and deliver the Holy Land." Strangely enough some such dream was working in the mind of Nicholas at the same time, and the Mission of Prince Menchikov was preparing. Otherwise it is difficult to account for the blindness of the Tsar to the general opinion of Europe and in defiance of which he believed that his cause against Turkey was a just one. In point of fact it was from Germany that he received his only support, and it was through the Diet of Frankfort that the negotiations of Russia with Prussia and Austria were carried on in the first stages. The Tsar was supported by Frederick William of Prussia, and Gorchakov had an unwavering supporter in Bismarck.

The majority of the Russian diplomatists, Gorchakov, Meyendorf, Kiselef, Brunnov, and even Nesselrode himself, held the view that the Tsar's policy was a disastrous one; yet they found it hard to forgive Austria when she refused to throw in her lot with Russia in the Crimean War. "The immense ingratitude of

Austria" became the parrot cry of every patriotic Russian, and Russia refused to recognise that Austria was loyal up to the point where her own vital interests were at stake. There is no law which places suicide among the duties of gratitude, and Austria was bound to prevent the Lower Danube from falling into the hands of Russia. Otherwise she would have been brought into direct contact with an empire, Panslavonic in its ideals, that would have threatened her own rule over her large Slav populations. As it was Austria pursued a course in which she sacrificed so much to her gratitude to Russia, that she offended the two Western Powers, and after the Peace of Paris was left without an ally in Europe.

In the summer of 1854 Prince Gorchakov was transferred to Vienna, the *cordon bleu* of the Russian Diplomatic Service, but in very trying circumstances. He was the Russian Representative at the Conferences of Vienna, while his cousin was Commander-in-Chief of the armies in the Crimea, and both were engaged in defending their country to the last extremity. Nesselrode instructed him that Russia was placed between the acceptance of four articles and war in the spring against the rest of Europe. The four articles in question were the Four Points, drawn up by the Western Powers in concert with Austria, after the Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities. Russia agreed to three of them—the joint guarantee of the Five Powers of the religious and civil rights of the Christian populations of Turkey, the vesting of the protectorate of the Danubian Principalities in the hands of the Five Powers instead of Russia alone, and the free navigation of the Danube. It was the Third point, which caused the breakdown of

the negotiations, namely the revision of the Convention of 1841, which had closed the Straits and the Dardanelles to foreign warships, and had bound the Powers to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. A Memorandum, showing the interpretation put upon these Four Points by the Western Powers and Austria, was communicated to Prince Gorchakov on December 28, 1854. It laid down that the exclusive protectorate of Russia over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia was to be abolished and their privileges placed under the joint guarantee of the Five Powers; that the free navigation of the Danube was to be secured; that the Treaty of 1841 was to be revised in order to admit Turkey to the concert of Europe and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, and that Russia was to renounce any pretension to the revival of her previous treaties with the Porte, which gave her the exclusive right to protect the Sultan's Christian subjects; in return the Powers were to pledge themselves to obtain from the Sultan such privileges for the Christians as were compatible with his dignity and the independence of his Crown.

Prince Gorchakov objected to the Memorandum on three grounds. He disliked the formal abolition of the former treaties between Russia and Turkey, he protested against being called upon to agree to the abolition of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, involving, he supposed, a limitation of the Russian navy and the destruction of the harbour of Sebastopol, and he maintained that Christian privileges would not be safeguarded unless they were made obligatory by treaty. The Conferences of Vienna finally broke down over the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, for on this

point Gorchakov refused to give way, until the fall of Sebastopol made Alexander, who had succeeded his father, Nicholas, in 1855, agree to the Austrian Ultimatum at the end of the same year. Peace was eventually signed at Paris, and by that peace Russia lost all the exceptional privileges which her treaties with the Porte had given to her, including the protectorate over her co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire ; she had to cede part of Bessarabia to the Danubian Principalities as Rumania was then called, and the Black Sea was neutralised. The foreign policy of Russia for the next fifteen years pursued one aim, that of getting rid of the clauses in the Treaty which were derogatory to her dignity, and this was the work of Gorchakov, who became Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as the Peace of Paris had been signed.

Gorchakov took back with him to St. Petersburg the most bitter animosity against Austria, whom he held responsible for all the misfortunes of Russia. There is a story that after a long interview with Buol,¹ he came out so agitated that he asked for a glass of water, and then paced the great hall of the Foreign Office for an hour, gesticulating violently, muttering to himself, and from time to time exclaiming in French, "Oh ! they shall pay for this one day ; they shall pay for it." They paid with the loss of the Austrian possessions in Italy and with the defeat of the Austro-Prussian War.

The old policy of Russia, which existed to the retirement of Count Nesselrode, had always been the same—to foster the growth of Russian prestige among the Christian populations of the East, to maintain the balance of power between Austria and Prussia and to increase

¹ Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Crimean War.

the influence of Russia among the secondary States of Germany. From 1815 to 1852 was added the defence of public order by the coalition of the great Powers. But Gorchakov broke loose from all these traditions and inaugurated a new style of foreign policy. Moreover, he held a position of importance in his own country and in Europe such as no previous Foreign Minister had enjoyed, for until the death of Nicholas I the Tsars had kept the control of foreign politics in their own hands. Gorchakov depended not only on the Tsar, but also on public opinion, which he took care to husband and even to flatter at times, and this was also a new phenomenon.

The Power with whom Russia maintained the most intimate relations after the Treaty of Paris was one of her late enemies, France. The idea of liberating Italy, of "fighting for an idea," was probably in Napoleon's mind when he signed the Treaty, and since the friendship of Prussia and Russia was necessary for the carrying out of that plan, he was careful not to humiliate Russia too far. Hence in all the discussions which took place in the carrying out of the peace terms, France invariably backed the Russian view. In concert with Russia France continually pressed the Porte to carry out the reforms she had promised; France backed the pretension of the Serbian people to choose their own ruler when they deposed their Prince, Alexander Karageorgević, in 1858; and France helped the Danubian Principalities to effect the union they desired. When Napoleon III was meditating his Italian campaign against Austria, Great Britain made a last attempt to prevent the outbreak of war, but Prince Gorchakov suddenly proposed a Congress, perhaps on a hint from Paris, and this proposal wrecked the negotiations. His other service to France

was the publication of the Circular of May 27, 1859, which calmed the warlike ardour of the secondary German States, and prevented them from helping Austria. Thus did Gorchakov have his first taste of vengeance against the Hapsburgs, and he was probably not altogether sorry when the annexation of Savoy by France brought the close alliance of Great Britain and France to an end.

In 1860 Prince Gorchakov proposed the reopening of the Eastern Question. He called together the Ambassadors of the Great Powers in order to examine the condition of the Christians in Turkey, and soon afterwards issued a Circular insisting on the necessity for a Conference to re-negotiate the stipulations agreed upon in the Treaty of Paris with regard to the Christians. His own remarks show the change which had taken place in the policy of Russia, and how far she was on the road to recover her old position in Europe. In his first Circular Russia was "meditating, not sulking"; in the second, issued at the time of the Italian complications, she was "shaking off the reserve which she had imposed on herself since the Crimean War"; and after the annexation of Savoy, "her conscience reproached her for keeping silence so long on the unfortunate state of the Christians in the East." This revival of Russian power was largely due to the skilful diplomacy of Prince Gorchakov, who knew how to turn all its twists to the advantage of his country, and how to preserve moderation both in his friendships and in his vengeance. Hence during the period of his friendship with France, he used to the full her good disposition towards Russia, and at the same time took full advantage of all her diplomatic blunders. It almost

seemed in 1860 as if there would be an alliance of Russia, France, and Prussia, in which case Russia and France would have been able to check Prussia in the accomplishment of the union of Germany. But Napoleon's attitude to the Polish Insurrection of 1863 put an end to the friendship between Russia and France, and gave Bismarck his chance to bind Russia to Prussia. From 1859 to 1862 Bismarck was the Prussian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he used all his powers to cement the good relations already existing with Russia, an object which was materially helped by his old friendship with Gorchakov. In May, 1862, Bismarck became Ambassador to Paris for two months, long enough for him to have taken Napoleon's measure; for he summed him up in the words, "the embodiment of misunderstood incapacity." At the end of September, 1862, the friend of Gorchakov became Premier of Prussia.

After the Polish Insurrection had broken Napoleon demanded a Congress. Gorchakov there denied the right of any foreign power to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. The nation hailed him as its saviour, who had repulsed a fresh invasion of Russia; for it could not know how little cohesion there was between the other Powers. He was accordingly made Imperial Chancellor and loaded with honours. From that time there was a close alliance between Russia and Prussia, and the friendship between Russia and France was broken. Gorchakov gave Bismarck his unwavering support during the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, and the Austro-Prussian War, for he rejoiced to see France mortified by the first, and Austria humiliated by the second. Thus he had scored off his ancient

enemies, but at the cost of the establishment of a great military State as the neighbour of Russia. In August, 1866, Bismarck sent Manteuffel on a special Mission to St. Petersburg in order to conclude an alliance with Russia, which lasted until 1878. Prussia gained a free hand against France, while Russia gained a free hand against Turkey.

The Eastern policy of Prince Gorchakov was the re-establishment of Russia's influence with the Balkan peoples, and the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. With regard to the first he secretly encouraged Pan-Slav propaganda in Turkey, whereby the Slavs of the Balkans were kept in a constant state of agitation. He appointed Ignatiev, an ardent supporter of Panslavism, to the Embassy at Constantinople, and did nothing to check the formation of a permanent committee to watch over the interests of Slav unity after the ethnological exhibition of Moscow in 1867, which was nothing less than a great Pan-Slav Congress. With regard to the second, Russia's chance came during the Franco-German War. It has sometimes been thought that Russia intended to go to war with Turkey when Prussia attacked France, but that the war in the West broke out before she was ready in the East. On October 19/31,¹ 1870, Gorchakov issued a Circular Despatch, stating that the Tsar no longer felt himself bound by the obligations of the Treaty of Paris, which limited his sovereign rights on the Black Sea. In explaining his course to a friend, he said, "If my calculations are out, if I have raised a tempest too dangerous for Russia, the Emperor has always the power to disavow me, if he thinks it necessary for the good of the country.

¹ The Russian calendar is eleven days behind the Western.

I should willingly sacrifice my person. My fall would not be the *dementi* of my career, for I could only be accused of having placed above all things the honour of my country. It is a sentiment, which has an echo in Russia." His calculations were not out. Even Great Britain did not object to the abrogation of the Clauses in principle, although she felt that it was impossible to allow a treaty to be torn up and flung in the face of Europe by one of the signatories. Hence she insisted on a Conference, which assembled in London in January, 1871, after Russia had avowed that "no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers, by means of an amicable arrangement." The new Treaty de-neutralised the Black Sea, but maintained the principle of the closing of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The Sultan really kept in his own hands the control of the Black Sea, for Russian warships had to be built and kept there. Moreover, if there was danger from Russia, he could always invite the ships of friendly powers to pass into the Black Sea before war had actually been declared.

Prince Gorchakov then sought to restore Russian prestige in the Balkans. When that had been accomplished, the last stain of the Crimean War would have been wiped away. As has been seen in the life of Andrassy, the old ill-feeling between Russia and Austria-Hungary was swept away by the formation of the Drei Kaiser Bund. In commenting on the meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin in 1872 Gorchakov told Brunnov, "It was a work of peace and reconciliation . . . nothing for the diplomatic archives, but the moral result is immense." Later, when the

understanding of Schönbrunn had been reached, he wrote: "The Count Andrassy is the first among all Austrian statesmen who has been able to advise his sovereign to try, in his relations with Russia, the application of simple common-sense rules. Prince Bismarck has said of him that he is too proud not to be loyal. He remains for us the honest rival, which Novikov¹ described to us. The clearness of his policy and the frankness of his character give an incontestable value to his assurances." By her *rapprochement* with Austria, Russia had in effect acknowledged the right of that empire to influence the Slav lands of the Balkans, a monopoly Russia had until then jealously guarded. Circumstances were, however, again to prove, as at the time of the Crimean War, that the interests of the two empires were fundamentally antagonistic, and that an alliance between them was very difficult.

The Russo-Turkish War was encouraged by Gorchakov, who, as always, kept his finger on the pulse of the nation, and found that Russia was growing ever more warlike, although the Tsar was anxious to maintain peace. As early as the Berlin Memorandum of May, 1876, he would have proceeded to extreme measures against Turkey, but was restrained by the Tsar, Bismarck, and Andrassy. When the Memorandum was withdrawn in order to give the new Sultan, Abdul Hamid—Abdul the Damned—time to prove his intentions, Gorchakov willingly agreed to this course. The conduct of Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, was doubtful throughout these preliminary negotiations, and during the Conference of Constantinople at the end of 1876 and the beginning of 1877. How far he was acting on

¹ Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

his own responsibility in encouraging anti-Turk propaganda in the Balkans, and how far he was supported secretly by Gorchakov can only be determined by an examination of the Russian Archives. The Treaty of San Stefano fulfilled all the ambitions of the Imperial Chancellor, but the attitude of Europe forced him to submit its terms to the Congress of Berlin. The preliminary negotiations with Great Britain were facilitated by the feeble state of his health, so that their conduct was left to Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador in England, who was much more amenable than the old Chancellor would have been. Gorchakov attended the Congress in person, and described the signature of the final settlement as the most painful duty of his life. The Congress of Berlin was perhaps the most remarkable assembly of European notabilities known to history. Its President was Bismarck, himself so worn out with work that he was obliged to drink a jug of port before every session. There were Disraeli, the Jew, always a strange and enigmatic figure, and Salisbury, the greatest of the younger statesmen of Great Britain. There was Andrassy, "a striking figure with his scarlet uniform, his sparkling black eyes, hair curling about his face, upturned moustache and the general appearance of a gay hussar," and there was the octogenarian Chancellor, "bent, thin, so feeble that he had to be carried into the hall of sessions, but still preserving the courage and dexterity, the exquisite grace and distinction, the command of polished and sonorous phrases, the high-flown and somewhat theatrical eloquence, to which he owed his great reputation."¹

¹ *The Congress of Berlin*, R. H. Lord, pp. 54-55.

The Congress of Berlin was no more successful in settling the Eastern Question than its predecessors had been. Russia and Great Britain, the two great rivals, both miscalculated the future of the Balkans, and it must be confessed that Russia, even if she were actuated by selfish motives alone, showed more foresight in her dealings with Turkey. The formation of Christian States, independent of Turkey, was the only solution capable of rescuing the populations of the Balkan Peninsula from Turkish atrocity and misrule.

In 1882 Gorchakov resigned his post as Imperial Chancellor and M. de Giers succeeded him at the Foreign Office. He died the following year at Baden Baden at the age of eighty-five. He was essentially a diplomatist of the old school. His despatches were models of style, so that he was known as the "Narcissus of the Ink Pot." He possessed the exquisite tastes and polished manners of the true aristocrat, and was not without a sense of humour except where his own dignity was concerned. In speaking of the Mission of Lord Wodehouse, afterwards the Earl of Kimberley, to Russia in 1856, he told his old friend, Sir Robert Morier, "Milord Wodehouse is a young man, who, I have no doubt, understands the science of farming perfectly, but who knows nothing at all of the practice of diplomacy. It was flattering for us that he was sent to us to learn his ABC, and I can congratulate myself on having given him several lessons." Sir Robert's diagnosis of the character of Prince Gorchakov was a penetrating one. "The springs of action in the Chancellor appear to me to be vanity tempered with patriotism. He is one of the vainest of the bigger statesmen, Beust always excepted, with whom I have ever had to deal. But his vanity is of a

far more masculine character than Beust's . . . being transfused with a great deal of genuine patriotism. . . . *Ego et Russia mea* are the Gods on whose altars he does not cease to burn incense."¹

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See also Bibliography at end of Life of Andrassy.

¹ *Sir Robert Morier, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 369.

BALKAN PERSONALITIES

CAROL OF RUMANIA

“Surely the best resistance to be offered to Russia is by the strength and freedom of those countries which have to resist her. . . . There is no barrier like the breasts of freemen.”—MR. GLADSTONE, *May 4, 1858.*

PRINCE CHARLES OF HOHENZOLLERN-SIGMARINGEN, a member of the Catholic and non-reigning branch of the Hohenzollern family, became the ruler of Rumania in 1866 until his death in October, 1914. His country was formed by the union of the two Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Their inhabitants claim descent from the Roman legions of Trajan, who colonised the Province of Dacia. They spoke the Latin tongue and looked upon themselves as the representatives of Latin civilisation in the midst of the Slavs, and followed the social and political manners of the French as far as they could. They had enjoyed a distinct position within the Turkish Empire, for they had possessed a considerable amount of internal autonomy under Hospodars, who until 1822 were Greeks appointed by the Sultan, but after that date native Princes. By the Treaty of Adrianople Russia had gained some kind of a protectorate over them, which gave her endless opportunities of interfering in their internal government. “For the phantom of Turkish suzerainty the Rumanians had received in exchange the stern reality of a Russian



Photo : Exclusive News Agency.]

CAROL OF RUMANIA.

protectorate." The form of government drawn up under Russian auspices was a rigid oligarchy, in which all rights and privileges were in the hands of the boyars, or native nobles, while the peasants bore the whole of the taxation. "The Rumanian people had no rights, the Rumanian nobles no duties." The sense of nationality, however, was strong in spite of social cleavages, and after the Crimean War they were freed from Russian domination. Austria and Turkey were opposed to the union of the two Principalities, and so a compromise was effected by the Convention of Paris in 1858 that was neither union nor separation. There were to be two Princes, two National Assemblies, and two Governments, but a central committee was to devise common laws for the "united Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia." The Rumanians themselves found a way out of this situation, for in 1859 they wisely elected the same Prince in each Principality, and the Powers allowed the election of Alexander Cuza to stand. His country was known henceforth as Rumania.

Prince Cuza carried out three important reforms: he transferred the land of most of the Rumanian monasteries to the State, and gave Rumania a great measure of religious freedom; he attacked the land problem by creating a large number of peasant holdings and by relieving the peasants of their feudal burdens; and he established free and compulsory education. But his private life was a scandal, and he alienated the nobles by his attack on their privileges and the people by his autocratic rule. He was forced to abdicate in February, 1866, and a Provisional Government was formed in order to elect a new Prince. The choice of the Chambers fell upon the Count of Flanders, but the Sultan pro-

tested, and a Conference of the Powers took place at Paris. The Count of Flanders refused to accept the offer, and on April 20 the Rumanians elected Prince Charles. The Paris Conference declared his election invalid, but the newly-elected Prince was of a stronger character than the Powers had anticipated. He took matters into his own hands and presented them with a *fait accompli* at a moment when they were too occupied to have time or opportunity to punish him.

When John Bratianu, leader of the Liberal party in Rumania, first appeared at Düsseldorf to tell Prince Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen that he was about to advise the Rumanian people to elect his second son, Charles, as their Prince—a course supported by Napoleon III—the two Princes had answered that they could not consent to such an important step without the consent of the King of Prussia, the head of the house. Moreover, Prince Charles objected to leave his own country, when it was on the verge of war with Austria. He was at the time twenty-seven years of age, exceedingly handsome, a soldier by inclination and upbringing. He had also gained some knowledge of administration through his father, who had become head of the Prussian Ministry in 1858 and who had held other important posts.

In spite of the somewhat doubtful response which he had received, Bratianu returned to Rumania, apparently well satisfied, and secured the election of Prince Charles. The King of Prussia did not like the project, but he did not definitely forbid it. Prince Charles found an unexpected ally in Bismarck, who gave him the typical advice, "Go to Bucharest in secret and present the Powers with a *fait accompli*, having first seen the Emperor

Napoleon, without whose support nothing is possible." Russia might be managed, and as for Austria Bismarck himself was going to occupy her attention for the time being. He added that if the adventure failed it would always be an amusing experience to look back upon. He advised the Prince to ask the King for foreign leave. He would know what it meant, but in that way he would not be implicated. Accordingly Prince Charles saw the Emperor Napoleon in Paris and then in Switzerland changed himself into Charles Hettingen, a commercial traveller with spectacles, who travelled second class, while his suite travelled first. After a nerve-wracking journey through Austria, where he once aroused suspicion by forgetting his name, he reached the Danube. Even then his troubles were not over, for owing to the Austrian mobilisation for the Austro-Prussian War the Danube steamer was two days late, and he had to wait hidden in his bedroom with the knowledge that if his presence had been discovered he would have been interned as a Prussian officer. Shortly before the steamer reached Turn Severin Bratianu came on board, but made no sign of recognition to the young man, who, sitting on a bale of merchandise on the second-class deck, was writing to the Emperor Francis Joseph that his acceptance of the Rumanian Crown concealed no hostile intentions against Austria. He had one last fright, when the captain demurred against his landing at Turn Severin, his ticket having been made out to Odessa. Muttering some excuse, he pushed his way on shore, where Bratianu, hat in hand, met him and asked his new sovereign to step into a waiting carriage. Behind him he heard the startled exclamation of the captain, "My God, that must be the Prince of Hohenzollern." Recog-

nition had come just a minute too late, and Prince Charles received an enthusiastic welcome from his new subjects. On his arrival at Bucharest he took the oath to keep the laws, maintain the rights and preserve the integrity of Rumania. After the ceremony he was escorted into his Palace, a one-storied building, whence he looked out on one side at a guardhouse, and on the other at a gipsy encampment with its herd of swine wallowing in the gutters of the main street of his capital.

The difficulties which awaited Prince Charles were enormous. The finances were bankrupt, the country backward though possessed of vast undeveloped resources, the government factious and corrupt, the army and police worthless and helpless. He never succeeded in overcoming the factiousness of the Rumanian Assembly, which in 1871 drove him to the verge of abdication, at a moment when he had temporarily lost the affection of his subjects, since he was a Prussian and their sympathies were ardently French in the Franco-German War. It was only a sense of duty that made him unwilling to leave Rumania until he had put the country on a sound basis—financial, political, and economic. But by dint of untiring devotion Prince Charles overcame the other disadvantages from which Rumania was suffering. In 1869 he went on a visit to the Tsar and then to his parents. While he was in Germany he became engaged to and married the Princess Pauline Elizabeth of Wied, who later did so much to rouse interest in her adopted country by publishing folk tales and poems under the name of *Carmen Sylva*. This marriage was one whose happiness was only marred by the death from scarlet fever at the age of three years of their only child, Princess Marie.

Princess Elizabeth won the love of her subjects from the moment she entered the country, and was untiring in working for their welfare. In fact Princess Marie caught the fever of which she died from her mother, who had become infected by nursing the poor of Bucharest.

As a Prussian officer, it is not surprising that one of Prince Charles' first cares was the army. For ten years he spent himself on remodelling it, with the result that in 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War, it covered itself with glory at the siege of Plevna. The war gave the Prince the opportunity to declare his country independent of the Porte, but this was the only advantage gained by the bravery of his soldiers. In spite of Prince Carol's protests Rumania was forced to give up Bessarabia to Russia, from whom it had been taken at the Peace of Paris in 1856. She received the Dobruja in exchange, but there was no comparison in the value of the two districts.

The Congress of Berlin recognised the independence of Rumania on certain conditions. The Jews in Rumania had long demanded the right of becoming naturalised Rumanian citizens, and the Powers decided that their enfranchisement should precede the recognition of Rumania's freedom. As Prince Charles pointed out, the number of Jews in Rumania was so great that they would have added between 300,000 and 400,000 citizens to the State and have swamped the native population. Moreover, birth in Rumania had never constituted nationality, and so the restriction on the Jews had no religious motive, but was merely a national precaution. In the end Rumania evaded the condition. The Powers recognised her independence, and the Jewish question was still unsolved when the Great War broke out. On March 26,

1881, Rumania declared herself a Kingdom and the Prince became King Carol I, his crown being fashioned from the iron of a Turkish gun captured at Plevna. From that date until 1912 Rumania belonged to that fortunate class of countries which have no history. In 1906 the Jubilee Exhibition was held to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Carol's rule, and visitors found that Rumania was possessed of all the externals of Western civilisation. Railways existed everywhere, the Iron Gates had been blasted and a magnificent bridge built over the Danube at Cernavoda, the credit of the country was excellent, and the production of petroleum had changed the character of Rumania, so that it was no longer a purely agricultural State.

In foreign politics Rumania through her King was at first drawn into the orbit of the Central Powers, but in spite of his German sympathies she tended to gravitate to the side of the Triple Entente. In 1913 she joined in the second Balkan War against Bulgaria and received a considerable increase of territory. At the beginning of the Great War she maintained a position of neutrality. Her King would have fought for Germany, but the feeling in the country was too strong for him. He died on October 10, 1914, and eventually Rumania threw in her lot with the Allies. As a result all the Rumanians previously outside her borders were incorporated within the kingdom. In this case the pendulum seems to have swung too far in her favour, and there is danger of trouble from the side of Hungary unless some rectification of frontier takes place by peaceful arbitration.

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STEFAN STAMBULOV

“On peut dire que la Bulgarie lui doit son existence comme État indépendant.”

STEFAN STAMBULOV, the Bismarck of the Balkans, was the man from whose life Western Europe gained its idea of a Balkan statesman, a violent barbarous person, living in an atmosphere of intrigue, plot, and assassination. This is unfortunate, for the history of the Balkan peoples since their liberation has not been entirely one of battle, murder, and sudden death. Moreover, if Stambulov's methods were neither humane nor civilised, those of Prince Ferdinand were little better. It is difficult to believe that eight years of Balkan air were responsible for the methods of the Saxe-Coburg Prince, who, in defiance of all the laws of gratitude and even of humanity, refused to allow his ex-Minister to withdraw from Sofia to a place of safety, and so practically handed him over to his murderers—if indeed he did not actually instigate the crime.

Stambulov was born on January 31, 1854, at Trnovo, the old capital of Bulgaria, where his father kept a small inn. He was educated at the communal school and became a tailor. During the agitation preceding the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, the first step in the direction of Bulgarian independence which freed its Church from the control of the Patriarch of Constantinople, a number of Bulgarian youths were sent

to Russia to be educated. Stambulov was among them, and entered the seminary of Odessa to prepare for the priesthood. Unable to bear the restraints imposed upon him, he rebelled against the discipline, and was expelled for having dealings with the Nihilists. He made his way back to Rumania, and there entered into close relations with the Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee at Bucharest, working for the political independence of Bulgaria. The first attempts at revolt took place in 1875, but they failed owing to the apathy of the bulk of the population. At the age of twenty he led an insurrection at Stara Zagora, while similar outbreaks took place at Trnovo, Panagurišté, and Koprištica. These outbreaks were entirely the work of the young Bulgarian party unsupported by Russia, for Russia did not intervene until war had been declared. They were, too, the signal for the massacres carried out by Turkish irregulars, known as the Bulgarian atrocities, which did so much to win the sympathies of Europe for the Bulgars and to alienate Great Britain from Turkey. When the revolt failed, its leaders were hunted through the mountains like wild animals, and many of them were captured and killed.¹ Stambulov, however, escaped, and when Serbia declared war on Turkey in 1876, he became a volunteer in the Serbian army. When Russia entered the war a Bulgarian contingent was formed to fight in the Russian army. Stambulov thereupon joined it and fought with the Tsar's troops in 1877 and 1878.

The Congress of Berlin allowed the formation of an independent Bulgaria, but insisted that it should not keep

¹ A most interesting account of the work of the Bulgarian Committees is to be found in Zachary Stoyonoff's *Autobiography*, pub. 1913.

the frontiers which Russia had designed in the Peace of San Stefano. Rumelia was separated from the Principality, and the Dobruja was given to Rumania in return for her cession of Bessarabia to Russia. In 1879 Alexander II's nephew, Alexander of Battenberg, became the first Prince of Bulgaria. He was subservient to Russia as might have been expected, but Russia was tactless in dealing with the Bulgaria she had done so much to create, and she soon lost the gratitude of the Bulgars. Stambulov, meanwhile, had settled in Trnovo as a lawyer, where he won a great reputation by his eloquence, and by 1886, when he assumed the Regency, was known as the cleverest and most acute lawyer in the country. He was elected Deputy to the Sobranje, the Bulgarian Parliament, and soon became one of its leaders. There were two chief parties, the Liberals, who were a patriotic party desiring "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians," and the Conservatives, who were Russian in their proclivities. In 1880 Stambulov became Vice-President of the Sobranje, and although the Prince and the Liberals were at variance, he seems to have enjoyed the confidence of both. On April 27, 1881, Alexander carried out a *coup d'état*, and suspended the Constitution. By means of packing the elections he obtained permission to govern irresponsibly for seven years. He found that the domination of the Russians forming the government was more objectionable than the method he had discarded, and he returned to the Constitution, to the rage of the Russians, who found themselves superseded by Bulgarians. In 1884 Stambulov became President of the Sobranje, but relations between him and the Prince had become very difficult. On one occasion, when

Stambulov was lying ill in bed, the Prince visited him and attempted to heal the breach between them. Stambulov was excessively rude, so that when the Prince re-entered his Palace, he was heard to remark, "Should it please God to take to Himself any of my Bulgarian subjects, He might choose my President, who never does me aught but ill."

In 1885 a conspiracy broke out in Eastern Rumelia. The Turkish Governor was expelled and the rebel Bulgars proclaimed the union of the two Bulgarias, and invited the Prince to accept the Union. While the other statesmen were wondering whether to adopt this course, Stambulov recognised its necessity and urged the Prince to yield. "Sire," he said, "the Union is made—the revolt is an accomplished fact beyond recall and the time for hesitation is gone by. Two roads lie before Your Highness: the one to Philippopolis and as far further as God may lead; the other to Sistov, the Danube, and Darmstadt. I counsel you to take the crown the nation offers you." Alexander's acceptance of the united crown was the final break with Russia. The Tsar appealed to the other Powers, but Austria-Hungary raised no objection and Sir William White, the British Ambassador, supported Bulgaria to the utmost of his power. Russia, therefore, was obliged to agree to the union, but proceeded to wreak her vengeance on the person of the Prince. In 1886 Alexander found himself at war with Serbia, whose Prince feared that united Bulgaria would threaten his own predominance in the Balkans. Russia had withdrawn all her officers from the Bulgarian army, so that Bulgaria seemed an easy prey. Overhaste, bad generalship, and lack of guns were, however, fatal to Serbia. The Bulgarians won

the three days' battle of Slivnica and advanced into the country. Austria-Hungary came to the rescue of her protégé, Prince Milan, and forced the Bulgarians to withdraw and make peace. Bulgaria thereupon concluded a Convention with the Porte, whereby the union of the two Bulgarias was formally recognised and an offensive and defensive alliance signed between Bulgaria and Turkey. During the war Stambulov had served as a simple soldier in the army, and after it was concluded he had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the alliance with Turkey.

In August, 1886, Russia organised a *coup d'état*. Alexander was kidnapped in his Palace, smuggled on board a Danube steamer, and landed on Russian soil, from whence he was allowed to withdraw to Austria. Zankov, the Conservative leader, made abject submission to Russia and Bulgaria lay at the feet of the Tsar. While a Government was being formed at Sofia, Stambulov took action at Trnovo. Rallying his partisans he recapitulated all the trials through which the country had passed to obtain its Prince, and the devotion which Alexander had shown to his adopted people. Was all this to end in handing over Bulgaria to Russia, and were Bulgarians traitorously to perform what all Europe had in vain attempted? He thereupon drew up a counter Proclamation against the Government and recalled Alexander. He next formed a Regency, and having discovered the whereabouts of the Prince, went in person to welcome him at Rusčuk, after which action he proposed to retire into private life. The Prince, however, besought him not to leave him and he therefore accompanied Alexander to Sofia. While he was resting, worn out by his exertions, the Prince sent a telegram to Russia,

which proved fatal to his cause. In it he said, "Russia having given me my crown, I am ready to return it into the hands of her Sovereign." The Tsar answered, "I shall abstain from all interference with the sad state of affairs to which Bulgaria is reduced so long as you remain there. Your Highness will know what to do."

On September 7, 1886, Alexander abdicated and withdrew to Austria, ending his life as an officer in the Austrian army. Before his departure a Regency had been formed, with Stambulov at the head, but things looked very black. Bulgaria was faced with the enmity of Russia, a partially disaffected army, and an opposition sure of Russian support. One of the Regents, moreover, was a traitor and had been bought by Russia. Stambulov, at the age of thirty-two, fought therefore almost single-handed for the liberty of his country. The tactlessness of General Kaulbars, sent by the Tsar to lay the foundations of the new government, strengthened the determination of the Bulgars to manage their own affairs, and on April 14, 1887, they found a new Prince in Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who was formally elected by the Sobranje on July 7. For nine years Russia refused to recognise his election, and he could not be received by the Courts of Europe, but this did not disturb Stambulov. After the Prince had actually landed in Bulgaria, he said to a friend, "No words can picture my delight at the arrival of the Prince. It had been a perpetual nightmare and terror to me that Bulgaria might lose her independence under my Regency and that my name would be handed down to posterity as a reproach. When the Prince left for Sofia with his new ministry, I spent three of the happiest days of my life."

Stambulov's holiday was short, for nobody but he

could govern Bulgaria. The Prince did not know a word of the language, and so from 1887 to 1894 Stambulov was the Government. His rule was a harsh one. "Stambulov was a man of Asiatic energy, passionate and cruel, a worthy pupil of his Russian masters, to whom he proved day by day that their weapons can also be employed by far feeblér adversaries. He concentrated all his extraordinary energy upon delivering Bulgaria from the Russian tutelage in which he found her, and from the Russian annexation which seemed to be in the future. To espionage, he replied by counter-espionage, to conspiracies by summary executions, to corruption by another variety of corruption, to cynicism by an equal cynicism."¹ Nevertheless, there was the other side of the picture. While he hanged the enemies of his country, whether Russian or Bulgarian, general or private soldier, without discrimination, he developed the resources of Bulgaria so that much of her subsequent development was due to his work. He established factories and primary schools, built roads and bridges, set up banks and secured large foreign loans with the help of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, and suppressed brigandage. It cannot be denied that his measures were summary and thorough. Personal friendship did not save Major Panica from being shot as a traitor. When the Holy Synod refused to pay its respects to Prince Ferdinand, Stambulov arrested the members, and sent them back to their dioceses, with the exception of the Metropolitan Clement, who was interned in a monastery for years. Such a régime was bound to create enemies. In 1891 and 1892 his greatest friends were assassinated, one in mistake for his person. In

¹ N. Iorga, *Histoire des États Balkaniques*, p. 424.

return he hunted all the doubtful characters out of the country, but when Prince Ferdinand, being tired of submitting to Stambulov's rule, determined to rule for himself and dismissed his minister, they were allowed to return.

The cause of the fall of Stambulov was his attempt to reform the administration of the army. The Constitution had left its control in the hands of the Prince. He was the Commander-in-Chief, all promotion was in his hands and the Minister for War was responsible to him and not to the Sobranje. It was, therefore, possible for the Prince to declare war on his own responsibility, and this is what happened when Ferdinand declared war on Serbia in June, 1915. Stambulov drew up a scheme for the reorganisation of the army on a constitutional basis, in order to guard against just such a contingency, and his scheme was passed by the Sobranje. Ferdinand, however, foiled him, first by depriving him of the services of the able Minister of War, and then by dismissing him from office by a rude telegram despatched from an Austrian watering place. Stambulov retaliated by a bitter campaign against the Prince in the public Press. It was known that the men who had tried to murder him before, had returned to Sofia, but Ferdinand forbade him to leave the capital. He was attacked and barbarously mutilated by Macedonian assassins in the streets of Sofia on July 15, 1895, and died the next day. His funeral was marred by disgraceful scenes, during which bands of rioters, unchecked by the police, tried to violate the body. The assassins were allowed to escape, and, when public opinion forced Ferdinand to bring them to justice, the methods used at their trial and the trivial punishment which they received threw

grave suspicion on the complicity of Ferdinand. But Stambulov's work had not been in vain. Bulgaria was independent, and the industry of her people soon gave her a commanding position among the Balkan States.

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NICHOLAS OF MONTENEGRO

THE hillsides which fringe the Bocche de Cattaro, an arm of the sea winding inland from the Adriatic, are luxuriantly covered with olives, figs, vines, and cypresses, but at the end of the inner basin the way is blocked by a sheer mountain wall of limestone some four thousand feet high. From top to bottom it is barren of all vegetation, and only the clouds soften the jagged edges of its crags. At the top of that rampart of rock is Montenegro—Crnagora, the Black Mountain—now merged in the Kingdom of Yugo-Slavia, for five centuries the champion of the Serbian race against the Turk. The country is a wild tumble of rocks and mountains. “When God made the world,” so runs the Montenegrin saying, “the bag which held the rocks burst and they all fell on Montenegro.” The Montenegrins are descendants of fugitives, who fled to the mountains after the battle of Kossovo in 1389, when the Serbian Empire was overthrown by the Turks, preferring liberty among the inhospitable heights to slavery under the Turkish yoke. The women did the work, the men the fighting. In times of great stress men and women fought side by side, for it sometimes happened that the Turkish armies were greater in actual numbers than the whole population of Montenegro. The direst insult that could be offered to a young Montenegrin was the reminder that his father had died in his bed. One instance will show



Photo : Exclusive News Agency.]

NICHOLAS OF MONTENEGRO.

the nature of the struggle. On Christmas Eve, 1703, the five brothers Martinović undertook to sweep Mohammedanism from the land by killing all the inhabitants who would not embrace Christianity. After hearing Mass and receiving the blessing of the Vladika, the Prince Bishop, their ruler, they carried out their grim work, so that when the red dawn came, a great shout went up, "The land is free indeed." Four years later the survivors of the massacre came to seek revenge accompanied by a mighty Turkish army, which suffered an overwhelming defeat, and in derision the Montenegrins ordered the Turks to ransom every prisoner with a pig—an unclean animal to the followers of Mohammed.

On August 12, 1860, Prince Danilo of Montenegro was assassinated at Cattaro by one of his subjects, whom he had exiled, and his nephew, Nicholas, or Nikita, a boy of eighteen, succeeded him. Danilo had altered the nature of the government. It had been in the hands of Prince Bishops, the succession from 1696 having passed from uncle to nephew in the Petrović family. Danilo wished to marry. Moreover, he had seen what evils might arise from a disputed succession where the ruler was a celibate, and he determined to reign as an ordinary Prince. By a new Code of Laws and other internal reforms he had done a great deal to civilise his wild mountaineers, of which his successor reaped the advantage. Nikita was born at Njeguš on October 7, 1841, and was the son of Mirko, Danilo's brother. Mirko was called the Sword of Montenegro on account of his exploits against the Turks. During the Turkish invasion of the Principality in 1853 he had held 10,000 Turks at bay for nine days with only twenty-one men in the Monastery of Ostrog. He was also a poet, a gift which

he handed on to his son. Within two years of the accession of Nicholas he too was at war with the Turks. The bad government of Turkey in Bosnia and Hercegovina, where the inhabitants were Serbs, was the cause of constant revolts in those two provinces. Naturally the Montenegrins had great sympathy with their kinsmen, and many of them went to their assistance, though they had been forbidden to do so by the Prince. The Turks saw in this an excuse for another attempt to make the Montenegrins acknowledge the Sultan as Suzerain. The Turks first established a strict blockade of the Principality and then attacked it on all sides with an army of 100,000 men against the Montenegrins' 17,000. In order to save his capital Nicholas capitulated, for he realised that his men, brave as they were, were no match for an army trained in modern scientific warfare. The terms of peace were humiliating ones, but European diplomacy prevented the most humiliating from being enforced.

What Nicholas wanted at all costs was peace in order to accomplish the first of his aims, the civilisation of his people. When that had been accomplished he intended to carry out the second ambition of his life, to free the still enslaved branches of the Serbian race. Two other objects of secondary importance were the acquisition of a port on the Adriatic, and the recognition of his independence by the Great Powers; for some of them still held that Montenegro in theory was part of Turkey, although in practice it had been independent for centuries.

Internal reforms were hampered by the poverty of the country, which was not rich enough to supply its own needs, but in spite of difficulties Nicholas accomplished much. A new Code of Laws forbade the blood

feud, and raids and murders on Turkish territory, pastimes which his subjects regarded as a fine form of sport. He founded schools with the help of the Tsar, and made education compulsory. He reorganised the army, equipping it with modern weapons, although even as late as the Balkan War in 1912 the Montenegrins considered that it was cowardly to take cover, so that they suffered terribly from modern artillery. He issued a newspaper at Cetinje, and promoted intercourse with the outside world by all means in his power, welcoming strangers to Cetinje with patriarchal hospitality. He was indeed the father of his people. He knew most of them by name and dispensed justice in person before the palace at Cetinje, being accessible at all times to the poorest of his subjects equally with his ministers. His greatest strength, however, lay in his diplomatic astuteness, although this was to be his ruin in the end. He waited patiently for a favourable opportunity before he wiped off the old score against Turkey, and kept peace in spite of frontier incidents until 1877.

After the Turks had shown that they were powerless to put down the revolt of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1875, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey in 1876. The Montenegrins performed prodigies of valour, and after Russia had joined in, in 1877, they were of inestimable value to the Tsar's army, for they kept an army of 82,000 men fully employed although the total population of Montenegro did not number 200,000, and eventually destroyed it. Nicholas was content as a rule to remain on the defensive within the borders of his own land, and to leave the storming of its mountains to the Turks. His only offensive move was the siege and capture of Nikšić.

At the Congress of Berlin Montenegro gained considerably in territory, although Austrian jealousy deprived her of the inheritance over which she had reasserted her authority by force of arms. Her chief grievance was that she was still cut off from Serbia by the Austrian occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar. She gained two ports, Antibari and Dulcigno, and more important still the plain and town of Podgorica, which had been a wedge of fertile land in the hands of the 'Turks driven into the very heart of the country and practically dividing it in two. Unfortunately the faults of the Prince's character were more obvious as he grew older. His rule was as autocratic as that of any Pasha of old, although he endowed Montenegro with a liberal constitution in 1906. He knew that factions were so bitter that a national Skupština would never hamper his power, and yet he could use it against the chiefs of the Montenegrin tribes if they became refractory. Thus he presided in person over the destruction of the building and machinery belonging to the Opposition newspaper, because it had dared to criticise him. But more serious still was his rivalry with Serbia, for this made him a tool of Austria. In his most famous dramatic work, the *Empress of the Balkans*, he envisaged the union of the Serbs that was to be, but he was determined that that union should take place under him. In 1866 he and Michael had made a pact whereby Nicholas was to stand aside, so that Michael could unite all the Serbs under him, a renunciation which Nicholas always spoke of as his "grand refusal," but he never mentioned the clause which made him Michael's heir, if Michael had no son, a contingency which was almost certain.

When his daughter's husband, Peter Karageorgević, became King of Serbia in 1903, Austria fomented bad feeling between Peter and Nicholas. An individual, called Nastić, accused the Serbian royal family of a plot to blow up Nicholas, while his granddaughter, Princess Helen of Serbia, was actually staying with him. The bombs for the purpose were carried in an ordinary portmanteau to Kotor (Cattaro), where they were discovered. Whether Nicholas planned the whole business in order to discredit the Karageorgević dynasty, or whether Aehrenthal was working to show Europe that Belgrade was a nest of vipers which ought to be crushed is uncertain, but this "bomb outrage" and the shady connection of Nicholas with the trial of some Serbs in Austria, the famous Agram Trials, destroyed his reputation with the Serbs. The Balkan War further extended Montenegrin territory, but Scutari, which had been captured after a long siege, had to be given up to the newly created state of Albania.

During the Great War Nicholas seems to have tried to keep a foot in both camps, but on this subject the evidence is very conflicting. It is, however, a fact that the Lovćen, the supposedly impregnable position which was the key to Montenegro, surrendered very easily to the Austrians on January 11, 1916. One party says that Nicholas betrayed it to the enemy, while another maintains that he had no course but to give it up. Be that as it may, it was an inexcusable act to desert his people in their extremity, and this is what the King did. Instead of sharing their privations he fled to Italy with the Crown Prince, a deed which his subjects never forgave. He spent the rest of his life in exile in France, and died at Antibes on March 1, 1921. He lies

buried at San Remo and his State is no more. The Montenegrins are now governed by Alexander, the King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. He is, however, the son of a Montenegrin Princess, so that he can trace his descent from the Montenegrin heroes of old, and the Petrović dynasty still lives.

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THE LIBERATORS OF SERBIA

“Hark ye—if God permit—neither the Germans, nor the Austrians, nor the Magyars, nor the Turks, nor all the devils of hell can conquer us. Though they cover Kossovo Polje and all our country as thick as lice, yet shall we return from the mountains yonder to slay them!”—*Words of a dying Serb during the Serbian retreat, 1915-16.*¹

FOR three hundred years the Serbian race had been divided and enslaved. The majority lived under Turkish rule in Serbia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina, the rest in Austria, where dwelt also their kinsmen the Croats and the Slovenes. Only in Montenegro a handful of the bravest of the race maintained a precarious independence in the wildest of mountains. At the end of the eighteenth century there had been a war between Austria and Turkey, and by the Treaty of Sistov in 1791 the Austrians had laid down that the Janissaries should no longer be allowed to garrison Belgrade and the other Serbian fortresses. But when Austria's attention was occupied in the West by Napoleon Buonaparte, the Sultan disregarded the treaty he had made and allowed the Janissaries to return in 1799. Their first act was to seize the fortress of Belgrade and murder the Vizir Mustapha, whose rule had been so beneficent that he was called the Mother of the Serbians. Their oppressions were so terrible that their victims continually

¹ Quoted from *The Slavs of the War Zone*, by W. F. Bailey. Kossovo Polje, or field, was the battle in which the Serbian Empire was vanquished by the Turks in 1389.



Photo : Exclusive News Agency.]

KING PETER OF SERBIA.

begged the Sultan to protect them. Finally, the Grand Vizir, acting on these petitions, sent a letter to the captain, threatening that he would despatch a non-Musulman army against him if he did not keep his turbulent troops in check. The Janissaries believed that the Sultan intended to arm the Serbs against them, and promptly deprived them of their leaders by massacring the influential men in each village. A few of the proscribed escaped, among them Kara or Black George, a peasant so illiterate that he could neither read nor write. He possessed, however, the genius of leadership, and in February, 1804, he was chosen Commander-in-Chief of his people, who had risen to avenge the death of their countrymen. So successful was the rebellion that the insurgents began to demand from the Sultan, not only the removal of the Janissaries, but a large measure of self-government as well. In 1807 Russia took them under her protection, when she declared war against Turkey, but in 1812 was obliged to abandon them, owing to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The Tsar made an attempt to safeguard Serbian interests in the Treaty of Bucharest, but in reality the Turks were able to reconquer the country unchecked. By the end of 1813 this had been accomplished and Kara George and the other chieftains fled to Austria.

The rebellion seemed to be over, but on Palm Sunday, 1815, a new leader arose. This was Miloš Todorović Obrenović, who unfurled the Serbian banner under the oak before the Church of Takovo with the words, "Here I am and here is war with the Turks." He, too, was a peasant whose wealth consisted in his herds of swine, but he was a wonderful diplomatist and secured from the Sultan self-government for his people and the grant of

hereditary succession for his own family. As usual the Porte tried to evade the concessions, which Miloš had wrung from it, but Russia came to the rescue and forced the Sultan to grant two Hatti-Sherifs in 1829 and 1830 and a Firman in 1833. These documents made Serbia a semi-independent Principality with a hereditary ruler and an independent Church. The sole rights possessed by the Sultan as Suzerain were the right of maintaining Turkish garrisons in the fortresses and the right to demand tribute. The privileges of Serbia were guaranteed by Russia, who thus became the guardian of the Principality, and as such possessed considerable influence in the country.

The very real benefits which Miloš had won for his people were obscured by his despotic rule. He could brook no rivals and in 1817 connived at or planned the murder of Kara George, when he returned from exile in Austria. From this deed came endless troubles for the new State. It gave Serbia two rival dynasties, the Karageorgević and the Obrenović, and that in its turn led to several revolutions and two assassinations, that of Prince Michael in 1867 and that of King Alexander with his Queen in 1903. In 1835 and 1838 attempts were made to check the despotism of Miloš by means of new Constitutions. The government of Serbia was supposed to be in the hands of a national assembly, the Skupština, which on important occasions comprised the whole nation. Such an unwieldy body could be ignored by an autocratic ruler, so a Senate was established, consisting of seventeen life members, representing the seventeen districts into which Serbia was divided. Miloš had no intention of abiding by the new Constitution, embodied in a Firman of 1838, which came to be

known as the Organic Statute, and he was therefore deposed in 1839. His elder son, Milan, died as soon as he had been proclaimed Prince, and his younger son, Michael, after a short and unsuccessful reign joined his father in exile. Alexander, the son of Black George, was chosen Prince in his stead.

Alexander Karageorgević reigned until 1858, but he was a weak creature, and did little to improve the condition of his country. That he reigned so long was due to the support of Austria, who was intriguing to substitute her own for Russian influence in Serbia. The revolutions of 1848 and 1849 had shown her the possibility of Belgrade as the centre of the Southern Slav race, and the danger of that ideal for the continuance of her own rule over the Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs within her empire. Hence as far back as 1850 can be traced the beginnings of the policy which culminated in the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914. In 1858 Alexander was deposed in his turn, for his subjects disliked his subservience to Austria and had not forgiven him for refusing to fight for Russia during the Crimean War. Miloš, therefore, returned to Serbia at the beginning of 1859, thus fulfilling the prophecy he had made when he had been driven out—that he would die as the reigning Prince of Serbia. The following year he died and his son Michael succeeded him. He was one of the ablest rulers in Balkan history, and thanks to him Serbia obtained a civilised form of government, by a thorough reorganisation of all branches of the administration, the establishment of swift and impartial justice, and the creation of a small regular army.

The great achievement of his reign was the final liberation of Serbian soil from the Turk. The fortresses,

including Belgrade, were still garrisoned by Turkish soldiers. In June, 1862, riots broke out in the capital as the result of the murder of two Serbians by two Turks. The Prince was absent, but his Prime Minister had already taken steps to ensure the restoration of order, when the Turkish Governor turned the guns of the citadel on the city and bombarded it for five hours. This act of fanaticism enabled the Prince to secure the removal of all Turks in Belgrade, except the actual garrison of the fortress. Further, two fortresses which menaced communication between Serbia and Montenegro were to be dismantled. But Michael was not satisfied, and by dint of skilful diplomacy the Turks were brought to agree to the evacuation of the fortresses on condition that the Turkish flag should wave side by side with the Serbian from the ramparts of the citadel of Belgrade. His final claim to greatness rests on his foreign policy. He projected a vast plan of Southern Slav union, and formed a forerunner of the Balkan League of 1912. Michael intended to unite Serbians and Bulgars under his rule, and therefore laid the foundations of a Bulgarian rising. He entered into a close alliance with Montenegro, and sought to draw Greece and Rumania into that alliance. It is doubtful whether his plans would ever have been put into practice, but all his schemes were cut short by his assassination on June 10, 1868. As he was walking in the wooded hills near his capital, where the summer palace of the Serbian Kings now is, he was shot by three murderers, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. If it was the result of a Karageorgević plot it failed of its object, for Michael's nephew succeeded him, and the Obrenovićs held the throne until 1903, when the last

of them was murdered and the Karageorgević line restored.

The grandson of Kara George was a very different man from his weak father, Alexander. Peter Karageorgević had spent most of his life in exile, for he was only fourteen when his father was deposed, and when he ascended the throne in 1903 he was nearly sixty. His path to the throne was over the dead bodies of a murdered King and Queen, Alexander and Draga. The last of the Obrenović line deserved his fate, and by his death the murder of Black George was finally avenged. The murder was a brutal one, and sent a thrill of horror throughout pre-war Europe, unused to horrors. The unfortunate victims were hunted through the rooms of their palace, stabbed and shot to death, and their bodies thrown out of one of the windows into the garden. But in Belgrade not a voice was raised for the murdered man, and Serbia breathed a sigh of relief when the deed was done. She thereupon summoned Peter to be her King, although Russia, alone of the Powers, recognised his accession.

Through all the vicissitudes of his life, Peter had clung fast to his belief in the Serbian people and their destiny. He was born in 1844 at the old Palace of Belgrade, and both his father and mother came of peasant ancestry. In exile they lived in Hungary and later in Vienna, and sent their son to be educated at the Military Academy of St. Cyr in Paris. He fought for France against Germany in 1870, and on one occasion he, a young lieutenant, and a sergeant were taken prisoner. They escaped during the night and he reached the French lines by swimming the Loire with the sergeant, who could not swim, on his back. For valour in the field he

received the Legion of Honour, and there is no doubt that he could have obtained French help against Prince Obrenović, who then occupied the throne of Serbia, but that he was unwilling to risk the peace of his country on any vague chance of success. His next exploit was to join the revolt of Bosnia and Hercegovina against Turkey. Austria, fearing that he would oust Milan, whose policy she was able to control, put a price on his head, while Milan hired assassins to murder him, and the Turks searched for him through the Bosnian forests. He escaped, however, after twenty months of guerilla fighting, through Croatia and the Austrian Tirol to Switzerland. There he lived from 1877 to 1903 in extreme poverty, even after his marriage to Zorka, the daughter of Nicholas of Montenegro. He was initiated into the ranks of the Socialists and is said to have had a seat at Geneva in the secret conclave, where Lenin drew up his plans against the day when he should be ruler of Russia. The only work Peter could do for his country during these years was to attempt to educate the Serbian people. He translated English and French classics into the Serbian language, so that his land might become acquainted with the masterpieces of Western civilisation.

Such was the man who was called to rule Serbia in 1903. His answer to the question whether he would accept the Serbian crown was, "Only if I may wear it as the president of a peasant's republic." His country needed reform in every direction. His chief creative work was the settlement of the agrarian question. Each peasant became the actual possessor of the land he worked. He would have done much more, but Austria gave him no rest. She barred the way to the sea and prohibited the export of Serbian cattle. Next, in 1909,

came the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, ancient Serbian territory, for which Peter would have fought, but for the fact that he was powerless without allies, and Russia was helpless after the Japanese War. Then came an explosion which Austria was powerless to prevent. The Balkan Alliance was formed in spite of her and resulted in the Balkan War and the defeat of the Turks. A second campaign was directed against Bulgaria, the recalcitrant ally, and Serbian territory was doubled at the Peace of Bucharest in 1913. Hence in defiance of Austrian efforts dating from 1849 greater Serbia had come into being and the time was therefore ripe for vengeance. An excuse was found in the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by Austrian Serbs at Sarajevo, the beautiful capital of Bosnia, set like a jewel in the midst of mountains with its bazaars and mosques full of a strange Eastern atmosphere. The Ultimatum of July, 1914, was despatched. Peter determined to accept its terms, rather than plunge his country into war, even though such an act of humiliation might cost him his throne. Serbia agreed to all the conditions save one—that Austrian officials should take part in the inquiry into the circumstances of the Archduke's death, and into the extent of anti-Austrian propaganda in Serbia. Austria thereupon broke off diplomatic relations. Peter appealed to Russia in his extremity and the Great War began.

Just across the river Save, which bounds the city of Belgrade on the west, lay the Austrian guns. The Serbs had had little time since the Balkan Wars to renew military stores and were lacking in all reserves except courage. Belgrade was bombarded and taken on December 2, 1914, but by the 15th the impossible had

happened. A victorious Serbian advance led by Peter in person drove them out again. Next autumn the Seckt-Mackensen offensive began, while Bulgaria stabbed Serbia in the back. Hence the country was lost. Never did a ruler rise to greater heights than this peasant King at the moment of his people's direst need. He gave up the royal power into the younger hands of his son, the present King Alexander, who was declared Regent, and stayed with his soldiers, sharing all their hardships. His speech, when resistance was known to be hopeless, might have come from the pages of Homer.

"Heroes, you have taken two oaths: one to me, your King, and one to your country. From the first I release you, for the situation is far too grave to justify me, an old man on the edge of the grave, in holding you to it. From the oath to your country no man can release you. But I promise you that if you decide to return to your homes, and if fortune favours our cause, you shall not be made to suffer. But whether you go or stay, I and my sons remain here."

The response of his soldiers was the same that met the greatest of the Serbian Tsars of old, Stepan Dušan-- "Whither thou leadest us, most glorious Tsar, we will follow thee." Peter led them in the terrible winter retreat through the Albanian mountains. He had refused to escape while there was time, and amid its horrors he grew deaf, almost blind, but still he went on, on foot after the oxen had fallen exhausted and finally carried on a rough litter. At Salonika he refused to leave the remnants of his army, and at last shared in the great advance, which won back not only his own kingdom, but the old Serbian lands as well. The

prophecy was fulfilled. "Years of terror draw nigh, and so cruel shall their ravages become in our land that the living shall envy the dead their happiness in their graves; yet thereafter a time reveals itself, which will send into the graves the cry of longing: Oh, ye dead, why are ye not still alive?"¹

Three years later Peter died in the Palace of Belgrade. His life was the epitome of his beloved country, a country which in the Great War suffered more than any other, but which bore that suffering without complaining, upheld by the faith that the day of liberation was at hand. Bosnia, Hercegovina, Montenegro, part of Dalmatia, Old Serbia, and the kindred folk across the Save and the Danube, the Croats and Slovenes and the Serbs of Hungary were united under his sway. And so his tomb bears the simple inscription, "Peter Karageorgević, the Great Liberator."

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¹ M. Harden, *My Contemporaries*, p. 212.

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